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ABSTRACT 
The suffering that initially prompts ethical reflection is frequently forgotten in the generalised 
rational response of much contemporary International Relations theory.  This thesis draws on 
Theodor W. Adorno and Gillian Rose to propose an alternative approach to suffering in world 
politics. 
 
Adorno argues suffering and trauma play a key role in the task of enlightening Enlightenment.  
They emphasise the concrete particularity of human existence in a way that is radically 
challenging to Enlightenment thought.  Understanding suffering helps to drive a negative 
dialectics that preserves the non-identical (that which cannot be understood, manipulated or 
controlled by reason), holding it up against the instrumentalism and abstraction that have 
prevented Enlightenment thought from fulfilling its promise. 
 
Part One reviews contemporary approaches to international ethics in a way that draws out 
their affinity with the Enlightenment thought Adorno criticises.  Despite their variety, liberal 
and Habermasian approaches to international ethics tend to be rational and problem-solving, 
to assume moral progress, to underestimate the importance of history and culture, and to 
neglect inner lives.  They approach ethics in a way that pays too little attention to the social, 
historical, and cultural antecedents of suffering and therefore promotes solutions that, whilst 
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in some ways inspiring, are too disconnected from the suffering they seek to address to be 
effective in practice. 
 
Part Two deepens the critique of modern ethics through an exposition of Adorno's work.  It 
then draws on Adorno's conception of promise, Rose's writing on mourning and political risk, 
and a broader literature on ways of working through trauma to propose an alternative way of 
being in the world with ethical and political implications.  I advocate a neo-Hegelian work of 
mourning, which deepens understanding of the complexities of violence and informs a 
difficult, tentative, anxiety-ridden taking of political risk in pursuit of a good enough justice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Violence and suffering are rife in global politics.  In this thesis, I examine and critique the 
normative responses to suffering in mainstream and critical international political thought.  I 
argue that ethical reflection in International Relations is prompted by global suffering, but the 
suffering that initially prompts reflection is forgotten in the generalised, rational response.  I 
draw on the thought of Theodor W. Adorno and Gillian Rose to suggest an alternative way of 
thinking about and responding to violence and suffering.  Unless traumatic experiences are 
worked through, they trigger either withdrawal from political engagement or a search for 
revenge and further violence.  I advocate mourning and critical reflection in response to 
trauma and suffering to enable social and political reengagement in life.  Such a response is a 
significant shift in focus from mainstream responses to violence, which skim over past and 
present suffering in an attempt to legislate a halt to cycles of violence; instead, it 
acknowledges the historical and structural antecedents of present realities, allowing space for 
grieving and reflection rather than rushing too quickly to solutions.    
Modern International Ethics and its Weaknesses 
In the early years of International Relations, a realist paradigm dominated the field.  Realist 
thinkers such as E. H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau perceived the international system as 
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oriented always towards self-preservation and counselled prudence in political judgement.  
Where morality was discussed,1 it was tempered with a strong pessimism with regard to the 
possibility of social learning and self-interest was assumed always to be at the heart of state 
action.  Such thinkers maintained that international politics were irredeemably tragic and 
therefore unable to make steady progress towards the good.  Any belief to the contrary was 
not only ill-judged but actively dangerous, masking self-interest with humanitarian intent.2 
 
The normative turn in International Relations emerged in recent decades as a desire to do 
something in response to the atrocities of modern world politics and, unlike realism, has 
belief in moral progress through rational argument at its core.3  The normative voices that 
sound loudest are human rights discourse and the global justice movement.  The human rights 
regime developed in reaction to the carnage of World War II, when citizens had no legal 
justification for disobeying state orders that they thought to be morally wrong.4  After the 
Holocaust, the cry never again prompted legal response in an effort to provide the normative 
guidelines that the international system lacked and in the hope of preventing future horrors.  
Global justice literature emerged somewhat later in the context of opposition to the Vietnam 
                                                
1 As indeed it was, contrary to the popular understanding of political realism.  See, for example, Nicholas J. 
Rengger, Tragedy or Skepticism? Defending the Anti-Pelagian Mind in World Politics, International Relations, 
Vol. 19, No. 3 (2005), pp. 321-328; Richard Ned Lebow, The Tragic Vision of World Politics: Ethics, Interests, 
and Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003); William E. Scheuerman, Realism and the Left: the 
case of Hans J. Morgenthau, Review of International Studies, Vol. 34, No. 1 (2008), pp. 29-51.  
2 See, for example, Carl Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, trans. George Schwab (ed.), forward by Tracy B. 
Strong (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), p. 54.  Schmitt is particularly wary of wars fought in the 
name of progress and humanity, saying that these inevitably involve the denigration and dehumanization of the 
enemy. 
3 Of course, security still remains the key goal of states: both internally and externally, and normative 
interventions in world politics are rarely, if ever, purely altruistic or without an eye to self-interest.  
4 Michael Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, A. Gutman (ed.) (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2001), pp. 4-5. 
3 
 
War.  Debates regarding the ethics of force paved the way for more general questions about 
justice, both domestic and international.   
 
This thesis argues that a normative turn in International Relations theory was necessary in the 
face of global suffering, bringing attention to issues that had been obscured by a focus on 
security.  However, these normative responses have fallen primarily within a too narrow 
conception of ethics, one that draws heavily on a Rawlsian liberalism with justice at its core.  
This liberal conception of ethics places heavy emphasis on a particular way of knowing 
(positivist and rational) and a particular way of approaching ethical questions (problem-
solving and forward-looking) and is problematic in a number of ways.  I draw on Raymond 
Geusss helpful characterisation of modern ethics in my critique of international political 
thought, and argue that both the normative and (to a lesser extent) critical turn in International 
Relations theory share these modern characteristics.   
 
Geuss maintains that modern Western ethical thought has a kind of elective affinity with 
Kantian thought in prioritising rational knowledge and universal moral guidelines.5  The type 
of knowledge that is central to modern ethical thought is useful knowledge: knowledge that 
generates empirically verifiable facts about how the world works and general principles that 
can be used to make predictions and rationally prescribe action.  This technical knowledge 
influences ethical thought in turn.  The central ethical question can be summarised as What 
                                                
5 Geuss cites Kants three questions, the answers to which comprise the whole of human interest: What can I 
know? What ought I to do? What may I hope for? and argues that modern thought asks very similar questions 
(although he makes no argument for their direct influence).  Raymond Geuss, Outside Ethics (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 2-3. 
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ought we to do?  The response generates some set of universal laws or rules or principles; in 
particular, a set of universal laws on which we would all agree (under some further 
specified circumstance).6  The ought of What ought we to do? is an abstract, rational 
ought; it is a generalisable ought that is universally applicable, seeks to restrict subjective 
judgment, and takes the struggle out of making judgments by prescribing clear guidelines for 
action.  Geuss argues that this approach to ethical thought is problematic, closing off whole 
avenues of thought for consideration.  In particular, abstract social contract methods do not 
encourage consideration of history or politics, and there is little or no room for contingency.  
The central ethical question is what Geuss terms the first pillar of modern ethics.  The second 
pillar is a sort of immanentism, a restriction of thought to that which can be fully known, 
observed, measured, and predicted, and a dismissal of that which is outside our full 
comprehension. 
 
Geuss advocates a critical theory that steps outside generally accepted beliefs about how the 
world works.7  Such an approach is necessarily more complex than the modern liberal 
approach.  It does not propose definitive guidelines about how we should behave but instead 
proposes a different way of thinking about ethics, an approach that falls outside [modern] 
ethics.  In outlining this approach, Guess draws on the nineteenth and early twentieth-century 
Central European approach of standing outside mainstream ethics adopted by such thinkers as 
Hegel, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, and Adorno:  
                                                
6 Geuss, Outside Ethics, p. 3. 
7 Geuss, Outside Ethics, p. 7. 
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Continental philosophers reject either one or the other (or both) of the two pillars of 
contemporary ethics.  As far as the first pillar is concerned, they take one or another 
of a variety of weaker or stronger views.  Thus, they cast doubt on the centrality of 
the ethical question, holding the weaker view that knowing What ought I to do? is 
of distinctly subordinate importance in practical life, or that it is not a philosophically 
significant question.  Alternatively, they hold the stronger view that it is actually a 
deep mistake or a failing to ask that question (at any rate, as a philosophical 
question).  The second pillar of contemporary ethics is a kind of immanentism.  
Enlightenment Reason is an immanent category; Heideggers Angst and Hegels 
Vernuft are not.8   
Philosophers who fall outside ethics are concerned that modern ethics has become absorbed 
with reacting to that which is immediate.  Asking What ought we to do? in response to 
contemporary problems blinds individuals to other considerations.  Similarly, the focus on 
reason forecloses contemplation of such non-immanent concepts as those mentioned above 
and, as I will expand on later in the thesis, Adornos concept of promise.9  An approach to 
suffering that falls outside ethics is more embedded in social and historical context, looking 
beyond the immediacy of present suffering to antecedent historical events and underlying 
deep structures.  It also considers a much broader range of human motivation than the rational 
persuasion of modern ethics, including factors such as imagination, emotion, and culture that 
are more traditionally the province of art, psychoanalysis, and literature.10   
                                                
8Geuss, Outside Ethics, pp. 59-60.  Geuss describes Hegels Vernuft as a way of perceiving the world in which 
common sense, everyday rationality, the formal rationality of mathematics, and scientific rationality are left 
behind, and other ways of knowing are explored (p. 52).  Heideggers Angst refers to the experience of extreme 
anxiety in the face of my own death that can bring me to see life and the world as a whole from an infinite 
distance, and to realise that everyday life is deranged and delusional because inherently constituted by a denial of 
this anxiety and what it reveals (p. 58).  
9 Adornos notion of promise is utopian hope in the possibility of absolute reconciliation, a negation of the bleak 
reality of modern life that points to something better to come.    
10 Scholars who fall outside (modern) ethics come from a variety of theoretical backgrounds, including the 
early Frankfurt School of critical theory, poststructuralism, feminism, and psychoanalysis.   A case might also be 
made for certain strands of classical realism as also falling outside ethics, because of their emphasis on a wider 
range of human motivation (as, for example, in the work of Hans Morgenthau and Carl Schmitt). 
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Geuss situates himself in the early Frankfurt School tradition of critical theory and has much 
in common with critical International Relations scholars.  His critique of liberal ethics recalls 
Robert Coxs famous distinction between problem-solving and critical theory.11  Cox 
borrowed the distinction from Max Horkheimers essay Traditional and Critical Theory.12   
He argues that problem-solving theory takes the world as it is and looks for ways of 
understanding and predicting patterns of social and institutional behaviour so as to better fix 
problems within the given order.  In contrast, critical theory problematises the given order, 
taking into account how it came about and proposing strategic rather than tactical responses.13  
Like Geuss, Coxs critical theory emphasises social and historical awareness and contingency.  
However, he perceives the world from a neo-Gramscian tradition, which does not challenge 
problem-solving theory as fundamentally as the Frankfurt School.14 
 
My approach, like Geusss, falls broadly within the tradition of the early Frankfurt School.15  
The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research was established in 1923 with the purpose of being 
                                                
11 Robert W. Cox, Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1981), pp. 126-155. 
12 Horkheimers essay was first published in the Zeitschrift fur Sozial Forschung (the journal of the Frankfurt 
Institute for Social Research, which he directed at the time) as Traditionelle und kritische theorie, Zeitschrift fur 
Sozial Forschung Vol. 6, No. 2 (1937), pp. 245-94.  It is republished as Traditional and Critical Theory, in 
Craig Calhoun, Joseph Gerteis, James Moody, Steven Pfaff, and Indermohan Virk (eds.), Classical Sociological 
Theory, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 304-318. 
13 Cox, Social Forces, States and World Orders; Robert W. Cox, Production, Power, and World Order: Social 
Forces in the Making of History, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987). 
14 Gramscis project of socialist revolution challenged the class relations of capitalism but not the more 
fundamental structures of Enlightenment thought (instrumentalism, reason, progress) challenged by Adorno. 
15 Geuss, Outside Ethics, p. 9.  Early critical theory has much to offer international political thought, but has been 
under-explored in International Relations, where the major critical theoretical influence is the (more liberal) 
Jürgen Habermas.  See Chapter One of this thesis for an exposition of Habermasian international political 
thought.   
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an autonomous research institute, largely independent of the government and the academy.  
Three themes are central to its critical theory: modernity, epistemology, and emancipation.  
Critical theorists maintain that the Enlightenment project has been usurped by an obsession 
with instrumental rationality; progress has brought new means of enslavement rather than 
the promised liberation.  The Frankfurt Schools concern with modernity has led to a rejection 
of traditional positivist assumptions.  Positivists maintain that there is an objective reality that 
may be discovered through empirical means and fail to reflect upon or question established 
structures.  In contrast, critical theorists maintain that theory is highly situated in social 
tradition and historical processes and do not accept the inevitability of the status quo.  They 
utilise the method of immanent critique to address the shortcomings of the prevailing order, 
maintaining that it is impossible to critically assess established political and social structures 
with reference to an objective ethical framework or truth.  Instead, they criticise the 
contemporary political order with reference to the guidelines set forth by its own laws, 
institutions, and embedded practices.  Not content with questioning the prevailing order, 
however, critical theories pursue an emancipatory agenda that promotes the transformation 
of the dominant system to redress its gross injustices.16    
 
                                                
16 This emancipatory agenda takes different forms in different critical theories.  For Habermas, emancipation is a 
process of transcending systemic distortions of communication (for example, where consensus has been coerced) 
through a process of critical reflection and dialogue. For Adorno, in contrast, emancipation is less concretely 
achievable and points beyond the immediate and rational to the utopian hope that things might yet get better, 
keeping despair at bay in the midst of bleak reality.  For a survey of the different emancipatory strategies 
conceived of by contemporary critical International Relations theorists, see Nicholas Rengger and Ben Thirkell-
White (eds.), Critical International Relations Theory After 25 Years (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2007).  
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From this tradition, then, I argue that an abstract problem-solving orientation to ethical 
thought is problematic for four interrelated reasons.  First, it neglects consideration of history 
and cultural context, abstracting from particularity and maintaining that in a neutral situation 
general guidelines for behaviour are able to be reached.  This ignores historical grievances and 
assumes that humanity starts from a place of equality.17  Second, mainstream normative 
thought is built on a strong assumption of moral progress, an assumption that can lead to 
complacency and mask the continuation of more subtle forms of suffering.  Third, it has a 
particular take on power and politics, where politics refers primarily to the day-to-day 
operation of state political systems, and it ignores the political, that is, the broad and deep 
production of social order.  By focusing on the realm of politics, a mainstream approach 
ignores questions of systems and power and has limited tools for political change.  Last, it 
shuts down alternative ways of thinking and acting outside the given political order.  The 
focus on rationality forecloses contemplation of non-immanent concepts such as Adornos 
notion of promise and Benjamins utopianism: concepts that allow the imagining of a different 
world and, therefore, prevent us from sliding into despair.  It also forecloses contemplation of 
the inner lives of individuals and communities; making discussion of emotions and trauma 
taboo and irrelevant to international politics.18 
                                                
17 Global justice theories that emphasise redistribution and reparations are less abstract than human rights based 
approaches in this regard, taking historical and social factors into account. 
18 This is changing, both at a grassroots level and in international political thought.  Richard F. Mollica, 
psychiatrist and director of the Harvard Program in Refugee Trauma, notes that in the 1980s, he was denied an 
appointment with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees because he firmly believed that refugee 
did not have emotional problems or psychological distress associated with their displacement and homeless 
state.  See Richard F. Mollica, Healing Invisible Wounds: Paths to Hope and Recovery in a Violent World 
(Orlando, Florida: Harcourt Books, 2006), p. 5.  However, there is now widespread acknowledgement of the 
trauma that accompanies displacement and psychosocial programmes are commonplace (although this is often 
accompanied by a worrying depoliticisationsee Vanessa Pupavac, Pathologizing Populations and Colonising 
Minds: International Psychosocial Programs in Kosovo, Alternatives, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2002), pp. 489-511).  For a 
9 
 
An Alternative Approach to Ethics 
The second part of the thesis points to a different way of thinking about suffering in world 
politics, attempting to avoid the pitfalls of contemporary international ethics.  To do this, I 
draw upon the thought of Theodor W. Adorno and Gillian Rose.  Adorno became one of the 
Frankfurt Schools most prominent intellectuals during the mid-twentieth century.  His 
writings are notoriously complex and cover a wide range of subject matter: aesthetics, 
musicology, sociology, cultural studies, literature, and philosophy.  He has come under 
criticism for having little to offer political thought or ethics; however his work is infused with 
ethical sensibility and a concern with suffering is central to his thought.  I draw on Adornos 
work to deepen my critique of modern ethics.  He is deeply critical of the type of knowledge 
with which Enlightenment ideals are pursued, pointing to the dehumanisation and 
homogenisation that accompanies an obsession with instrumental rationality.  He argues that 
the task of the critical intellectual is to preserve alternatives to the status quo, drawing 
attention to particular suffering as a counter to notions of inevitable progress, but also to the 
notion of promise as a counter to the distressing realities of modernity.  Adorno was 
influential in the development of Gillian Roses thought; indeed, his writings were the subject 
of her doctorate and first book.  Roses works have occasioned some attention in literary, 
sociological and historical circles but little, if any, attention in international political theory.  
She places brokenness and struggle at the centre of her thought, emphasising the need to 
acknowledge and work through human suffering alongside the need for political engagement.  
                                                                                                                                                   
consideration of emotion in international thought, see Karin Fierke, Whereof We Can Speak, Thereof We Must 
Not Be Silent: Trauma, Political Solipsism and War, Review of International Studies, Vol. 30, No. 4 (2004), pp. 
471-491; and Neta Crawford, The Passions of World Politics: Propositions on Emotions and Emotional 
Relationships, International Security, Vol. 24, No. 4 (2001), pp. 116-56. 
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Both thinkers were profoundly influenced by their readings of Hegel, whose speculative 
dialectics offer a means of critiquing both Enlightenment and postmodern thought and point to 
a means of negotiating such binary opposites as particular and universal, finite and infinite. 
 
Drawing on the work of both thinkers, but especially Rose, I propose a different way of 
thinking about suffering in international political thought, an approach I term speculative.19  
I do not attempt to build an alternative ethics with concrete suggestions for change; instead, I 
offer a different way of responding to suffering, a way of thinking and being with political 
ramifications.  Such a sensibility would lead international political thought in four different 
directions.  First, it would hold together a consideration of particular and universal, reflection 
and action: listening to the stories of individuals and communities that are suffering, whilst 
also taking the risk of action on behalf of many in the pursuit of a good enough justice.20  
Second, it would encourage a deeper knowledge of history and social context.  It would look 
beyond the immediacy of present suffering to antecedent historical events and underlying 
deep structures.  It would acknowledge the necessity of mourning and working through past 
traumas that restrict the exercise of political imagination and action.  Third, it would 
acknowledge that the world is full of tragedy and that although moral progress is possible, it is 
                                                
19 My notion of speculative thought is drawn from Adorno and Roses readings of Hegel and offers a way of 
negotiating binary opposites without privileging one category over the other.  It insists both on attention to 
particular suffering and wider reflection on the broad social processes that facilitated that suffering.  Speculative 
thought also has a non-immanent dimension that points to a utopian hope in future transformation.  See Chapters 
Three and Four of this thesis for a discussion of Hegels influence on the development of Adorno and Roses 
thought.  For a broadly similar reading of Hegel, see also Kimberly Hutchings, Hegel and Feminist Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), particularly Chapter Two: Philosophy as the Task of Comprehension.   
20 Gillian Rose, Loves Work (London: Vintage, 1995), pp. 115-116.  
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also fragile and reversible.21  However, alongside an awareness of persistent suffering under 
modernity, it would not dismiss the possibility of moral learning and thus abandon itself to 
despair, but instead dare to hope that we might yet succeed.22  Fourth, it would acknowledge 
that to engage politically is to take risk: there are no quick-fix solutions to the brokenness and 
sufferings of our modern world, and any action should be subject to evaluation and subsequent 
adjustment in the light of its inevitably unexpected consequences.   
Brief Outline of Chapters 
In Part One of the thesis, I point to the limitations of established mainstream and critical 
approaches to thinking about violence in suffering in International Relations.  Chapter One 
traces the normative turn in International Relations theory, with a particular focus on global 
justice and human rights literature as the loudest moral voices in world politics.  I argue that 
both approaches fall within a modern conception of ethics (in Geusss terms) or problem-
solving theory (in Coxs terms): they assume a particular type of knowledge of the world, and 
seek to articulate a universally applicable set of moral demands that would create an idealised 
future.  The normative turn is motivated by human suffering, but attention to suffering is lost 
in the attempt to prescribe rational guidelines for a better world.  It is also predicated on a 
strong assumption of moral progress, which overestimates the ease of creating positive change 
and encourages complacency in the knowledge that something is being done.  Such an 
                                                
21 For a non-emancipatory critique of moral progress, see Nicholas Rengger on the anti-Pelagian stance which 
[does] not believe that there is a man-made short cut to heaven and [maintains] that the beginning of political 
wisdom is to see this and accept it (Rengger, Tragedy or Skepticism?, p. 326).   
22 Theodor W. Adorno, The Experiential Content of Hegels Philosophy, in Theodor W. Adorno, Hegel: Three 
Studies, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 68. 
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approach is short-sighted and limited, neglecting consideration of past and present suffering 
and the historical and structural processes that facilitated the suffering.    
 
Disaffection with the normative turn in International Relations has encouraged a number of 
international political theorists to challenge the status quo from broadly critical traditions such 
as the Frankfurt School of critical theory and poststructuralism.  In Chapter Two, I trace the 
way in which these traditions think about violence and suffering in global politics.  The first 
part of the chapter focuses on the thought of second and third generation political theorists in 
the tradition of the Frankfurt School: Jürgen Habermas, Andrew Linklater, Seyla Benhabib, 
and Nancy Fraser.  I argue that although these thinkers question many of the assumptions of 
contemporary ethical thought and acknowledge the ambiguities of modernity, the limitations 
of problem-solving theory remain, albeit to a lesser extent.  They continue to be wedded to a 
strong version of moral progress, the pursuit of emancipation through widening dialogic 
communities encourages an emphasis on procedure and rational decision-making, and the 
attempt to delineate conditions for a better future precludes attention to past and present 
horrors, which may make rational discussion difficult or even impossible.23  The second part 
of the chapter examines and critiques poststructural international political thought, drawing in 
particular on the work of Jenny Edkins, David Campbell and Vivienne Jabri.  These theorists 
have a greater sensitivity to human suffering and the fragility of moral progress under 
modernity and provide a more convincing critique of mainstream ethics.  However, in 
                                                
23 One of the markers of trauma is that traumatic experiences are unable to be assimilated into already-existing 
categories; they are too far outside the normal realm of experience.  As a result, it takes time and work in order to 
reconstruct the traumatic experience, and its retelling is often accompanied by altered emotional, psychological, 
and physical states that make rational argumentation of the sort advocated by Habermasian theorists an 
extraordinarily difficult task.  
13 
 
dismantling established hierarchies such as public and private, universal and particular, 
identity and difference, there is a tendency for poststructural thought to overemphasise the 
formerly neglected side of the pair.  This can lead to a focus on personal experiences of 
suffering and mourning to the detriment of public and institutional experiences and means of 
working through.  
 
In Part Two of the thesis, I turn from the exposition and critique of established normative and 
critical literatures in International Relations to the articulation of a different way of thinking 
about violence and suffering in world politics.  I advocate a reinvigoration of critical theory in 
the tradition of the early Frankfurt School, drawing on the work of Adorno and Rose.  These 
thinkers fall outside the modern conception of ethics, yet hold fast to Enlightenment ideals.  
They are profoundly influenced by a negative dialectical (Adorno) and speculative (Rose) 
reading of Hegel, which insists that understanding must be socially and historically situated 
and offers a means of negotiating binary opposites.  A critical theory in this tradition rejects a 
strong conception of moral progress, but does not reject the notion of progress entirely, 
recognising its fragility whilst holding fast to its possibility.  It draws attention to particular 
suffering, but encourages public forms of working through alongside the private.  It 
encourages giving voice to suffering, both as part of the process of bearing witness to hidden 
atrocities and injustice and in order to encourage critical reflection on the structures and 
practices that facilitated them.   
 
In Chapter Three, I deepen my critique of liberal ethics through a discussion of Adornos 
writings on suffering and hope.  Adorno is critical of the instrumental rationality of 
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Enlightenment thought, which abstracts from particular experiences and leaves little room for 
imagining an alternative world.  He draws attention to suffering in its raw, bodily form, 
reintroducing a humanity that he perceives as lacking in modernity.  He also points to an 
unformed, utopian hope of a better world than that offered by modernity; a promise that he 
sees glimpses of but that remains essentially negative,24 leaving his insights as a message in a 
bottle for future generations.25  In Chapter Four, I turn to Rose, who takes up this message 
and fleshes out a way of being in the world that moves forward from a negative Adornian 
position without prescribing a blueprint for action.  Her two-fold response to what she terms 
the disasters of modernity26 is one of mourning and political risk.  First, we must mourn the 
actual and existential traumas of modernity,27 where mourning involves the critical 
remembering of the past, expression of pain, and self-examination.  Rose warns that if traumas 
are not worked through, it can have political consequences as those who have suffered 
experience resentment, hatred, inability to trust, and then, the doubled burden of fear of those 
negative emotions.28  As well as looking to past traumas as a key to understanding the 
present, we must also take the risk of acting politically.  Political action is undertaken realising 
that this life is inherently flawed and that any attempt to heal the present will at best only 
partially succeed.  However, we have a responsibility to stay with the brokenness of the 
                                                
24 Adornos notion of promise is negative in the sense of not putting forth a positive description of what an ideal 
world might look like.  It points to the non-identical: that which cannot be subsumed into known categories or 
concepts, and in doing so, offers a critique of society that refuses to confirm or reproduce what is criticised. 
25 This quote appears to be apocryphal.   
26 Rose, Loves Work, p. 120. 
27 A note on agency: Roses notion of mourning operates on a number of levels, but is primarily a communal one 
that operates at state and civil societal levels.  See Howard Caygill, The Broken Hegel: Gillian Roses Retrieval 
of Speculative Philosophy, Women: A Cultural Review, Vol. 9, No. 1 (1998), pp. 19-27. 
28 Gillian Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law: Philosophy and Representation (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), p. 51. 
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present and to engage with it: attempting to move forward, making mistakes, learning from 
them, and trying again. 
 
In the final two chapters of the thesis, I apply the insights gained from Adorno and Roses 
thought to international political theory.  In Chapter Five, I apply Roses twofold response of 
mourning and political risk to the experience of trauma in global politics.  I focus on the 
experience of trauma, in part because trauma is inextricably linked with violence, the 
traditional preoccupation of International Relations.  Trauma is very often caused by violent 
events, and, unless properly worked through, can prompt further violence in efforts to 
establish security or to wreak revenge.  Trauma also points to the cracks in modernity, 
providing an opportunity for critical reflection and re-evaluation.  According to Adorno, pain 
tells our knowledge that suffering ought not to be, that things should be different.29  If we 
fail to give voice to suffering, we miss opportunities to reflect upon how it came about and 
how things might be different.  Thus, any response to the brokenness of modernity needs to 
have consideration of violence and trauma at its core.  In the Conclusion, I revisit the 
limitations of liberal and poststructural ethics and show how a speculative approach, drawn 
from the writings of Adorno and Rose, addresses these limitations and offers a different 
analysis of and response to suffering in global politics.  I then gesture towards two other 
applications of this approach: first, exploring the ways in which it speaks to the issue of 
displaced persons and asylum seekers, and second, broadening the discussion beyond concrete 
disasters of modernity to a more general enlightening of Enlightenment through (childhood) 
education.  
                                                
29 Theodor W. Adorno, Negative Dialectics, trans. E. B. Ashton (London: Routledge, 1973), p. 203. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE NORMATIVE TURN IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
The normative turn in global politics emerged in response to the worst excesses of modernity: 
human rights were enshrined in international law after the horrors of World War II and the 
Holocaust;1 global justice debates (re)emerged in the wake of leftist political uprisings in protest 
against the follies of Cold War hubris.2  Both were practical attempts to do something to fix 
problems that were becoming progressively more difficult to ignore in an increasingly globalised 
                                                
1 See, for example, Jack Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, 2nd ed. (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 2003); Tim Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler (eds.), Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1999); David P. Forsythe, Human Rights and World Politics, 2nd ed. (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1989); Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry; Margaret E. Keck and 
Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics (New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1998); William Korey, NGOs and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Hampshire: 
Macmillan Press Ltd, 1998); Austin Sarat and Thomas R. Kearns (eds.), Human Rights: Concepts, Contests, 
Contingencies (Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 2001); Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, 
and U. S. Foreign Policy, 2nd edition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996); Raymond John Vincent, Human 
Rights and International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987); Jeremy Waldron, Liberal 
Rights: collected papers 1981-1991 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993). 
2 Global justice debates have a long, but often neglected history: Charles Beitz cites David Hume, Adam Smith, 
Henry Sidgwick and John Stuart Mill as among those who considered the morality of global issues such as foreign 
trade, immigration, and imperialism.  See Charles Beitz, Cosmopolitanism and Global Justice, The Journal of 
Ethics, Vol. 9, No. 1-2 (2005), pp. 11-27.  See also Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979, 2nd ed., 1999); Charles Beitz, Social and Cosmopolitan Liberalism, 
International Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 3 (1999), pp. 515-529; Thomas Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Violation of 
Negative Duties, Ethics and International Affairs, Vol. 19, No. 1 (2005), pp. 55-83; Thomas Pogge, World Poverty 
and Human Rights (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002);  John Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
Harvard University Press, 1999); Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (New York: First Anchor Books, 1999); 
Peter Singer, One World: The Ethics of Globalization (London: Yale University Press, 2002). 
18 
 
world and this practical turn fed into, and was supported by, a normative turn in international 
political theory.  Such issues had not previously been at the forefront of debate among 
International Relations theorists or political decision-makers, who instead focused primarily on 
security and perceived the international system as comprised of states whose leaders were 
uniquely responsible for the well-being of their citizens.  The normative turn has thus widened 
the range of issues that are considered worthy of debate in the International Relations canon, and 
has brought some interesting perspectives to bear on them.   
 
The normative impetus is to be applauded; the persistence of suffering in global politics calls for 
reflection and response from international political theorists.  However, the solutions proposed 
by cosmopolitan and human rights theorists are inherently limited because of their subscription 
to a particular liberal vision of global politics.  They are both part of a rationalist tradition that 
focuses primarily on moral arguments and technical solutions to problems without fully 
considering their political dimensions.  As such, they do not pay enough attention to how the 
problems came about in historical and structural terms or to political responses.3  They thus fall 
into what Robert Cox famously describes as problem-solving theory rather than critical 
theory.4  In terms of political practice, the normative turn has supported foreign aid and 
humanitarian interventions in the name of global justice and human rights; however, a neglect of 
                                                
3 Although, as we shall see, this is true to varying degrees.  For example, Thomas Pogge is a cosmopolitan thinker 
who emphasises both global economic structures and historical processes in his argument that we (in the affluent 
West) have a negative duty to redress global inequality.  Nonetheless, the solutions he proffers are aimed at elite 
decision-makers, and he relies on rational argumentation to prompt moral change. See Pogge, World Poverty and 
Human Rights; Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties. 
4 Cox, Social Forces, States and World Orders. 
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the political dimension of such interventions obscures the danger that these can subvert what 
they claim to secure.5   
 
In this chapter, I draw on the tradition of the early Frankfurt School of critical theory to point to 
key limitations of the normative (liberal) project in International Relations.  I do not attempt a 
thorough critique of particular theories of global justice or human rights.  Instead, I point to some 
of the fundamental limitations of liberal ways of knowing, maintaining that the rational, forward-
looking focus on what ought to be done to address contemporary problems is restrictive and 
limits our understanding of how those problems came about and how we might respond.  To do 
this, I adopt Geusss useful distinction between modern ethics and that which falls outside 
ethics, and maintain that the social turn in International Relations has led to theorising that 
predominantly falls within the problem-solving, normative approach of modern ethics.  Despite 
considerable variation between thinkers, the emphasis on instrumental rationality and abstract 
generalities is pervasive and deeply rooted.6   
 
I begin by recapping Geusss characterisation of modern ethics (or problem-solving theory) and 
point to Rawlsian liberal theory and cosmopolitan ethics as exemplifying this approach.  John 
Rawls placed justice at the heart of liberal political thought; his approach was then globalised by 
such thinkers as Charles Beitz and Thomas Pogge, giving birth to a modern cosmopolitan 
                                                
5 See, for example, Geoffrey Hawthorn, Liberalism since the Cold War: an Enemy to Itself?, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 25, S1 (1999), p. 148.   
6 There are many strands of cosmopolitan international thought and human rights discourse, and these exhibit the 
traits of problem-solving theory to varying degrees.  However, I do not have space to deal with the variety of 
thought in this chapter; my purpose is rather to point out the clear commonalities that exist between the different 
conceptions of international ethics. 
20 
 
liberalism.  Contemporary human rights discourse draws upon both Rawlsian and cosmopolitan 
liberalism,7 and falls with them into Guesss characterisation of contemporary ethics.  
Cosmopolitan liberalism and human rights are the two loudest ethical voices in International 
Relations; although they have different intellectual and practical roots, they both emerge as 
normative responses to real-world problems and seek practical solutions to global problems in an 
effort to prevent past and present atrocities from recurring.  Drawing upon these discourses, I 
demonstrate the pervasiveness of problem-solving characteristics in contemporary international 
ethics.  I argue that they prescribe technical remedies for political problems and that, in rushing 
towards solutions, they ignore both historical and structural antecedents and the stories of those 
who suffer most.  This is problematic because it encourages complacency in the knowledge that 
something is being done, buying into liberal notions of inevitable moral progress under 
modernity, and discourages political action that challenges the status quo.   
Geuss and Modern Ethical Thought 
The normative turn in international political thought has common roots with a broader shift 
towards problem-solving in modern ethical thought.  Geuss helpfully characterises modern 
philosophical ethics as essentially organised around the debating of the question What ought we 
to do? in response to the ills of modernity.  During the medieval Christian period this question 
                                                
7 Human rights discourse employs the language of cosmopolitan liberalism, but relies on states protecting their 
citizens rights, and thus effectively depends on a state-centric, Rawlsian liberalism.  Since the end of the Cold War, 
however, human rights have been used to justify (military) interventions in the name of humanity, arguing that states 
give up their right to sovereignty when they systematically abuse the rights of their own citizens.    
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was asked and answered in a theocentric framework; since abandoning the Christian worldview, 
Western philosophy has taken on the mantle of providing answers.  The ought in What ought 
we to do? is a narrow, rational ought; it seeks useful knowledge from which to prescribe 
universal moral guidelines and aspires to motivate change in behaviour by virtue of rational 
persuasion.  Philosophical ethics in this sense has become a pervasive aspect of modern life: 
With secularisation the ethical realm is construed not merely as freestanding, but also in 
some sense all-encompassing: I can and must ask the basic ethical question in any 
context in which I find myself in which action might be called for; no domain stands 
outside the scope of ethics.8 
As discussed earlier, this central ethical question is what Geuss terms the first pillar of 
contemporary ethics.  The second pillar is the loss of a reference to God, which was central to the 
Christian conception of ethics, or indeed anything outside observable experiencein critical 
theoretical terminology, immanentism.  Although the specific replacement remains a source of 
debate, reason is a leading candidate.9  The remainder of this chapter expands and deepens 
Geusss characterisation of modern ethics with reference to contemporary international thought 
as exemplifying problem-solving theory and points to some of the limitations of this approach. 
Modern Ethics: From the Domestic to the International 
Modern ethics draws heavily on liberal political theory and approaches to political life, and 
particularly on a Rawlsian-influenced liberalism with notions of justice at its heart.  Rawlss 
                                                
8 Geuss, Outside Ethics, p. 45.   
9 Geuss, Outside Ethics, p. 44. 
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project is essentially a remoralization of political philosophy, whereby ethical considerations 
are placed at the centre of a liberal conception of politics, and political theory essentially 
becomes applied ethics.10   
 
Rawls draws on Kantian ethics and revises the face of liberalism in two primary ways: justice is 
viewed as a key liberal tenet, and moral principles are reintroduced to political philosophy.  
These moves are a major departure from classical liberalism;11 early liberals viewed Kant as anti-
liberal and were suspicious both of his contention that there are universal principles (the concept 
of the a priori) and his positive conception of freedom, which places reason at its core.12  Kants 
elucidation of a normative political philosophy was anathema to early liberals and at the root of 
much contemporary disaffection with liberalism: 
The pure normative standpoint that Kants ethics tries to occupy, a standpoint in which 
we consider only the normatively relevant features of a possible world, abstracting 
strictly from the real world and the empirical accidents of concrete situations, is an 
expression of what Dewey called the quest for certainty.  In an insecure world, weak 
humans struggle convulsively to reach some kind of stability; the a priori is an 
overcompensation in thought for experienced human weakness.13 
Kants abstraction from the real world in order to find a pure normative standpoint, and thus 
provide certain guidance in an uncertain, contingent world, is mimicked by Rawls in A Theory of 
                                                
10 Geuss, Outside Ethics, p. 16. 
11 Geuss, Outside Ethics, pp. 11-28. Geuss characterises classical liberalism, which emerged during the nineteenth 
century, as a negative phenomenon, more defined by what it stood in opposition to than by what it stood for in any 
positive sense.  Classical liberalism opposed two prevailing tendencies of the time: the idea that the state had a duty 
to care comprehensively for its citizens and the exaggerated moralization of politics (p. 13). 
12 Geuss, Outside Ethics, pp. 16-17. 
13 Geuss, Outside Ethics, pp. 20-21. 
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Justice.14  In this seminal work, Rawls describes (at length) the social arrangements that he 
believes would be reached by rational individuals placed in an original position operating 
behind a veil of ignorance, whereby they are unaware of their position in society, their personal 
characteristics, or their conception of the good, and where each is forced to choose for all.15  He 
aims to generalize and carry to a higher order of abstraction the traditional doctrine of the social 
contract and in so doing, determine the key features of a non-utilitarian account of justice he 
termed justice as fairness.16  He outlines a difference principle to guide national economic 
orders, stating that the social order is not to establish and secure the more attractive prospects of 
those better off unless doing so is to the advantage of those less fortunate.17  
 
Rawlss project prescribes technical solutions to problems of injustice through a remarkable feat 
of abstraction: a thought experiment whereby individuals are stripped of all facets of their 
identity and asked to come to a consensus about the best social arrangements for all who reside 
in a particular community.  Geuss challenges Rawlss project on two counts, asking why he 
believed consensus to be possible in the first instance, and, secondly, why any decision made in 
the original position should have any relevance to the world in which we live.  He argues that 
[t]he theory purports to be pure of contamination by the facts of history, psychology, economics 
sociology, and political science, but it is highly questionable whether we can have a useful 
practical philosophy, or even a useful set of normative rules, without such grounded 
                                                
14 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971/1999). 
15 Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 121. 
16 John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993/1996), p. xvii. 
17 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 65. 
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understanding.18  In a similar vein, Benhabib maintains that Rawlsian liberalism silences the 
concrete other: 
[T]he Kantian presuppositionsguiding the Rawlsian theory are so weighty that the 
equivalence of all selves qua rational agents dominates and stifles any serious 
acknowledgment of difference, alterity and of the standpoint of the concrete 
otherNeither the concreteness nor the otherness of the concrete other can be known 
in the absence of the voice of the other.19 
She maintains that although Rawls undoubtedly had genuine concern for individual well-being, 
there is no room for consideration of otherness in his theory.  On the contrary, individuality is 
stifled as the desire for universality and generality results in abstraction from particularity and 
historicity.   
 
Rawlss notion of justice as fairness attracted a great deal of criticism for failing to account for 
those subjects that fell outside his conception of a homogenous, liberal subject.  In Political 
Liberalism, Rawls revises his earlier conception of a just society, answering his critics by 
acknowledging the difficulty of realising a well-ordered society of justice as fairness.20  
Instead, he argues for a political conception of justice that allows a reasonable plurality of 
moral, religious, and philosophical claims within a form of liberalism determined by broad, 
overlapping consensus.  He argues that a central goal is to ensure a just basic structure and that 
adjustments are continually required to maintain this.21  However, his approach remains 
ungrounded in an understanding of those individuals who make up particular communities, their 
                                                
18 Geuss, Outside Ethics, p. 33. 
19 Seyla Benhabib, Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1992), pp. 167-168.  
20 Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. xix. 
21 Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 281-285. 
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histories, and their relationships, and it assumes rather than defends liberalism as the best 
political arrangement.  In The Law of Peoples, he extends his approach to the international 
sphere, but rejects the idea that the difference principle should apply internationally.  Instead, he 
maintains that domestic societies must take responsibility for their own people and that the 
responsibility of the international community is primarily to ensure the background conditions in 
which domestic societies are able to flourish.  As such, he proposes an international duty of 
assistance with a much lower threshold: to enable poor societies to achieve liberal institutions 
and political autonomy.22   
 
Rawlss writings on justice prompted a cascade of philosophical and political theorising in which 
ethical considerations were placed centre-stage.  Partially in response to A Theory of Justice, 
boundaries between political theory and International Relations started to dissolve, and 
international political theory became a recognised area of thought.  International political theory 
is a relatively new development: in the early years of the discipline of International Relations, 
there were few voices calling for moral or political theorising; political theory and International 
Relations were distinct areas of study that had little to say to one another.  Nicholas Rengger 
points to a crucial shift in international political thought in the 1970s, prompted by debates 
surrounding the Vietnam War and by the publication of A Theory of Justice in 1971.23  However, 
these debates shifted the development of international political thought in a particular direction: 
one marked by its emphasis on problem-solving and justice.  Where there had been a paucity of 
theory, theory became influential, but it was almost exclusively what Rengger terms 
                                                
22 Rawls, The Law of Peoples, pp. 116-120. 
23 Nicholas J. Rengger, Political Theory and International Relations: Promised Land or Exit from Eden?, 
International Affairs, Vol. 76, No. 4 (2000), pp. 755-770.   
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hyperrationalist theory of a particular orientation: seduced by the lure of thinking that it can 
help and wielding useful knowledge in order to do so.24   
 
Cosmopolitan political theory was at the forefront of the evolution of international political 
theory.  In International Relations, important crossover works such as Michael Walzers Just and 
Unjust Wars25 and Charles Beitzs Political Theory and International Relations26 kick-started 
international political thought as we know it today and established its problem-solving 
orientation in response to contemporary debates.  Beitzs work in particular was influential in 
creating a space for a normative theory of International Relations; he brought the international to 
the forefront of political theory and was the first theorist in modern times explicitly to espouse a 
cosmopolitan international political theory.  He was also the first to make global poverty an 
issue deserving of attention by international theorists generally obsessed by questions of war and 
peace.  The and in Political Theory and International Relations (PTIR)the idea that the two 
spheres of thought might have something to say to each otherwas a revelation and enormously 
influential in the birth of international political thought as we now know it.27   
 
Cosmopolitan political theory and global justice literatures have proliferated over the decades 
and very often act as agenda-setters within the discipline of International Relations.28  However, 
                                                
24 Rengger, Political Theory and International Relations, p. 769. 
25 Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977, 2nd ed. 1992, 3rd ed. 2000). 
26 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations. 
27 See the Forum on Charles Beitz in Review of International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2 (2005), pp. 361-423.  In The 
House that Chuck Built: Twenty-five Years of Reading Charles Beitz (pp. 371-379), Chris Brown maintains that 
PTIR was genuinely innovatory; it introduced a new way of looking at some old problems in international relations 
and applied some older ways of thought to examining some new problems[PTIR] was the first general study of 
the field, and the questions it addressed remain on the front burner (p. 371). 
28 Rengger, Political Theory and International Relations, p. 763. 
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if one looks more broadly at the world of international politics, the loudest ethical voice 
continues to be that of human rights.  Human rights discourse employs the language of 
cosmopolitan political theory: the two approaches to international ethics have much in common, 
despite their different intellectual and practical roots.  In particular, both approaches are 
hyperrationalist and problem-solving in orientation: oriented toward justice and to the abstract 
bestowal of rights upon individuals.  They are also based upon a strong assumption of moral 
learning, believing both that there is clear evidence of progress under modernity and that 
progress will continue to take place.  Both approaches have also provided theoretical justification 
for practical responses to suffering in global politics, particularly in the post-Cold War world 
where the demand to do something has grown louder.29  In what follows, I demonstrate the 
pervasiveness of these characteristics, and outline some of their limitations as the dominant 
forms of ethical thought in International Relations theory.  
Limitations of Modern International Ethics 
In this section, I point to the strong commonalities between cosmopolitan political theory and 
liberal human rights discourse.  Both approaches exhibit the core characteristics of modern 
ethical thought pointed to by Geussan emphasis on problem-solving and immanencyand 
                                                
29 Global justice and human rights theories, and their common liberal cosmopolitan roots, have provided a 
theoretical underpinning for humanitarian interventions in the post-Cold War world, including famine relief, conflict 
management, and peace-building.  See, for example, Jenny Edkins, Legality with a Vengeance: Famines and 
Humanitarian Relief in Complex Emergencies, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 25, No. 3 
(1996), pp. 547-575; Hawthorn, Liberalism Since the Cold War; and Richard Devetak, Between Kant and 
Pufendorf: Humanitarian Intervention, Statist Anti-cosmopolitanism and Critical International Theory, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 33, S1 (2007), pp. 151-174. 
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assume a strong version of moral learning.  Beitz, Pogge, and Peter Singer all advocate a liberal 
cosmopolitan approach to the problem of global poverty, maintaining that we must extend the 
concept of justice beyond traditional state boundaries, prioritising the individual as the subject of 
justice.  Each thinker proposes some sort of redistribution of wealth, either through an extension 
of something like the Rawlsian difference principle internationally (Beitz and Pogge) or through 
personal donations to charity (Singer).30  Human rights discourse also uses the language of 
liberal cosmopolitanism, but focuses primarily on violations of the person and political 
oppression rather than poverty, enshrining guidelines in international law and treaties that bestow 
rights upon individuals by virtue of their humanity.  
 
These approaches to global suffering share four problematic characteristics (to a greater or lesser 
degree).  First, they privilege a rational, problem-solving approach to politics, with a focus on 
elite decision-making and technical solutions to suffering. Second, they are based on a strong 
assumption of moral progress: believing both that progress is possible, and that individuals, 
communities, and global leaders are willing to work towards it.  Third, they largely neglect 
consideration of history and social context, generating guidelines for living that focus on the 
future with little redress for past wrongs.  Finally, they disregard the motivational force of such 
non-immanent concepts as promise or utopianism and refuse to take the inner lives of individuals 
and communities into account.  I consider these four themes in turn. 
                                                
30 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations; Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights; Singer, One World. 
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Rational and problem-solving  
Global justice and human rights discourses privilege a particular way of knowing about the 
world and propose technical and legal solutions to fix the problems of repression and global 
inequality.  The problem-solving orientation of human rights has been central since its inception.  
The human rights regime developed as a reaction to the carnage of World War II, when citizens 
had no legal justification for disobeying state orders that they thought to be morally wrong.31  
International human rights law was established to provide the normative guidelines that the 
international system lacked, thus empowering citizens to challenge oppressive practices.  
Cosmopolitan thinkers propose technical solutions by which global poverty might be addressed 
and rely on moral reasoning and persuasion to advocate their positions.  Beitz argues for an 
extension of Rawlss difference principle internationally, maintaining that it is no longer tenable 
to privilege the state in the light of increasing interdependence.  Pogge constructs a complex 
causal argument that makes the case that the affluent West is responsible for countless deaths 
every day and thus has a negative duty to redress global inequality.32  Singer maintains that 
because we in the affluent West could do much to relieve global poverty at little cost to 
ourselves, it is serious moral failure if we do not.33  As such, all three fall within the category of 
rationalist, problem-solving theory, exhibiting those characteristics of modern ethics outlined by 
Geuss.   
 
                                                
31Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry, pp. 4-5. 
32 Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties.  
33 Peter Singer, What Should a Billionaire Give  and What Should You?, New York Times Magazine (December 
17, 2006).  This article can be accessed online: see http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/17/magazine/17charity.t.html 
(last accessed 11 March, 2008). 
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Beitzs ground-breaking Political Theory and International Relations uses moral reasoning to 
propose a radical shift in the way that political theorists formulate questions of justice.  It is 
comprised of three interlinking essays.  In International Relations as a State of Nature, Beitz 
criticises international scepticism, or political realism, which he characterises as holding a 
Hobbesian view of the international system as a state of nature, where normative standards do 
not apply to states and it is irrational to constrain behaviour out of regard for the interest of 
others.  In The Autonomy of States, he criticises the chief alternative to international 
scepticism: the morality of states, or Rawlsian social liberalism, where states have the primary 
responsibility for the well-being of their people.  Beitz argues that both realism and social 
liberalism are untenable in the light of increasing interdependence of global actors, where norms, 
institutions, and practices exist that apply to people largely without consent and materially 
influence their well-being.  A more satisfactory theory of international relations would privilege 
individuals as actors: a moral cosmopolitan liberalism.  Following the logic of his first two 
essays, in International Distributive Justice, Beitz delineates a cosmopolitan theory of justice.  
He draws upon Rawlss ideas as put forth in A Theory of Justice and argues that to be consistent, 
Rawlss notions of justice should apply not only to relations within states, but also to relations 
globally: it is wrong to limit the application of contractarian principles of social justice to the 
nation-state; instead, these principles ought to apply globally.34  International interactions create 
both benefits and burdens for individuals that would not be present otherwise.  As such, 
interactions should be guided by a principle of distributive justice; this principle is most 
appropriately a global form of Rawlss difference principle selected by a hypothetical-contract 
argument.  However, he translates Rawlss arguments on to the international system without first 
                                                
34 Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations, p. 128. 
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justifying Rawlss arguments, taking the difference principle to an even higher level of 
abstraction in order to address inequality. 
 
Pogge also relies on rational argument to persuade the affluent West of its duty to alleviate 
global poverty. 35  He maintains that we are implicated in the suffering of countless millions and 
thus have a negative duty to make changes that will alleviate global poverty.36  He argues that the 
interconnectedness of institutional regimes means that lives are deeply influenced by non-
domestic structures and that the present global economic order is unethical because of its role in 
perpetuating inequality.  Citizens of affluent nations bear some responsibility for upholding this 
unjust system, through, for example, unfair trade rules and the international arms trade.  He 
maintains that by upholding this coercive regime without actively working for its reform or 
compensating those it harms, we are partly responsible for the inequality it engenders.  Like 
Beitz, he points to the unacceptability of Rawlss double standard for national and international 
orders, saying: we owe the global poor an account of why we take ourselves to be entitled to 
impose on them a global economic order in violation of the minimal moral constraints we 
ourselves place on the imposition of any national economic order.37  Pogge advocates an 
institutional understanding of justice, claiming that we have a duty not to uphold a coercive 
institutional order that avoidably restricts access to basic necessities for some human beings.  He 
maintains that structural changes are needed to address the poverty and inequality that so often 
engender human rights abuses.  One of the reforms he suggests is the instigation of a Global 
Resources Dividend (GRD) to improve the capacity of the global poor.  The GRD is based on the 
                                                
35 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights. 
36 Pogge, Severe Poverty as a Violation of Negative Duties. 
37 Pogge, World Poverty and Human Rights, p. 109. 
32 
 
notion that all peoples are entitled to a share in limited resources, and thus to a small proportion 
of their value if governments decide to make use of or sell them.  Pogges proposal for reform 
based on this injustice is modest: he suggests shifting one per cent of global income to a fund 
which would be used to equip the global poor to meet their own needs.38   
 
Singer also argues that citizens in the developed world have a moral duty to address problems of 
global injustice.  He proposes a solution that bypasses political processes; instead, he puts the 
onus on individuals to donate to charity.  Unlike Beitz and Pogge, he does not ground his claims 
in political theory; he uses counterfactual and utilitarian reasoning to persuade.  For example, he 
tells the story of a professor coming across a child drowning in a pond whilst on his way to give 
a lecture.  He has a choice.  He could wade in and save her, muddying himself in the process and 
making himself late for class, or he could leave her to drown, enabling himself to arrive at the 
lecture tidy and on time.  Singer maintains that just as it would be morally wrong for the 
professor to leave the child to drown, so is it wrong for those of us from affluent nations to spend 
all our disposable income on luxury when people are dying of starvation.  Given our ability to 
help those living in extreme poverty at no noticeable cost to ourselves, it is morally incumbent 
upon us to do so.39  Singers argument is thus that we have a positive duty of assistance: a duty to 
help those in need.  Singers approach to global justice is simple: it does not require any action 
on the part of states or consideration of global structures.  He recommends that those of us living 
in the affluent West should donate substantial amounts to charities such as Oxfam and UNICEF 
                                                
38 Pogge, World Politics and Human Rights, pp. 196-215 
39 This story was first published in Singers influential article entitled Famine, Affluence and Morality, Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, Vol. 1, No. 1 (1972), pp. 229-243.  Revised version available online at 
http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/1972----.htm (last accessed March 11, 2008).  See also Singer, One World, pp. 
156-157. 
33 
 
that are devoted to addressing poverty in the developing world.  The amount donated would 
ideally be everything over and above that needed for the necessities of life, but maintains that if 
comfortably off Americans gave just 10 per cent he would not chastise them, given that they 
would be doing much more than their fellow citizens.40   
 
All three prominent cosmopolitan theoristsBeitz, Pogge, and Singerrely on rational 
argument and persuasion to motivate agents to do something to alleviate poverty.  Beitz does so 
in a conversation with Rawls, ignoring such nuanced moral alternatives as classical realism or 
critical theory.  As Chris Brown aptly remarks, Beitz addresses [the issue of global justice] as a 
conversation amongst cosmopolitan liberals and, inevitably, produces a cosmopolitan, liberal 
solution.41  Pogge and Singer also propose liberal, technical solutions with which to address the 
problem: Pogge targets intergovernmental leaders with a proposal for a tax to help the global 
poor; Singer targets comfortably-off individuals and challenges them to donate a substantial 
proportion of their income to charities that deal with poverty.  As such, all three share 
characteristics of problem-solving theory, depending on logical persuasion and forward-looking 
solutions to alleviate global suffering.   
 
The human rights regime also falls squarely within the rubric of contemporary ethics as defined 
by Geuss: it provides guidelines for the question of what we ought to do in response to rights 
violations, and it is based upon a secular conception of human nature.  Human rights are 
                                                
40 Peter Singer, The Singer Solution to World Poverty, New York Times Magazine (September 5, 1999), pp. 60-63.  
This article can be accessed online: http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/by/19990905.htm (last accessed  May 11, 
2007). 
41 Brown, The House that Chuck Built, p. 378. 
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generally understood and defended as an empowering discourse that is instrumental in improving 
individuals lives.42  Throughout its lifespan, the rights regimecomprised of generally accepted 
principles of human rights, norms expressed in international law, formal procedures in the UN, 
and civil societal mechanisms used to influence changehas been utilised to respond to human 
rights violations that take place in such varying arenas as conflict zones, prisons, and the 
workplace.  Like much of contemporary ethics, the human rights regime draws heavily on a 
Kantian liberalism, prescribing normative guidelines that are codified in law and defended as 
universal.  It is a guide to action, operating as a safety net that has the goal of providing redress 
for the worst excesses of humanity.43   
 
Although there has been much debate about how we might ground the human rights regime, 
Michael Ignatieff defends its instrumental, rational nature with reference to the divisive potential 
of foundational claims, saying: Far betterto forgo these kinds of foundational arguments 
altogether and seek to build support for human rights on the basis of what such rights actually do 
for human beings.44  However, echoing Benhabibs critique of justice-focused cosmopolitanism, 
human rights inevitably remain abstract and distanced from concrete historical situations.45  Jay 
Bernstein argues that a universalist, rights-based approach to morality is not only limited, but 
actively hinders individual well-being, saying rights areforms of misrecognition and injury 
                                                
42 Ignatieff, Human Rights, pp. 20-21, 54-55; Anthony J. Langlois, Human Rights and Modern Liberalism: A 
Critique, Political Studies, Vol. 51, No. 3 (2003), p. 521.  Where foundational claims are made, these are generally 
to do with the moral vision of human nature and a general consensus on human value.  See, for example, Donnelly, 
Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice, pp. 14-19. 
43 Waldron, Liberal Rights, pp. 370-391. 
44 Ignatieff, Human Rights, p. 54. 
45 Kate Schick, Beyond Rules: A Critique of the Liberal Human Rights Regime, International Relations, Vol. 20, 
No. 3 (2006), pp. 345-351. 
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since they presuppose mutual indifference, formalize that indifference, and abstract from 
particularity.46  He notes that a liberal approach to ethics does not include the political in any 
substantive wayhe describes it as the instrumentalization of the political47and thus is 
unable to live up to its promise.48   
 
The central ethical questionwhat ought we to do?provides the raison dêtre and organising 
force for the human rights regime and for global justice debates.  These responses to active and 
structural violence are motivated by pervasive global suffering and it would be wrong to suggest 
that they have had no positive impact on the international stage.  On the contrary, liberal 
cosmopolitanism has a grassroots element that has empowered individuals and communities to 
fight for change: 
When liberalism sheds its metaphysical orientation it comes to be recognized as a 
distinct historical projectWhile there is much in liberal thought that relies on a 
Kantian metaphysics, from Rawlss Theory of Justice to its cosmopolitan articulation in 
Beitz and others, it is hence entirely wrong to suggest that all liberal thought is devoid 
of a conception of the struggles and contestations that have come to define a distinctly 
liberal understanding of modern political subjectivity and the social formations 
emergent from a distinct historical era.49  
Thus, while human rights and global justice literatures in international political thought abstract 
from human suffering, and propose legal and technical solutions in order to relieve the ills of 
                                                
46Jay M. Bernstein, Suffering Injustice: Misrecognition as Moral Injury in Critical Theory, International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies, Vol. 13, No. 3 (2005), p. 317. 
47 Bernstein, Suffering Injustice, p. 304. 
48 The political concerns the broad and deep production of social order, as opposed to the more easily observable 
activities and institutions of politics.  For an excellent summary of the difference between the political and politics, 
see Jenny Edkins, Poststructuralism and International Relations: Bringing the Political Back In (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishers, 1999), pp. 2-6. 
49 Vivienne Jabri, Solidarity and Spheres of Culture: The Cosmopolitan and the Postcolonial, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 33, No. 4 (2007), p. 719. 
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modernity, they have also been appropriated by political movements and used to fight for 
change.  However, as an approach within international political thought, liberal cosmopolitanism 
remains limited by its restrictive forward-looking, problem-solving approach and provides 
theoretical justification for elite governmental and non-governmental responses to suffering that 
rely heavily on rational knowledge and expert counsel.50   
Assumes moral progress 
Both cosmopolitan political theory and human rights discourse rest on a central plank of moral 
progress.  The notion of moral learning is rarely defended; it is a core liberal assumption that is 
taken for granted as being true.  This is one of the major departures of liberalism from political 
realism, which sees such progress as tenuous and reversible.  However, there are problems with a 
strong conviction in moral progress.  It encourages thinkers to view the world through a lens that 
highlights evidence of their conviction and conceals evidence to the contrary.  It also encourages 
misplaced complacency.  This is particularly the case for human rights discourse, where the 
codification of rules and the spread of human rights talk and norms are taken as evidence of 
progress.  The notion of human rights has achieved great prevalence since the publication in 
1948 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, not only in academia, but also in 
                                                
50 For example, in Legality with a Vengeance, Edkins discusses the heavy reliance in theory and practice on 
technical solutions to relieve famine.  She focuses particularly on Amartya Sens writings on the link between 
famine and conflict.  Sen argues that famines are not caused by food shortages and therefore cannot be addressed 
through food aid; instead, famines signal economic collapse and are linked to conflict and violence.  However, 
despite the increased complexity of Sens analysis, it too suggests technical solutions including early warning 
systems and public welfare and Edkins argues that there is a poverty of the political in such responses.  By 
designating famines problems that can be solved by the instigation of knowledge-driven programmes, such an 
approach distracts from deeper reflection on the ways in which the international community and its laws and 
interventions are implicated in violence and oppression.   
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governmental and non-governmental fora.51  Liberal internationalists, such as Michael Ignatieff, 
argue:  
We know from historical experience that when human beings have defensible rights
when their agency as individuals is protected and enhancedthey are less likely to be 
abused and oppressed.  On these grounds, we count the diffusion of human rights 
instruments as progress even if there remains an unconscionable gap between the 
instruments and the actual practices of states charged to comply with them.52 
Ignatieff recognises that states are slow to demonstrate progress in their treatment of citizens, but 
argues that the international human rights regime has empowered victims and global civil society 
to challenge state practice; in this sense, progress has been made.   
 
However, a strong conviction that the proliferation of the human rights regime is indicative of 
moral progress can hide the way in which human rights talk has been instrumentalised and co-
opted by states for their own ends.   Julie Mertus describes how human rights talk has been used 
as bait by the United States government to get US citizens to support its foreign policy whilst, 
in reality, applying double standards.53  For example, the US consistently advocates the 
universality of human rights, saying that they must not be swept under the rug;54 however, it 
refuses to sign a number of international human rights treaties.55  Even when the US finally 
signed the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 1992, after a lengthy 
                                                
51 See, for example, Donnelly, Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice; Richard Falk, Think Again: 
Human Rights, Foreign Policy, March/April 2004, pp. 18-26; Ignatieff, Human Rights as Politics and Idolatry; 
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52 Ignatieff, Human Rights, p. 4. 
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54 Lorne W. Craner, Briefing on Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The US Record 2003-2004, 
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delay, the Bush Administration added a number of reservations.  One such reservation was to 
Article 7 of the ICCPR, which asserts: No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment or punishment.56  The US readily condemns other countries for torture: 
in the recent report Supporting Human Rights and Democracy, for example, the US criticised 
Jordan for such human rights abuses as arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention and torture.57  
However, the US government does not hold its own behaviour to the same standard.  Peter 
Singer discusses the treatment of suspected Al Qaeda members held by the US in Afghanistan 
and on the island Diego Garcia: 
According to a Washington Post report based on interviews with U.S. national security 
officials, these prisoners are subjected to stress and duress techniques, which include 
an initial beating to soften up the captive, followed by sleep deprivation through bright 
lights and loud noises, being kept standing or kneeling for hours in painful positions58  
The desire to be seen to observe human rights and thus accorded legitimacy remains strong, but 
this does not transfer into substantive observance.  The US has been known to hand over 
prisoners to states such as Syria, where human rights are not observed, with one CIA (Central 
Intelligence Agency) official remarking: We dont kick the [expletive] out of them.  We send 
them to other countries so they can kick the [expletive] out of them.59  The US employs the 
cosmopolitan rhetoric of universal rights, but in practice, an obsession with state security and the 
well-being of its own citizens takes precedence.   
 
                                                
56 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/a_ccpr.htm  (last 
accessed March 25, 2008). 
57 Supporting Human Rights and Democracy: The US Record 2003-2004, 
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The clash between discourse and practice is an obvious example of the limitations of the 
contemporary human rights regime.  US exceptionalism has been discussed at great length; it is 
perhaps no surprise that a major world power is able to flout international law.  But what about 
the regimes influence on repressive states?  Is it as unambiguously positive as it is portrayed in 
much of the literature?  James Ron argues that it is not, pointing to the mixed impact of the 
human rights regime on detainees in the Israeli Occupied Territories.  He observes that around 
1991-1992 a significant change took place in the methods of interrogation that Israeli security 
agencies employed against Palestinians, a change that came about because of the pressure that 
non-governmental organisations such as Human Rights Watch placed on the Israeli government 
to change these practices.60  Interrogators used severe physical violence against detainees from 
1988-1990, including beatings which often led to broken bones and a need for hospitalisation.  
At some point over the following two years, changes took place: interrogation was less 
physically violent, the state had increased control over the interrogation process, and military 
authorities endeavoured to give the process a more humane image.61  However, the increase in 
humanity went only so far; psychological procedures took over as the interrogation methods of 
choice, including extensive sleep deprivation, isolation, and body position abuse, all of which 
cause severe psychological harm and trauma.62  Herein lies one of the dangers of the human 
rights regime: the tendency to look for empirically observable changes in practiceassuaging 
our guilt and encouraging us to believe that things really are getting betterwithout attending to 
less observable psychological or emotional aspects of abuse or to the underpinning structural 
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61James Ron, Varying Methods of State Violence, pp. 275-277. 
62 James Ron, Varying Methods of State Violence, pp. 286, 294.  
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dimensions of political practices.63  Of course political theorists cannot entirely be blamed for the 
rhetorical adoption of their ideas in the public sphere, without serious underlying commitment to 
action. My point, though, is that aspects of liberal thought make it particularly easy for this kind 
of appropriation to take place.  
 
The projects of cosmopolitan international theorists also depend on a strong assumption of moral 
progress.  Beitz, Pogge, and Singer all rely on persuasive moral arguments that hope to convince 
agents at various levels to redistribute wealth in order to relieve poverty.  Beitz and Pogge target 
elite leadership of states and international institutions, arguing for structural changes that will 
shift wealth from the affluent West to the global poor.64  Singer targets individuals, arguing for a 
radical increase in charitable donations to organisations that work to alleviate global poverty.65  
Both strategies assume that agents are aware of global poverty, that they care, and that they are 
able to be persuaded to make personal or communal sacrifices in order to better the lives of those 
who are less well off.   
Neglects history and social context 
One of the consequences of narrow problem-solving approaches to global suffering is that they 
largely neglect the historical and social contexts in which they operate.  In global justice 
literatures, Singers proposed solution to injustice has come under particular attack for ignoring 
                                                
63 The example of torture practices in repressive states is just one illustration of the human rights regimes deflection 
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World Poverty and Human Rights.  
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historical antecedents, economic structures, and social context.66  Beitz and Pogge pay more 
attention to historical and social contexts in their account of poverty; however, they too propose 
forward-looking solutions that largely fail to work through the injustices of the past.  Human 
rights discourse proposes generalisable guidelines for dealing with human rights violations; 
however, these abstract from particular instances of abuse and are more concerned with 
punishing the perpetrators through legal procedure than with addressing the underlying 
economic, cultural, or historical grievances.  This neglect of what the past has to teach us, both 
about ourselves as political agents and about contemporary dilemmas or atrocities, is extremely 
short-sighted.  Friedrich Kratochwil argues that critical historicity is an indispensable 
precondition for grasping our predicament as agents.67  Without an understanding of those 
historical and social processes that have facilitated present suffering, our reflections on how we 
might address that suffering are inevitably limited.  
 
Singers approach to world poverty is emotive, persuasive, and simple to implement.  In this 
sense, it is political: his approach is calculated to motivate actionthe sort of action that 
involves writing a cheque or reading out a credit card number.  However, he does not take global 
economic structures into account, nor does he consider historical processes.  He reduces the issue 
of global poverty to a matter of money, all but ignoring the human element.  Andrew Kuper 
states baldly that if Singers exhortations make you want to act immediately in the ways he 
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International Affairs, Vol. 16, No. 2 (2002), pp. 107-120. 
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recommends, you should not do so. 68  His argument is that Singer seduces us into believing that 
there is an easy path to poverty reduction and that in fact his approach is likely to seriously harm 
the poor.69  The issue of world poverty is just too complex to solve by throwing money at the 
problem: 
[Singers] analogies and other arguments abstract from the causal dynamics of poverty 
and opportunity, and from the mediated and indirect nature of social relations at a 
global scaleA theory that does not include a contextual and institutional analysis (in 
the broadest sense) is condemned to recommending brief symptomatic relief, or even 
damaging and counterproductive action.70 
Kuper argues for a political philosophy in the place of Singers practical ethics: a philosophy that 
considers the roles of history, social and political structures, and economic institutions.   
 
Unlike Singer, Pogge both acknowledges the historical antecedents of world poverty and 
proposes a revision of global economic structures in response. He proffers a historical account of 
world poverty, saying that the present circumstances of the global poor are significantly shaped 
by a dramatic period of conquest and colonization, with severe oppression, enslavement, even 
genocide, through which the native institutions and cultures of four continents were destroyed or 
severely traumatized.71  Beitz, too, in more recent years, has noted a need to take into account 
those historical accounts of poverty put forward by developmental economists and economic 
historians.72  However, despite presenting a more nuanced account of global suffering than 
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Singer, they both propose abstract, forward-looking solutions that do not deal with the past in 
any significant sense.   
 
The neglect of history in formulating solutions to global poverty is beginning to be addressed by 
some cosmopolitan theorists.  Catherine Lu, for example, argues that the major problem with 
cosmopolitan liberalism is that it ignores history, and proposes reparative justiceas a 
complement to a cosmopolitan liberal theory of global justice.73  Reparative justice seeks a 
moral accounting of that history of injustice, that includes acknowledgement of the historical 
wrong, [sic] and material reparations for victims and their descendents who continue to suffer the 
negative legacies of historical injustice.74  However, she goes on to say that such justice can 
only be compatible with cosmopolitan liberalism, saying that it is unintelligible outside such a 
moral framework.  This claim is narrow theoretical hubris indeed; cosmopolitan liberalism does 
not have a monopoly on morality or on action oriented towards the relief of present suffering 
with historical causes.   
Neglects inner lives 
The instrumental rationality of liberal approaches to suffering means that non-immanent, non-
observable factors such as the inner lives of individuals and communities are neglected.  
International governmental and non-governmental organisations that focus exclusively on human 
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rights and poverty relief can make situations worse.75  Cosmopolitan and human rights theorists 
have a particular rationalist way of knowing and acting; this leaves no room for the insights of 
classical realism, with its emphasis on tragedy and the political;76 early critical theory, with its 
emphasis on particular suffering tempered with promise and hope;77 or psychoanalysis, with its 
insistence on the possibility of individual and communal working through.78  Brown argues that 
cosmopolitan theorists (and other inheritors of the rationalist, liberal tradition):  
as modern heirs of the Scottish Enlightenment, have no time for such quasi-theological 
notions [as evil or tragedy].  For them, when people do bad things or behave 
uncooperatively it is because they are pursuing what they take to be their rational 
interests in a context which provides no incentive to cooperate or behave well; 
moreover, there can be no such thing as a tragic dilemma, because, given enough 
brainpower employed to solve a problem, the right thing will always become clear.79 
A strong belief in moral learning and in problem-solving theory means that, given time, thought 
and persuasion, the worlds ills can be eradicated through rational (primarily legal, technical, or 
institutional) means.  These means do not include looking behind the curtain80 to see the inner 
lives and sufferings of individuals or communities; they do not include making space for 
psychological healing; and they do not include the realist and critical theoretic acknowledgment 
that life is difficult, suffering inevitable, and progress fragile.   
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cited in Mollica, Healing Invisible Wounds, pp. 42-43. 
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The failure to look beyond easy solutions for the observable ramifications of human rights 
abuses and refugee crises is endemic.  Richard F. Mollica, psychiatrist and director of the 
Harvard Program in Refugee Trauma, argues that the human rights regimes narrow focus on 
justice fails to promote individual well-being in the wake of horrific violence.  The focus on 
proving human rights violations and holding perpetrators accountable fails to consider the effect 
of that violence on those that have survived.  He maintains that [s]ocieties make a grave error 
when they emphasize obtaining the details of killings and other crimes over the mission of self-
healing.81  He also notes that seven million out of the twelve million refugees worldwide have 
been kept in refugee camps for over a decadea situation that is disastrous for their physical and 
mental well-being.82  In Cambodia, a letter from one of the interns of the Site 2 refugee camp on 
the Thai border was smuggled out which stated that the trauma caused by the Pol Pot regime had 
been outstripped by the more overwhelming trauma of living in appalling conditions in the 
United Nations refugee camp.83  Mollica argues that with all good intentions, the international 
community has created environments that maximise almost every negative social factor that 
fosters illness, such as chronic unemployment and unremitting violence.84   
 
A similar failure to look beyond that which is easily measured and to consider the hidden aspects 
of human experience exists in Australia around issues concerning the Aboriginal community.  
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82 See Merrill Smith, Warehousing Refugees: A Denial of Rights, a Waste of Humanity, World Refugee Survey 
2004, pp. 38-56.  Accessible online: http://www.refugees.org/data/wrs/04/pdf/38-56.pdf (last accessed March 11, 
2008). 
83 Mollica, Healing Invisible Wounds, pp. 224-228. 
84 Mollica, Healing Invisible Wounds, p. 227. 
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Marlene Kong, a medic who has worked in refugee camps in Sierra Leone, is also an indigenous 
Australian.  She argues that the extremely poor physical and mental health of Aboriginals is in 
large part due to unobservable factors such as a negative history that systematically destroyed 
their culture and took their land.  She maintains that without a soul, a community is destined to 
fail.  There is a lot of pain, anger and grief suffered by Aboriginal people, and they dont have 
much hope for the future.  This immense pain and lack of hope cannot be solved solely by 
rational meanschanging policies takes more than evidenceits not about money, but about 
recognising suffering.85  A rationalist, forward-looking, liberal approach to suffering, however, 
largely neglects the psychological, trans-generational dimensions of suffering, focusing instead 
on observable problems amenable to programmatic intervention.  
Conclusion 
Cosmopolitan political thought and human rights discourse fall squarely within Geusss rubric of 
modern ethics: their central organising question is What ought we to do?,  and the 
corresponding answer is restricted by its dependence on an instrumental rationality that utilises 
useful knowledge to solve problems of poverty and repression.  They are also characterised by 
an unyielding immanency and a reluctance to look beyond that which can observed, measured, 
and predicted.  Thus the solutions proffered are legal, technical solutions that are profoundly 
limited and distract attention from the human aspects of suffering.  The human rights regime 
relies on international legislation that abstracts from particularity and enshrines protection for the 
                                                
85 Rachel Nowak, Time to Heal a Troubled Nation, New Scientist, 2 June 2007, pp. 50-51. 
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individual in law.  However, for those who are struggling to survive, the existence of legal rights 
means little; they have no means of accessing these rights and the international communitys 
obsession with collating records of violations and administering justice overlooks those who 
suffer the most.86  Furthermore, the human rights regimes rules-based nature and its abstraction 
from real-life suffering distracts from actual political situations and focuses attention away from 
a historical understanding of the present in an attempt to forge a better future.  Cosmopolitan 
political theorists also propose technical solutions with which to alleviate global poverty, 
including an extension of a Rawlsian difference principle internationally, the adoption of a type 
of Tobin tax, and donations to charity.  All these overlook the sociohistorical and political 
dimensions of poverty, proposing technical economic solutions to a much more complex and 
multifaceted problem.   
 
The normative turn in International Relations was, in part, a reply to the perceived inability of 
political realism to offer useful knowledge with which to address global suffering.  However, in 
basing their approaches to human suffering upon a foundation of moral progress, liberal 
cosmopolitanism and human rights neglect two of the central ideas of political realism: the 
notion of tragedy and the inability to escape the logic of the political.  A classical realist account 
of politics is not bereft of normative content as is often assumed, for example, in Beitzs first 
essay in PTIR, where he rejects Hobbesian moral scepticism.  However, unlike normative 
approaches to International Relations, a classical realist account rejects the notion of moral 
learning, maintaining that normative approaches are not sufficiently sensitive to the tragedy and 
                                                
86 Although, as noted earlier, the human rights movement has also been appropriated by grassroots movements to 
fight for legal and political change (Jabri, Solidarity and Spheres of Culture, p. 719).  
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fragility of life and humanity.  Thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau perceive liberal thought as 
naively discounting the messiness of politics, replacing it with an overly optimistic moralism and 
legalism that disguises the realities of life.  He does not discount their aims, but vehemently 
disagrees with their tidy, abstract approach to politics.  In Renggers words: 
 [L]iberals, he believed, had to see the reality of their predicament squarely and that, 
fundamentally, meant confronting the tragic in all its forms: the tragic sense of life, the 
tragic presence of evil, the tragic antinomies of human existence and so on and so on. 
This does not mean that there is no sense of the good in politics, but rather there is no 
progress toward the good, noticeable from year to year, but undecided conflict which 
sees today good, tomorrow evil prevail.87 
In this sense, Morgenthaus critique is similar to that of the early Frankfurt School,88 who also 
perceive moral progress as fragile and reversible; thinkers such as Walter Benjamin and Adorno 
were famously hostile to the notion of progressive historicism.89  Adorno maintained that a 
strong belief in moral learning was problematic in that it encouraged a discounting of those 
aspects of life not congruent with that belief.  This is certainly borne out with regard to the 
human rights regime in contemporary politics: the perception of a consensus on human rights 
                                                
87 Nicholas Rengger, Tragedy or Skepticism?, p. 324. 
88 See Scheuerman, Realism and the Left, for an exposition of the influence of the Left on the development of 
Morgenthaus thought.  He spent his early career in Frankfurt, working closely with the great socialist barrister, 
Hugo Sinzheimer.  During those years, he was influenced both by his work in chambers, working for social reform, 
and by the left-wing intellectual milieu of the city.  Scheuerman argues that too little has been made of the common 
intellectual roots of Morgenthaus classical realism and the Frankfurt School of critical theory and that recent moves 
to highlight the critical potential of realism are not as unexpected a shift as they might initially appear.  See, for 
example, Richard K. Ashley, The Poverty of Neorealism, International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2 (1984), pp. 
225-286, for a discussion of the critical potential of classical realism.  See also William E. Scheuerman, A 
Theoretical Missed Opportunity?  Hans J. Morgenthau as Critical Realist? in Duncan Bell (ed.), Tragedy, Power, 
and Justice: Variations on a Realist Theme (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming); Brent J. Steele, 
Eavesdropping on Honoured Ghosts: From Classical to Reflexive Realism, Journal of International Relations and 
Development, Vol. 10, No. 3 (2007), pp. 272-300; and Michael C. Williams, The Realist Tradition and the Limits of 
International Relations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).    
89 See Chapter Three of this thesis for an exegesis of Adornos critique of modern thought. 
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amongst the international community and the knowledge that something is being done 
encourages complacency when complacency has no place.   
 
The normative turn also has a tendency to discount the pervasiveness of the political, positing a 
world in which morality and law govern and where liberal democracies have the right to 
intervene on behalf of the powerless in the name of human rights.  Here, again, classical realism 
offers a warning: Schmitt argues that the idea that wars can be fought under the banner of 
humanity is a delusion; they cannot escape the logic of the political.  They often mask self-
interest with moral intent the concept of humanity is an especially useful ideological 
instrument of imperialist expansionand they inevitably require the dehumanisation of the 
enemydenying the enemy the quality of being human and declaring him to be an outlaw of 
humanity.90  Thus, universal categories are wielded on the behalf of some, to the denigration of 
others.  Although I do not advocate a realist perception of world politics, in which self-
preservation is the organising motive and the state is reified, the warning that the realm of world 
politics cannot be tamed and controlled by the exercise of rationality is prescient.91 
 
I argue that we need an approach to violence and suffering in world politics that goes beyond the 
mainstream problem-solving approach, which abstracts from and obscures rather than exposes 
unpleasant reality.  Such an approach would recognize the fragility of moral progress and look 
beyond rational, problem-solving solutions to human suffering.  It would take historical and 
                                                
90 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political, p. 54. 
91 For a critique of realist anti-cosmopolitanism, see Devetak, Between Kant and Pufendorf.  Devetak argues the a 
priori decision that humanitarian intervention is wrong is in itself a normative judgement, and that this shuts down 
the political by taking away the exercise of judgement in the moment of decision. 
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cultural factors into account and look beyond the immediate physical and legal ramifications of 
suffering in order to promote the broader cultural and psychological healing needed to support 
sustained physical health.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE CRITICAL TURN IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 
In the previous chapter, I traced the normative turn in International Relations and argued that 
although it widens the issues considered by international political theorists, the project remains 
restricted by its dependence on a liberal vision of progress that proffers technical solutions to the 
worlds ills.  The vision of modernity subscribed to by liberal thinkers emphasises its progressive 
march towards an increasingly moral international system, encouraging misplaced complacency 
and obscuring those aspects of human experience that cannot easily be measured or controlled.  
Thus, although the normative project is prompted by global suffering, its understanding of 
suffering is profoundly limited and takes into account primarily useful knowledge: it fails to 
situate subjects in their social and historical context or to consider bodily and psychological pain. 
 
In social and political thought, disaffection with grand narratives of progress and the modern 
obsession with instrumental knowledge has prompted the development of broadly critical 
theories of society: theories that question generally accepted assumptions about modernity and 
epistemology.  Two particularly influential strands of critical theory are the Frankfurt School and 
poststructuralism.  Frankfurt School critical theory perceives the dark side of modernity 
alongside its potential emancipatory force, maintaining that under modernity, reason is replaced 
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by instrumental rationality and critical voices are stifled by the anonymous sway of the status 
quo.1  Poststructural theory is even less optimistic about the possibility of progress, pointing to 
the inextricable link between knowledge claims, power, and politics. 
 
The perceived poverty of mainstream International Relations theory has prompted a number of 
its thinkers to draw on Frankfurt School and poststructural critical theories to articulate a more 
embedded and human approach to world politics.2  The majority of critical International 
Relations theory in the Frankfurt school tradition draws on Habermasian discourse ethics, which 
move away from the liberal Rawlsian vision of a just society governed by abstract rules and 
emphasise instead the emancipatory potential of widening dialogic communities.3  Critical 
International Relations theory in the poststructural tradition questions settled assumptions about 
world politics, pointing to the violence inherent in established social arrangements, and is deeply 
                                                
1Theodor W. Adorno, Prisms, trans. Samuel and Shierry Weber, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1981), 
p. 21. 
2 For a general overview of critical theories and their influence on international political thought, see Richard Wyn 
Jones (ed.), Critical Theory and World Politics (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001); Rengger and Thirkell-
White (eds.), Critical International Relations Theory After 25 Years.  Another critical tradition that has been 
influential in International Relations is neo-Marxist international political economy, but I do not have the space to 
consider its influence here.  See, for example, Robert W. Cox and Timothy J. Sinclair, Approaches to World Order, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
3 See Craig Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992); Richard 
Devetak, The Project of Modernity and International Relations Theory, Millennium ,Vol. 24, No. 1 (1995), pp. 27-
51; Devetak, Between Kant and Pufendorf; Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory of International 
Relations (London: Macmillan, 1982); Andrew Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community: Ethical 
Foundations of the Post-Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998); Richard Shapcott, Cosmopolitan 
Conversations: Justice Dialogue and the Cosmopolitan Project, Global Society, Vol. 16, No. 3 (2002) , pp. 221-243; 
Martin Weber, The Critical Social Theory of the Frankfurt School, and the Social Turn in IR, Review of 
International Studies, Vol. 31, No. 1 (2005), pp. 195-209.  See also the debate between Mark Hoffman and Nicholas 
Rengger: Mark Hoffman, Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate, Millennium: Journal of International 
Studies, Vol. 16, No. 2 (1987), pp. 231-249; Nicholas J. Rengger, Going Critical? A Response to Hoffman, 
Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (1988), pp. 81-89. 
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concerned with the notion of alterity in international politics.4  Both strands of thought identify 
their approaches as exemplifying critical theory as opposed to problem-solving theory, in Coxs 
formulation, although, as is discussed below, they succeed in doing so to varying degrees. 
 
In this chapter, I consider the ways in which these two strands of critical International Relations 
theory deal with the problem of suffering in international politics.  The chapter is divided into 
two main parts.  In part one, I examine the Habermasian response to the brokenness of modernity 
and its influence on international political thought, drawing on the work of Andrew Linklater, 
Seyla Benhabib, and Nancy Fraser.  I then consider the Habermasian turn in light of the 
limitations of liberalism discussed in Chapter One: focus on rational, problem-solving theory; 
strong belief in moral progress; paucity of history and social context; and failure to consider 
inner lives.  I argue that the Habermasian turn has resulted in the development of a more 
embedded emancipatory theory: one that widens the conversation beyond elites and addresses 
broader issues of exclusion, identity, and redistribution.  However, it has not gone far enough: it 
continues to be based on a strong assumption of moral progress, it emphasises procedural 
solutions to the problem of exclusion and difference, and it underestimates the strength of 
existing power asymmetries and historical wrongs, both of which seriously undermine the 
                                                
4 Ashley, The Poverty of Neorealism; Richard K. Ashley and R. B. J. Walker, Conclusion: Reading 
Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the Question of Sovereignty in International  Studies, International 
Studies Quarterly, Vol. 34, No. 3 (1990), pp. 367-416;  David Campbell, Why Fight: Humanitarianism, Principles, 
and Post-structuralism, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, Vol. 27, No. 3 (1998); David Campbell and 
Michael J. Shapiro, (eds.), Moral Spaces: Rethinking Ethics and World Politics (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1999); William E. Connolly, Identity|Difference: Democratic Negotiations of Political Paradox, 
expanded edition (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2002); William E. Connolly, The Ethos of 
Pluralization (Minneapolis: The University of Minnesota Press, 1996); Edkins, Poststructuralism and International 
Relations; Vivienne Jabri, Discourses on Violence: Conflict Analysis Reconsidered (New York: Manchester 
University Press, 1996). 
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potential of a conversation to address human suffering.   In part two, I examine the influence of 
poststructural theory on international political thought.  I argue that a poststructural approach 
offers a greater awareness of the fragility of moral progress in a radically broken world, drawing 
our attention to exclusionary structures and practices that perpetuate suffering and 
acknowledging the role of inner lives in the politics of violence.  However, there is a tendency on 
the part of some poststructural thinkers to overemphasise the personal to the detriment of public 
and institutional categories and the task of keeping faith with trauma (or marking the lack) to 
the detriment of working through.   
Habermas and Critical International Political Thought 
Habermas and the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory  
As discussed earlier, the Frankfurt School has its roots in the founding of the Frankfurt Institute 
for Social Research as an autonomous research centre in 1923.  The early Frankfurt School 
advocated an interdisciplinary approach to social thought and comprised such thinkers as Max 
Horkheimer, Adorno, Herbert Marcuse, Eric Fromm, and Walter Benjamin.  A vibrant group of 
philosophers, sociologists, and political scientists, these thinkers were deeply concerned with the 
analysis of modernity and rejected traditional positivist assumptions in favour of a constellation 
55 
 
of approaches to sociological research.5  They advocated critical theory: theory that looks 
beyond the given order to the structures that sustain it and imagines its transformation.  The 
major foci of the early Frankfurt School were the critique of modernity, reflections on 
epistemology, and the pursuit of emancipation, although the groups emancipatory impulses 
became increasingly utopian as time went on.  Adornos writings in particular became 
progressively more pessimistic about the possibility of emancipatory action beyond negation and 
utopian imaginings.6   
 
Habermas is a direct inheritor of this group of thinkers: his thought developed in reaction to 
theirs and he is often described as the foremost thinker of the so-called second generation of the 
Frankfurt School.  As a student of Adorno from 1956, Habermas readily adopted the Frankfurt 
Schools openness to a wide range of philosophical and social theories.  However, he was 
dissatisfied with their increasing pessimism,7 and much of his theorising is an attempt to craft a 
more positive way forward.  Adorno and Horkheimer were deeply sceptical of the project of 
modernity, which they saw as promising good but delivering harm, a theme they expounded in 
Dialectic of Enlightenment.8  They maintained that the type of knowledge with which 
Enlightenment ideals are pursued is instrumental knowledge, which is used to promote an 
efficient, profit-driven system.  As a result, however, humans become perceived as commodities 
valued primarily in terms of market value, making them increasingly unable to express social 
                                                
5 See, for example, Theodor W. Adorno, Sociology and Empirical Research, in Theodor W. Adorno, H. Albert, R. 
Dahrendorf, J. Habermas, H. Pilot, and K. R. Popper, The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology (London: 
Heinemann Educational Books,  1969/1976), pp. 68-86. 
6 See Adorno, Negative Dialectics. 
7 See, for example, Habermass critique of Adorno and Horkheimer in The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity: 
Twelve Lectures, trans. Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1987), pp. 106-130.  
8 Theodor W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (London: Verso 
Books, 1944/1997).  
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criticism.  Adorno maintains that the task of social theory in todays commodified society is to 
preserve alternatives to the status quo.  However, for Adorno, this is largely a negative task that 
refuses to prescribe positive courses of action, but instead determinedly preserves that which is 
non-instrumental and non-identical.   
 
Habermas found Adornos negative dialectics profoundly unsatisfactory and responded to the 
dialectic of enlightenment with a defence of modernity and the development of positive, 
emancipatory social (and moral) theory.  His later work, in particular, takes a different turn from 
that of the earlier Frankfurt School: he defends much of the Enlightenment thought and 
modernity that Adorno and Horkheimer so bitterly attacked, particularly in their later years.  As 
well as differing in terms of substantive aims, Habermass work also departs markedly from his 
predecessors in relation to the place of philosophy in social theory.  Where Adorno and 
Horkheimer eschewed the notion of a systematic approach to social theory, preferring a 
constellation of approaches, Habermass work is devoted to the delineation of a systematic 
approach with a quasi-transcendent foundation.  This contrasts markedly with Adorno and 
Horkheimers position that there can be no such foundation.  As David Held puts it:  
The whole emphasis in [Habermass] work  on engaging and appropriating competing 
traditions of philosophy and social thought, reformulating the foundations of social 
theory, and demonstrating the superiority of his stance over others  contrasts markedly 
with the main interests of the Frankfurt theorists.9 
Where Adorno and Horkheimer sought to enlighten Enlightenment by demonstrating the 
mismatch between ideals and actuality, Habermas seeks to harness its positive potential.  And 
                                                
9 David Held, Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1980), p. 253. 
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where his predecessors shied away from positive prescription, be it substantive or procedural, 
Habermas advocates rational debate in search of consensus and engagement with public policy.   
 
Habermass writings can be loosely categorised into two periods: his early period, which focuses 
on social critique, and sits more comfortably with the trajectory of the early Frankfurt School;10 
and his later period, which develops a normative theory of discourse ethics, and moves further 
away from the aims and methods of his predecessors.  It is this later period that has most 
influenced international political thought: Habermass discourse ethics have been appropriated 
by a variety of critical international theorists.   
 
At the core of Habermass discourse ethics is his belief that all speech has at its heart an 
orientation towards consensus, although this is rarely borne out in practice. The structures of 
language and communication anticipate a form of life in which truth, freedom and justice are 
possible11 and thus provide the normative foundation upon which a critical theory of society 
rests.  As such, we can judge actual communication situations in light of an ideal form of 
communicative discourse.  In an ideal speech situation participants share a tradition and their 
orientations are normatively integrated to such an extent that they start from the same definition 
                                                
10 See, for example, Jürgen Habermas, The Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics: A Postscript to the 
Controversy between Popper and Adorno, in Theodor W. Adorno, H. Albert, R. Dahrendorf, J. Habermas, H. Pilot, 
and K. R. Popper, The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology (London: Heinemann Educational Books,  
1969/1976), pp. 131-162; Jürgen Habermas, A Positivistically Bisected Rationalism, in Adorno et al., The 
Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, pp. 198-225, and Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the 
Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1989). 
11 Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, p. 256; see also Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action 
(Volume 1) Reason and the Nationalization of Society, trans. Thomas McCarthy (London: Heinemann, 1984); 
Jürgen Habermas, The Theory of Communicative Action (Volume 2) Lifeworld and System: A Critique of 
Functionalist Reason, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Cambridge: Polity, 1987). 
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of the situation and do not disagree about the claims to validity that they reciprocally raise.12  A 
consensus reached in such a situation is termed a rational consensus, and is the criterion by 
which truth can be judged.  Thus, deliberation is always goal-orientedreaching towards 
consensusand analytical, whereby the force of the better argument wins out. 
 
Critical reflection and dialogue are central to the application of Habermass ideas in practice.  
His conception of public space allows all those who may be affected by social norms and 
political decisions to be included in the deliberation pertaining to the drafting and enactment of 
these norms.  He maintains that just those norms deserve to be valid that could meet with the 
approval of those potentially affected, insofar as the latter participate in rational discourses.13  
This ideal formulation of public space serves as a comparator against which actual situations can 
be judged.  Such judgments reveal situations of distorted communication, for example, where 
consensus is reached by coercion.  Habermas defends liberal human rights on this basis, saying 
that they put forth ideals against which situations on the ground can be measured: [human 
rights] discourse itself sets the standards in whose light the latent violations of its own claims can 
be discovered and corrected.14 He cites their potential as a universal vehicle of communication 
and protection for individuals and argues that one of their fundamental purposes is to ensure that 
every person has a voice and recourse to international law.   
                                                
12 Jürgen Habermas, What is Universal Pragmatics?, in William Outhwaite (ed.), The Habermas Reader 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 129, n. 2.  
13 Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms: Contributions to a Discourse Theory on Law and Democracy trans. 
William Rehg (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1996), p. 127.  
14 Jürgen Habermas, Remarks on Legitimation through Human Rights, in Jürgen Habermas, The Postnational 
Constellation: Political Essays, trans. Max Pensky (ed.) (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2001), p. 120. 
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Habermas and Critical International Political Thought  
The vast majority of critical International Relations theory in the tradition of the Frankfurt 
School draws upon Habermass later work, and in particular, his discourse ethics.  Andrew 
Linklater summarises the normative goal of critical International Relations theory in decidedly 
Habermasian terms: 
The normative aim of critical IR theoryis to increase the spheres of social interaction 
that are governed by dialogue and consent rather than power and force; to expand the 
number of human beings who have access to a speech community that has the potential 
to become universal; and to create the socioeconomic preconditions of effective, as 
opposed to nominal, involvement for all members of that community.15 
According to Linklater, critical International Relations theory has a radically democratic aim: to 
increase the proportion of those who are participants in a dialogic community that is governed by 
consent.  In this sense, it situates itself in opposition to both political realism, with its focus on 
high politics and securing the state, and Rawlsian and cosmopolitan liberalism, with their 
abstraction from particularity and non-participatory, top-down approach to world politics. 
 
In The Transformation of Political Community, Linklater articulates a progressive critical theory 
that advocates the triple transformation of political community: to secure greater respect for 
cultural differences, stronger commitments to the reduction of material inequalities and 
significant advances in universality.16  He draws on Kant, Marx, and Habermas in elucidating 
his project; these thinkers emphasise the universalising processes at work in human history and 
                                                
15 Andrew Linklater, The Changing Contours of Critical International Relations Theory in Jones, Critical Theory 
and World Politics. 
16 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, p. 3. 
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perceive the emancipatory potential in such trends.  Linklater is particularly influenced by 
Habermass discourse ethics, defending them against their critics.17   He argues that although 
unlikely to be fully attained in practice, the aim of discourse ethics is laudable: to remove the 
modes of exclusion which obstruct the goalwhich may never be realisedof global 
arrangements which rest upon the consent of each and every member of the human race.18  He 
maintains that although thick, prescriptive versions of discourse ethics may exclude those outside 
a liberal tradition, a thin version should enable vulnerable societies to protect themselves from 
marginalisation by powerful liberal societies.19  The thin version decrees that all individuals 
have a right to be consulted about decisions made outside their society which disadvantage 
them20 but does not require them to adopt liberal democratic politics.   This thin 
cosmopolitanism has no fixed and final vision of the future.21  Instead, it proposes a particular 
approach to dialogue through which communities come to their own decisions about what is and 
is not appropriate.  Linklater argues that the right to participation in dialogue within ever-
widening communities is the best means with which to negotiate difficult questions of inequality 
and marginalisation.  He cautions vigilance against coercion and repression, however, noting that 
any dialogic process must be self-reflective and guard against the marginalisation of non-liberal 
world views.22  
                                                
17 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, pp. 87-100.  Linklater discusses both feminist and 
postmodern critiques of Habermasian discourse ethics, emphasising the similarities (and downplaying the 
differences) between Habermas and his critics. 
18 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, p. 93. 
19 Andrew Linklater, Dialogic politics and the civilizing process, Review of International Studies Vol. 31, No. 1 
(2005), pp. 141- 154. 
20 Linklater, Dialogic politics, p. 144. 
21 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, p. 49. 
22 For example, Linklater points to the failure of the Australian government to engage with the Yolngu people on the 
issue of land claims.  The Yolngu do not have a liberal-individualist perspective on land ownership; they believe that 
land is possessed by (and possesses) a community, a belief that is not allowed for in the Australian legal system.  
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Seyla Benhabib and Nancy Fraser also draw heavily on Habermass discourse ethics in their 
critical social theories.  They maintain that his moral theory has much to contribute to ethical 
dilemmas in political thought and that it compares favourably with other normative approaches 
to the international.  In an essay on the public sphere and discourse ethics, Benhabib contrasts his 
conception of public space with Arendtian civic republicanism and Ackermans liberalism, 
deeming it the most fruitful of these three dominant strands of normative political thought.  She 
maintains:  
the chief virtue of the Habermasian discourse model of public space is its radical 
indeterminacy and openness.  When compared to the Arendtian one, Habermass model 
neither restricts access to public space nor sets the agenda for public debate.  When 
compared to Ackermans neutrality principle, the discourse model of public space is 
also distinctive in that it captures the dynamic and renegotiable aspects of such 
distinctions as that between the right and the good.23 
Fraser also makes the case for a Habermasian approach to social theory.  She argues that 
something like Habermass idea of the public sphere is indispensable to critical social theory 
and democratic political practiceno attempt to understand the limits of actually existing late-
capitalist democracy can succeed without in some way or another making use of it.24  Both 
theorists find in Habermas inspiration for an approach to social theory that is open and inclusive 
and that reintroduces a notion of an active and engaged public sphere. 
 
                                                                                                                                                       
Instead of disallowing the conversation, a dialogic model should encourage the suspension of assumptions and strive 
to understand the other point of view (Dialogic politics, p. 149).     
23 Seyla Benhabib, Models of Public Space: Hannah Arendt, the Liberal Tradition, and Jürgen Habermas, in Craig 
Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992), pp. 84-85. 
24 Nancy Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy, in 
Craig Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1992), p. 111. 
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Although Fraser and Benhabib base much of their work on Habermass discourse ethics, they are 
not uncritical of his thought, believing it to privilege the liberal tradition.  Benhabib maintains 
that Habermass moral theory leans too close to the liberal social-contract tradition, and borrows 
from it dubious distinctions that stand at variance with his earlier, more critical, project.25  
These dubious distinctions include a privileging of public over private spheres, justice over the 
good life, and the generalised other over the concrete other.  Fraser argues that Habermas inherits 
a narrow conception of the public sphere.26  In The Structural Transformation of the Public 
Sphere, he depicts the existence of one definitive and contained (liberal) public sphere, but fails 
to explore its exclusionary nature or to consider the alternative counter-publics that were 
established alongside the official public sphere, including: nationalist publics, popular peasant 
publics, elite womens publics, and working-class publics.27  Foremost among those excluded 
from the dominant public sphere were women, who actively sought other ways to access political 
life: establishing voluntary associations, lobbying, and protesting.  Habermass discourse ethics 
thus restrict the conversation at the outset, shutting down the voices of those who most need to 
be heard.   
 
Despite their perception of profound limitations in Habermass moral theory, Fraser and 
Benhabib remain sympathetic critics.  They perceive his thought as an important emancipatory 
resource and base much of their own theorising upon some variation of his discourse ethics.  In 
Situating the Self: Gender, Community and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics,28 Benhabib 
                                                
25 Benhabib, Models of Public Space, pp. 88-89. 
26 Habermas, Structural Transformation; Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere, pp. 109-142. 
27 Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere, p. 116. 
28 Benhabib, Situating the Self. 
63 
 
reformulates Habermass discourse ethics, arguing for a post-Enlightenment project of 
interactive universalism.29  She aims to situate reason and the moral self more decisively in 
contexts of gender and community, while insisting upon the discursive power of individuals to 
challenge such situatedness in the name of universalistic principles, future identities and as yet 
undiscovered communities.30  Benhabibs revision of Habermass discourse ethics emphasises 
its political character and argues that it should be modified to reflect a more historicist and 
hermeneutic position and to take account of concrete as well as generalised others.  The 
reversibility of perspectives is at the core of her reformulation.31  She calls for an ongoing moral 
conversation, in which actors seek to listen and to understand others points of view before 
making moral judgments.  Fraser builds less directly on discourse ethics, but her writings have a 
Habermasian emphasis on participation, dialogue and democratic justice.  She points to the all-
affected principle as central to any reflections on justice, saying that all those affected by a 
given social structure or institution have moral standing as subjects of justice in relation to it32 
and pursues a transformative agenda of change that encompasses redistribution and recognition.   
Revisiting the Limitations of Modern International Ethics 
The Habermasian emphasis on a thin cosmopolitanism that proffers a mechanismdiscourse 
ethicsfor living in community without (ostensibly) prescribing substantive guidelines for 
living has provided inspiration for numerous critical thinkers attempting to challenge mainstream 
                                                
29 Benhabib, Situating the Self, p. 3. 
30 Benhabib, Situating the Self, p. 8. 
31 Benhabib, Situating the Self, pp. 8, 53-54, 140-141 
32 Nancy Fraser, Reframing Justice in a Globalizing World, New Left Review, Vol. 36 (2005), p. 82. 
64 
 
thought without falling prey to charges of cultural imperialism or relativism.  However, although 
this has given rise to a more embedded international theory that examines more seriously 
questions of power and inclusion, it does not go far enough.33  Habermasian critical international 
theory emphasises a form of discourse in which the better (more rational) argument takes 
precedence and excludes other conversational styles; it continues to be premised on a foundation 
of moral progress; it fails to consider social and historical context; and it neglects the unseen 
emotional dimensions of global suffering.  In what follows, I revisit these four themes and argue 
that while the Habermasian turn has gone some way to mitigating the pitfalls of liberal thought, 
the limitations remain. 
Rational and problem-solving 
Liberal political thought prescribes rational solutions to political problems, utilising the 
hypothetical-contract method to establish guidelines purported to be for the good of all.  
Habermasian critical theory, in contrast, refuses to prescribe particular ways of being or rules to 
live by.34  Linklater highlights this difference between liberal social-contract and Habermasian 
ethics: 
Kant believed that separate moral agents had a duty to ask if it was possible to 
universalise the maxim underlying any action.  Judgements concerning 
universalisability involved a process of private rationalisation for individuals rather than 
any dialogic encounter with others.  Habermas argues that the test of universalisability 
                                                
33 Although, as we shall see, different thinkers fall prey to the assumptions of liberal thought to different degrees, 
and feminist thinkers such as Fraser and Benhabib go further towards an embedded approach than do critical IR 
theorists such as Linklater. 
34 Although, as mentioned in the next section on moral progress, in discourse ethics there are two preconditions for 
dialogue: egalitarian reciprocity and universal respect. 
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is found not in private reason but in associating with others in wider communities 
dedicated to open and unrestrained dialogue.35   
Rather than determining universal guidelines for living on the basis of a thought experiment, 
therefore, Habermasian theorists maintain that such decisions should be made on the basis of free 
and open discussion with others within a community.   
 
In advocating the abolition of exclusionary arrangements through dialogue with the radically 
different,36 Habermasian ethics are less formal and divorced from real world suffering than 
those derived from Rawlsian thought experiments.37  Furthermore, their open-ended nature and 
emphasis on procedure rather than prescription acknowledges and gives space for contingency in 
a way that liberal approaches rarely do.  However, although a discourse ethics purports to make 
no substantive claims, it is not as thin a cosmopolitanism as its proponents maintain.  Discourse 
ethics restrict the type of conversation from the outset by assuming the existence of an 
underlying consensus which can and should be reached and thus ensuring that any conversation 
will be oriented towards achieving that goal.  Although Habermas proffers a different 
mechanismdialogueby which it can be reached, the essential position that such consensus 
exists and that it is able to be reached within and between given societies is a distinctive liberal 
assumption and radically underestimates the difficulty involved in reaching such consensus.38  
                                                
35 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, pp. 91-92. 
36 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, p. 5. 
37 For a critique of approaches to global justice premised on the Rawlsian difference principle, see Seyla Benhabib, 
The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 106-114. 
Benhabib maintains the Rawlsian emphasis on econometric accounting discounts the need for political judgement in 
reflections on justice.   
38 See Geuss, Outside Ethics, pp. 17-20.  
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Furthermore, it prioritises questions of justice over the good and by prescribing a particular type 
of discourserational argumentprecludes other types of communication. 
 
The search for basic guidelines on which all members of a community agree focuses attention on 
procedural issues and the minimal requirements of justice to the detriment of wider debate.  In 
Geusss words, discourse ethics encourage us to give up the search for a philosophically 
enlightened discussion of the good life and to limit our philosophical ambitions to 
describingthe minimal conditions of smooth human cooperation.39  The basic assumption in 
discourse ethics of an underlying consensus encourages a focus on rational analysis and goal-
oriented dialogue in an attempt to uncover the basic norms by which we should organise society.  
Linklater argues that the force of the better argument40 prevails.  This does not allow for 
alternative styles of conversation, marginalising those individuals who place a higher value on 
emotional and interpersonal dimensions of communication.41  Just as Habermass account of the 
history of the public sphere was biased and ignored its narrow, exclusionary characteristics,42 so, 
too, is his ideal speech situation biased against those who are uncomfortable with a rationalist, 
adversarial approach to debate.   
                                                
39 Geuss, Outside Ethics, p. 94. 
40 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, p. 97. 
41 Note that feminist critiques have been instrumental in challenging exclusively analytical, goal-oriented discourses, 
although I do not suggest an essentialist position that makes the case for an alternative feminine style of 
conversation.  See, for example, the discussion in Susan H. Williams, Legal Education, Feminist Epistemology, and 
the Socratic Method, Stanford Law Review, Vol. 45, No. 6 (1993), pp. 1571-1576.  For a feminist critique of 
deliberative democracy, see also Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2000), pp. 52-80.  Young advocates a broader conception of political communication, maintaining that discourse 
ethics should include not only diverse actors with diverse perspectives, but diverse forms of communication.  She 
points to styles of conversation valued more highly in non-Western cultures: greeting, rhetoric, and narrative.  For 
New Zealand Maori, for example, rituals of greeting are an important part of social and political interactions 
between groups, providing an opportunity for parties to acknowledge one another and build trust (p. 59). 
42 Fraser, Rethinking the Public Sphere, p. 116.   
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Even Benhabibs broader conception of discourse ethics is overly rationalist, privileging 
argumentative discourse.  She is critical of Habermas for privileging morality, defined as 
questions of justice, over ethics, or the good, and for maintaining that such issues as care and 
responsibility are merely personal matters on the fringe of ethical theory.  Following Carol 
Gilligan, Benhabib argues that this division privileges a traditionally masculine way of being to 
the denigration of a more feminine perspective.43  However, despite her feminist critique, 
Benhabib privileges a deliberative form of communication that entails the articulation of good 
reasons in the public sphere.44  This has given rise to criticism from feminist theorists, who 
maintain that such an approach is too restrictive and who proffer less formal forms of 
communication, such as those put forward by Iris Younggreeting, rhetoric, and narrative.45  
However, Benhabib maintains that Youngs alternative forms of communication have no place in 
public space, arguing that they would introduce arbitrariness and capriciousness to public 
debate and limit rather than enhance social justice.46  In response to Benhabibs critique, Young 
maintains that Benhabib joins those who construct an opposition between the rational purity of 
                                                
43 Seyla Benhabib, The Debate over Women and Moral Theory Revisited in Benhabib, Situating the Self, pp. 178-
202.  Gilligans classic book, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Womens Development (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1993) argues that women hear a different voice to that of men, upsetting deeply engrained 
ideas of uniformity, justice, and progression as they focus on an ethics of care and responsibility emerging out of 
relationship.  For Habermass critique of  Gilligan, see Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative 
Action, in Jürgen Habermas, Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, trans. Christian Lenhardt and 
Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Boston: MIT Press, 1990), pp. 175-182. 
44 Seyla Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, in Seyla Benhabib (ed.), Democracy 
and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999), pp. 67-74. 
45 See Iris Marion Young, Communication and the Other: Beyond Deliberative Democracy, in Seyla Benhabib 
(ed.), Democracy and Difference: Contesting the Boundaries of the Political (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1999) pp. 120-136; Young, Inclusion and Democracy, pp. 52-80.  See also the discussion in Kimberly Hutchings, 
Speaking and Hearing: Habermasian Discourse Ethics, Feminism and IR, Review of International Studies, Vol. 31, 
No. 1 (2005), pp. 155-165. 
46 Benhabib, Toward a Deliberative Model of Democratic Legitimacy, pp. 81-83. 
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argument and the irrationality of other forms of communication.47  She does not advocate that 
these less formal modes of communication replace rational argumentation, but rather that they be 
allowed to supplement it, and thus give generalised reason orientation and body.48  
 
The mechanism by which Habermasian theorists seek to address the ills of modernity is dialogue 
among those affected parties.  However, as we have seen, the conversation is restricted from the 
outsetit is analytical in style and oriented towards consensus about how best to solve the issue 
at hand.  In this way, the Habermasian approach exhibits characteristics of problem-solving 
theory, encouraging decisions on the basis of a restricted form of knowledge that privileges 
abstract, rational debate.  Underlying the belief that an underlying consensus exists, and that it 
can be uncovered through dialogue, is a strong belief in the possibility of moral progress.  This, 
too, is a characteristic that Habermasian theory shares with liberal problem-solving theory, and I 
revisit this limitation next.   
Assumes moral progress 
A belief in the possibility of moral learning is a central plank of Habermasian critical theory, 
although this belief is tempered with a greater awareness of the ambiguities of modernity49 than 
is a liberal account of progress.  Habermasian critical theorists acknowledge that alongside the 
potential for emancipation lies the potential for domination and inequality, but maintain that the 
progressive aspects of modernity are able to prevail over its dark side.50  They point to 
                                                
47 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 78fn. 
48 Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 78fn. 
49 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, p. 6. 
50 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, p. 177. 
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historical evidence in their defence of this belief.  Habermas maintains that in the eighteenth 
century the more fortunate nations learned that unfettered power can be restrained by law and 
points to international human rights as a contemporary example of such progress.51  He portrays 
rights as vehicles of emancipation whereby individuals are rooted in a community that affirms 
their identity and gives them a voice and a safe forum from which to dialogue with the other.  
In a similar vein, Linklater points to decolonisation and the end of apartheid in South Africa as 
impressive monuments to the achievements of cosmopolitan morality.52  Benhabib also points 
to the historic achievements of modernity, citing the fall of communism in Eastern Europe, and 
argues that modernity itself provides the resources for reforming the less salubrious aspects of 
the project of modernity.53  
 
A Habermasian approach to critical theory highlights a mechanism of learning: dialogue.  
Habermas believes that the systematic distortion of communication is at the heart of domination 
and that emancipation results from transcending such distortion through a process of critical 
reflection.54  In an account suffused with references to moral progress, Linklater draws on 
Habermass discourse ethics to argue that dialogue is the mechanism through which political 
communities become increasingly inclusive and just.  He maintains that the best efforts to remain 
true to the spirit of Kant and Marxs emancipatory projects emphasise the widening of dialogic 
community: 
                                                
51 Habermas, Remarks on Legitimation, p. 120.   
52 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, p. 24. 
53 Benhabib, Situating the Self, p. 2. 
54 Held, Introduction to Critical Theory, p. 256. 
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[Dialogue is] the medium through which greater human variety can be discovered and 
explored.  Dialogue holds out the promise that agreements will not be reached by 
ignoring or suppressing marginal and dissident voices.  The logic of the argument is that 
dialogic communities will be sensitive to the needs of the victims of the totalising 
project: namely, aliens beyond secured borders and a range of internally subordinate 
groups.55 
Linklater perceives the emancipatory potential of an international system being shaped by the 
twin influences of globalisation and fragmentation, seeing in its transformation the possibility for 
greater universality alongside a deep appreciation for the wealth of human differences.56  This 
negotiation of universality and particularity is facilitated by widening dialogic communities. 
 
Benhabib, too, believes in the possibility of moral learning through dialogue, and argues that it is 
most likely to take place under conditions of modernity.  She follows Habermass Kohlbergian 
model of stages of reasoning, arguing that moral learning is most advanced in modern societies 
or high cultures.57  In Benhabibs formulation, learning takes place through a moral 
conversation in which the ability to perceive others points of view, and to reason from their 
perspective, is crucial.58  Her discourse ethics presuppose normative content from the outset: it is 
assumed that every individual is worthy of participation (universal respect) and that each 
individual has the same rights within the conversation (egalitarian reciprocity).59  Benhabib 
asserts that only judgment guided by the principles of universal moral respect and reciprocity is 
good moral judgment, in the sense of being ethically right60 and that without these limits, 
                                                
55 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, p. 41. 
56 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, p. 41. 
57 Benhabib, Situating the Self, p. 6.  
58 Benhabib, Situating the Self, p. 8.    
59 Benhabib, Situating the Self, p. 29. 
60 Benhabib, Situating the Self, p. 54. 
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discursive interactions might be used for amoral or manipulative purposes.  She maintains that 
such attitudes are more likely to be found under the conditions of modernity and that, with 
increasing interdependence, they are spreading.61  In this way, she links particular characteristics 
of discourse (respect and equality) with a narrative of progress, saying that modern subjects are 
more likely to engage in appropriate and reasonable dialogue.62    
 
Habermasian critical theory offers a more nuanced view of progress than a liberal account; 
however, like liberal normative theory, it does not consider human frailty sufficiently.  Linklater 
situates his project against political realism, which he perceives as dangerously pessimistic and 
hostile to normative theory.  However, his critique of realism is almost exclusively a critique of 
neo-realist thought, which, he argues, preserves [realisms] imperfections.63  By failing to 
engage with classical realist thinkers such as Hans Morgenthau and Carl Schmitt, Linklater fails 
to address one of the more powerful critiques of progressive theory: the notion that life is 
inherently and tragically flawed.  According to classical realism, not only is moral progress 
unlikely, given the predominance of self-interest as a motivator towards action, but a strong 
belief in its inevitability can be dangerous, as the consequences of actions targeted to solve 
problems, no matter how well-intended, cannot be predicted.64    
 
                                                
61 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture: Equality and Diversity in the Global Era (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 2002), p. 40.   
62 For a critique of Benhabibs notion of moral learning, see Hutchings, Discourse ethics, feminism and IR, pp. 
158-162. 
63 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, pp. 14-45 
64 Schmitt, The Concept of the Political. 
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Benhabib, too, is overly optimistic about the ease of implementing a discourse ethics.  She 
speaks of reversing perspectives and increasing understanding of the concrete other as if these 
were easily attainable goals.65  However, this underestimates the complexity and variety of 
humankind: taking the perspective of those who come from similar cultural and educational 
backgrounds is difficult enough; being able to take the perspective of someone from a radically 
different background is even harder.  Young argues that Benhabibs notion of symmetrical 
reciprocity is not only unattainable but also undesirable.66  It is hubris to assume that one can 
imagine what it is like to belong to a different gender, class, or race.  It is also politically 
problematic, particularly across structures of privilege and oppression, where closely held 
assumptions and stereotypes cause us to misrepresent the position another would take.  Instead of 
enhancing understanding of the other, the attempt to take anothers perspective is likely to shut it 
down: if one assumes that one understands how another thinks and feels, one is less likely to 
suspend ones assumptions and listen.  In the place of Benhabibs symmetrical reciprocity, 
therefore, Young proffers the notion of asymmetrical reciprocity, which acknowledges each 
subjects different life history and social standing.  Such a notion replaces hubris with humility: 
one starts with the assumption that one cannot see things from the other persons perspective 
and waits to learn by listening to the other person to what extent they have had similar 
experiences.67  It is a more creative process of dialogue, one that more fully takes difference into 
account and is likely to enhance, rather than diminish, the understanding of the other.  
 
                                                
65 Benhabib, Situating the Self, p. 8.  
66 Iris Marion Young, Asymmetrical Reciprocity: On Moral Respect, Wonder and Enlarged Thought, in Iris 
Marion Young, Intersecting Voices: Dilemmas of Gender, Political Philosophy and Policy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, 1997), pp. 38-59. 
67 Young, Asymmetrical Reciprocity, p. 49. 
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A Habermasian approach to global politics rests on a theory of moral learning, proposing that 
societal learning can and does take place and that the mechanism for this learning is dialogue.  
With increasing dialogic communities, therefore, comes increasing justice and inclusiveness.  
However, this approach overestimates the ease of achieving consensus (Habermas and Linklater) 
or understanding (Benhabib) through dialogue.  Furthermore, the analytical, goal-oriented nature 
of the dialogue advocated restricts the conversation from the outset, working against the goal of 
inclusion.  One such consideration that is often excluded from Habermasian discourse ethics is 
attention to historical and social context, to which I turn next.   
Neglects history and social context 
The Habermasian turn in international political thought has prompted theory that is in many 
ways more embedded in historical and social context.  However, despite the attempt to elucidate 
a broader, more contextualised approach to political theory,68 the overall impression is of 
abstract, ideal theory that takes little account of social, economic, or historical constraints.  
Linklater maintains that the future of global society can be determined by freely chosen moral 
principles which further the autonomy of all human beings.69  Such a statement is revealing: it 
indicates a persistent belief in a disembedded rationality, despite the attempt to trace a more 
contextualised critical theory.  The notion of freely chosen moral principles is ideal theory, and 
bears little relation to the reality of life in community; all choices are influenced by past 
experiences and present social and economic factors.   
                                                
68 Habermas points to the communal dimension of individual rights (Habermas, Remarks on Legitimation, p. 
125.); Linklater speaks of the need to redress past wrongs (Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, p. 
101.) 
69 Linklater, The Transformation of Political Community, p. 22 [emphasis mine]. 
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Fraser goes further in outlining an embedded approach to discourse ethics, proposing a status 
model of recognition that takes cultural, economic and political barriers to social participation 
seriously.  She recasts recognition not as a problem merely of identity, but of social status.  The 
status model has participation at its heart: it advocates a politics aimed at overcoming 
subordination by establishing the misrecognized party as a full member of society, capable of 
participating on a par with the rest.70  To do this, it examines the various forms in which 
misrecognition is socially embedded, be it in formal law or societal norms, to name just two 
examples, and seeks institutional remedies for institutionalized harms.71  According to the 
status model, however, it is not just misrecognition that impedes participation in society; it is 
also the misallocation of resources, where economic structures and labour markets, for example, 
are organised in a way that promotes economic inequality and dampens voices where people 
struggle to materially survive.  Fraser lists a number of motivators of social discontent; these 
include resentment of unearned privilege, abhorrence of cruelty, aversion to arbitrary power, 
revulsion against gross disparities of income and wealth, antipathy to exploitation, dislike of 
supervision, and indignation at being marginalized or excluded.72  These phenomena are not a 
disparate collection; they are firmly linked by their role in facilitating or hindering social 
participation.73  When individuals fail to be given social status through a variety of mechanisms 
(including material), they fail to be accorded status or recognition.  She criticises the liberal 
welfare affirmative approach to problems of cultural discrimination and material inequality, 
                                                
70 Nancy Fraser, Rethinking Recognition, New Left Review, Vol. 3 (2000), p. 113. 
71 Fraser, Rethinking Recognition, p. 116. 
72 Nancy Fraser and Axel Honneth, Redistribution or Recognition? A Political- Philosophical Exchange, trans. Joel 
Golb, James Injram, and Christiane Wilke (London: Verso, 2003), p. 203. 
73 Bernstein, Suffering Injustice, p. 311. 
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which attempts to address inequality without changing underlying structures, and advocates 
instead a transformative approach that examines deep structures of injustice.74  Thus, Frasers 
politics are deeply embedded in both cultural and economic structures.  She seeks to understand 
the ways in which these perpetrate injustice and advocates their transformation at a deep level. 
 
As well as promoting the transformation of unjust cultural and economic structures, Fraser has 
more recently called for reflection on meta-political issues, adding a third dimension of justice 
that she terms the political.75  In this context, Frasers notion of the political is one that specifies 
who is included in, and who excluded from, the circle of those entitled to a just distribution and 
reciprocal recognition.76  It deals with the who? and how? questions of justice, pointing to 
dialogical paths forward.  Fraser argues that a post-Westphalian theory of justice must be 
dialogical at every level, meta-political as well as ordinary-political.77  Debates on justice 
cannot merely discuss what can be done; they must also reflect on who and how.  
 
The attempt to elucidate a more embedded approach to human suffering has thus had mixed 
results in Habermasian theory.  Theorists like Linklater, who adhere closely to Habermass 
discourse ethics, fail to do so, clinging to the notion of freely chosen moral principles in a way 
that is not far removed from a Rawlsian thought experiment.  Linklater perceives the goal of 
discourse ethics as being increasing justice and freedom.  The path towards this goal is through 
                                                
74 Nancy Fraser, From Redistibution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a Post-Socialist Age, New Left 
Review I, Vol. 212 (1995), pp. 68-93. 
75 Fraser, Reframing Justice, p. 74. 
76 Fraser, Reframing Justice, p. 75. 
77 Fraser, Reframing Justice, p. 87.  For Fraser, ordinary-political refers to issues of representation within states 
whilst meta-political refers to the deeper issue of boundary-setting: who is included and who is excluded from a 
particular political community. 
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rational, forward-looking dialogue that neglects consideration of history and social context.  
Fraser, on the other hand, traces a more nuanced critical theory, one that includes attention to 
recognition and redistribution as precursors to participation in communal dialogue.  However, 
even this approach, which takes sociocultural and economic structures into account, does so in 
order to facilitate a dialogical approach to emancipation and fails to problematise the notion of 
moral learning or dialogue as the mechanism of progress.  Furthermore, Fraser does not look 
closely at historical injustices or traumas, focusing instead on more observable institutional and 
social barriers to participation.  In what follows, I advocate the need to consider the place of 
individuals and communities inner lives in reflections on suffering in world politics.      
Neglects inner lives 
As we have seen, Habermasian critical theory prioritises a rational, goal-oriented dialogical 
approach to ethics in global politics and in consequence, like liberal problem-solving theory, 
precludes consideration of less observable aspects of human experience.  Although a desire to 
emancipate humankind from suffering provides the motivation for discourse ethics, this suffering 
is all too often instrumentalised and the influence of present emotion or past traumas on present 
capability for political interaction is all but ignored.  This is problematic because emotion plays a 
powerful and varied role in world politics.  In cases of extreme suffering and trauma, individuals 
and communities can withdraw from political engagement (acting in) or use the experience as a 
motivator for revenge in order to right wrongs (acting out).78   
 
                                                
78 See, for example, Dominick LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 2001).  For a more in-depth discussion on the role of trauma in world politics, see Chapter Five of 
this thesis. 
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Habermasian approaches to suffering argue that the path to emancipation from suffering is 
through dialogue and thus assume that all relevant human experience is able to be expressed 
verbally.  However, this is far from the case.  In her reflections on hunger, Kirsten Hastrup 
argues that a dependence on hard facts such as social and economic structures has disallowed 
attention to non-observable, non-quantifiable aspects of human experience.  She notes that not all 
experience can be put into words:  
I would contend that by far the largest proportion of cultural experience lies beyond 
words in this senseTime has come to transcend the limitations of Western 
logocentrism and its implication that everything worth saying is immediately sayable in 
our own kind of alphabetical prose.79  
The idea that a great deal of human experience is beyond words is especially important when it 
comes to reflections on suffering.  Traumatic experiences are by definition so overwhelming as 
to defy assimilation into normal categories in memory and in emotion.  Those who have been 
traumatised thus have enormous difficulty in recalling and expressing their stories, and it takes 
time and work before they are able to be communicated verbally.  Even if traumatised 
individuals are able to give words to their experiences and the ways in which these have shaped 
their world view, the strong emotion that accompanies such retelling does not fit easily into an 
adversarial, analytical dialogue. 
 
Another aspect of living in political communities that is beyond words, or hidden from view, is 
the influence of historical wrongs on peoples inner lives.  History has a long reach, and can 
shape present day choices, particularly in the case of extreme suffering inflicted by one group on 
                                                
79 Kirsten Hastrup, Hunger and the Hardness of Facts Man, New Series, Vol. 28, No. 4 (1993), p. 732. 
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another.  In the previous chapter, I pointed to the depoliticisation that can take place when 
historical traumas are not addressed, illustrating this with reference to the Australian 
governments relationship to its Aboriginal population.  Another reaction to historical trauma is 
where the trauma becomes a chosen trauma80 and is used to motivate acts of revenge (as in the 
Balkan wars) or the reassertion of self-worth (as in the case of National Socialism in Germany).  
However, the analytical approach of discourse ethics leaves little room for discussion of emotion 
and its forward-looking orientation does not allow a focus on the past. 
 
Linklater has recently called for a new agenda for critical international theory, arguing that 
suffering should be returned to the centre of critical thought in the manner of the early Frankfurt 
School.  Such an agenda would address the marginalisation of the body and emotions in the 
Habermasian turn and [regard] the prevalent attitudes to harm, suffering and vulnerability, and 
the dominant dispositions to cruelty and compassion, in different international states-systems as 
the principal object of sociological inquiry.81  However, although Linklaters re-appropriation of 
the notion of suffering for critical international thought is inspired by the work of the early 
Frankfurt School, he uses it in an instrumental, goal-oriented way that does not sit well with the 
work of those theorists he draws on.  He proposes that humankinds common experience of 
bodily and emotional pain can be used to motivate an emancipatory global ethics; in short, as the 
foundation for moral progress.82  In this way, suffering can be used in a positive way, as useful 
knowledge that might provide an impetus for an increasingly moral global community.  This 
                                                
80 Vamik Volkan, Blood Lines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism (Colorado: Westview Press, 1997). 
81 Andrew Linklater, Towards a sociology of global morals with emancipatory intent, Review of International 
Studies, Vol. 33 (2007), p. 140. 
82 See also Andrew Linklater, The Harm Principle and Global Ethics, Global Society, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2006), pp. 
329-343. 
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instrumentalisation of suffering sits ill with the work of early Frankfurt School theorists such as 
Adorno and Horkheimer, who had a deep distrust of narratives of progress and demanded that 
attention be drawn to particular suffering as a counter to broad, universal categories, which were 
so often co-opted by the status quo.   
Conclusion 
The Habermasian turn in international political thought has articulated a critical approach to 
global ethics that is less rules-bound and elitist than Rawlsian liberalism.  Its dialogic approach 
means that it is more embedded in political communities, especially in the version put forward 
by Fraser, who takes seriously structural and social barriers to participation.  However, 
considerable limitations remain which undermine its critical intent and continue to obscure those 
aspects of human experience that do not fit into the category of useful knowledge.  Although its 
thin cosmopolitanism purports to allow the negotiation of universalism and difference, it 
undermines this goal by prescribing a narrow style of conversation that privileges rational, 
analytical debate oriented towards consensus.  In what follows, I introduce a second strand of 
critical thought in international politicspoststructuralismwhich is much more successful in 
articulating societal critique.   
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Poststructural International Political Thought 
In this section, I argue that poststructural approaches to suffering in world politics address many 
of the shortcomings of liberal cosmopolitan and Habermasian political theory: they emphasise 
the fragility of moral progress; they focus attention on particular suffering instead of seeking 
universal truth; and they acknowledge the role of emotion in the politics of violence.  A concern 
with the political leads poststructural international theorists to question settled assumptions about 
world politics, emphasising the contingency and violence of existing social arrangements and 
practices, and points to the need to give voice to those who are deemed other or different.  In 
this sense, poststructuralism has similar goals to Habermasian critical theory, which also purports 
to look beyond the status quo to structures of power and attempts to integrate the other into 
widening political communities by dialogue with the radically different.  However, the two 
strands of critical thought have very different approaches.  Habermasian theories advocate a 
cosmopolitan agenda of reaching for universally acceptable guidelines for living in the pursuit of 
justice, whereas poststructural theories reject the notion of an underlying consensus grounded in 
the notion of humanity or in the common experience of suffering.83  For poststructuralism, 
suffering is not valued as a means to ground problem-solving theory; instead, it is valued in and 
of itself, as a pointer to the traumatic real that lies beneath the surface of modernity.  
Furthermore, although Habermasian theories have the stated goal of the inclusion of the other,84 
this is undermined by the nature of debate and its search for a rational consensus on what 
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constitutes the better argument.  In contrast, poststructural theorists tend to resist attempts at 
incorporation and domestication, advocating an uncovering and celebration of alterity and 
difference.  In what follows, I give a brief overview of the origins and trajectory of poststructural 
thought, before discussing the ways in which it has influenced certain strands of critical 
international theoryencouraging the questioning of settled assumptions and a concern with 
identity and difference.    
 
Poststructuralism emerged as a response to the structuralist movement.  Structuralists such as 
Claude Lévi-Strauss and Jacques Lacan conceive of society as a coherent system comprised of 
constituent social phenomena whose interrelations are governed by underlying rules.  
Furthermore, they maintain that the organisational rules of the system can be uncovered and 
known through rigorous structural analysis.  Structuralism claims for itself a scientific approach 
to the social world that dispenses with subjectivity, claiming that the subject is constituted by the 
system and therefore that the subject can effectively be removed from analysis.  It draws heavily 
on the work of Ferdinand de Saussure, whose semiotic theory characterises language as a system 
of signs that convey meaning.  Within this system, de Saussure distinguishes between two parts: 
the signifier, the visible and audible element, and the signified, the conceptual element.  A 
poststructural critique opposes structuralism on a number of grounds, arguing that it abstracts 
from real human experience and fails to see historical and cultural variations in meaning.  Both 
positions reject the notion of an autonomous subject; however, a poststructural view perceives 
the subject as constituted not by a unified, stable system (as in structuralism) but instead stresses 
the arbitrary and shifting nature of social experience and meaning.  Poststructuralism rejects the 
basic assumptions of modern philosophy, maintaining that there is no absolute foundation for 
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knowledge and that those oppositions that are taken for granted in traditional metaphysics 
(subject and object, noumenal and phenomenal) are in fact violent hierarchies of values that 
suppress the less valued term.85   
 
Unlike Habermasian international theory, which appropriates and responds to the (later) work of 
Habermas and is therefore relatively unified in its approach, poststructural international theory 
borrows from a number of thinkers who articulate their critique of modernity in varying ways.  
However, despite significant differences between the varieties of poststructural thought, at the 
centre of their approach to world politics is a concern with the political.  Jenny Edkins 
characterises the political as an arena in which social givens are not taken for granted and the 
possibility of thinking and being otherwise, of transgressing accepted boundaries, is explored.  It 
operates at a much more fundamental level than politics: [it] has to do with the establishment of 
that very social order which sets out a particular, historically specific account of what counts as 
politics and defines other areas of social life as not politics.86  The everyday technical business 
of politics (including elections, government, and diplomacy) distracts from the struggles of the 
political.  We are confinedto activity within the boundaries set by existing social and 
international orders, and our criticism is restricted to the technical arrangements that make up the 
politics within which we exist as subjects of the state.  The political subject and the 
                                                
85 See Ashley, The Poverty of Neorealism, pp. 233-237; Steven Best and Douglas Kellner, Postmodern Theory: 
Critical Interrogations (New York: The Guilford Press, 1991), pp. 1-33; Edkins, Poststructuralism and 
International Relations, pp. 23-26.  In The Poverty of Neorealism, Ashley highlights the way that structuralism is 
utilised by neorealists in their reworking of classical realism, which they deem insufficiently scientific.  
86 Edkins, Poststructuralism and International Relations, p. 2. 
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international subject, too, are safely caged and their teeth pulled.87  Politics depoliticises, 
drawing us away from political struggle and towards instrumental calculation.   
 
A concern for the political is central for both Jacques Derrida and Michel Foucault, despite their 
different approaches to critique.  Derrida is particularly concerned with language and writing, 
and the ways in which hierarchies of terms suppress and exclude the other, while Foucault is 
more concerned with power as it operates in historical and sociological terms.  For both thinkers, 
reflections on questions of justice and the ethical are enormously important and, as such, both 
have profoundly influenced critical international political thought concerned with suffering in 
world politics.  Derrida advocates deconstruction in response to the brokenness of modernity, 
maintaining that disturbing and unsettling settled hierarchies leads to the inherently political 
moment of decision.  In his reflections on the relationship between deconstruction and justice, 
Derrida points to the founding violence of the law and the impossibility of justice.88  He points to 
the necessary ordeal of the undecidableengaging in the process of making an impossible 
decisionbut argues that it is impossible for any decision to be fully just:  
either [the decision] has not yet been made according to a rule, and nothing allows us to 
call it just, or it has already followed a rulewhether received, confirmed, conserved or 
reinventedwhich in its turn is not absolutely guaranteed by anything; and, moreover, 
if it were guaranteed, the decision would be reduced to calculation and we couldnt call 
it just.89   
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For Derrida, this moment of decision is the moment of the political; it is undergoing this process 
that marks the political from the instrumental.  Foucaults critique of modernity takes a rather 
different approach, emphasising the historical contingency of existing social and political 
arrangements.  Like the Frankfurt School, he is critical of Enlightenment thought for promoting 
new forms of oppression in the name of freedom, and he advocates political resistance to the 
dominance of the status quo.90  According to Foucault, political change arises from widely 
dispersed, localised struggles against micropowers that will eventually have an effect on the 
whole.91   
Questioning Settled Assumptions 
Poststructural approaches to violence in world politics emphasise the contingency of existing 
social arrangements, asking why they exist and how they might be challenged.  In this way, they 
are critical, in Coxs sense, not taking the world as it is, but asking why and how current social 
arrangements and practices are accepted as normal and desirable.92  In international political 
thought, this has led poststructural theorists to question both the dominant state-system and the 
emerging post-Westphalian liberal-democratic order championed by Habermas and his 
followers.  
                                                
90 Indeed, Foucault remarks that if he had come across the writings of the Frankfurt School earlier in his life, I 
would have avoided many of the detours which I made while trying to pursue my own humble pathwhen, 
meanwhile, avenues had been opened up by the Frankfurt School.  It is a strange case of non-penetration between 
two very similar types of thinking which is explained, perhaps, by that very similarity.  Michel Foucault, Michel 
Foucault: Politics, Philosophy, Culture, Laurence D. Kritzman (ed.) (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 26. 
91 Paul Rabinow (ed.), The Foucault Reader: An introduction to Foucaults thought (London: Penguin Books, 
1984), p. 174. 
92 Cox, Social Forces, States and World Orders. 
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The problematisation of the state is a key theme in poststructural thought.  In contemporary 
world politics, there is a forgetting of the historically-specific violence with which states come 
into being and the right to defend borders with violence is seen as right and acceptable.93  
William Connolly argues that the state goes to unacceptable lengths to protect its sovereignty, 
refusing to accept its limitations and demonising that which challenges it.  He portrays the 
democratic territorial state as a paradoxical site of liberation and imprisonment.94  It liberates in 
that it gives (some) people a voice and encourages government to heed those voices in light of 
their electoral power.  But it also imprisons in that it suppresses minority voices in an effort to 
promote general, settled norms.  This desire to protect state sovereignty often gives rise to a 
politics of forgetting95 whereby those actions and attitudes incoherent with a states perception 
of itself are concealed.  For example, the medicalisation of traumatised military personnel 
ensures concurrent depoliticisation in order to prevent questioning that might threaten the states 
use of violence.96 
 
Alongside a poststructural problematisation of the state is a questioning of the emerging post-
Westphalian order advocated by critical thinkers such as Habermas and Linklater.  David 
Campbell argues that their liberal cosmopolitanism radically underestimates the moral 
complexity of crises and that the pursuit of moral criteria to establish normative principles that 
                                                
93 See, for example, Jenny Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2003), p. 6; Jabri, Solidarity and spheres of culture. 
94 Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization, p. 152. 
95 Connolly, The Ethos of Pluralization, p. 138. 
96 Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics; Pupavac, Pathologizing Populations and Colonising Minds. 
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would separate the good from the bad is untenable.97  The Habermasian pursuit of settled 
norms is grounded on a metaphysical humanism; however, this humanism is not sufficiently 
human.98  Connolly agrees, maintaining that settled codes based on transcendent truths are not 
only insufficiently human, but actively dangerous: systematic cruelty flows regularly from the 
thoughtlessness of aggressive conventionality, the transcendentalization of contingent identities, 
and the treatment of good/evil as a duality wired into the intrinsic order of things.99  The 
metaphysical humanism upon which cosmopolitanism is grounded is a transcendental 
egoism:100 egoistic, because it extracts embedded truths from particular traditions and insists 
that they apply without question to all, and transcendental, because it insists on its grounding in 
an accessible underlying consensus or higher law that can be identified as true.   
 
Vivienne Jabri also maintains that Linklaters call for the transformation of political 
community fails to live up to its critical, emancipatory goals.101  Although it purports to 
encourage dialogue between the radically different, in reality, the post-Westphalian project is a 
political and moral ordering of individuals and institutions.  Jabri points to historical evidence of 
such ordering, namely colonial and post-colonial dispossession of indigenous peoples in the 
name of progress and civilisation.  She maintains that a key problem with the cosmopolitan 
project is a certain dislocation from history; this allows its advocates distance from the concrete 
realities of violence and suffering that accompany interventions wielded in the name of 
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cosmopolitan justice.102  It is in the historical specificities of the modern project that political 
reality challenges closely-held normative assumptions.   
 
Jabri draws on the work of Michel Foucault to call into question accepted practices of 
humanitarian intervention in the face of suffering.103  According to Foucault, every society 
creates regimes of truth that both generate and are sustained by power structures.104  The 
human rights regime is one such regime of truth, sustaining fundamental hierarchies built into 
the liberal cosmopolitan projecthierarchies that facilitate the use of violent force by liberal 
democratic states in the name of emancipation.  Paradoxically, the sovereignty of liberal 
democratic states is reinforced as they intervene in the name of human rights and a post-
Westphalian liberal order.105  Jabri reflects on the discourses of truth that are produced in the 
lead up to war, noting that there is rarely room for uncertainty or doubt as to the motivations for 
invasion or the means that will be employed:  
The war against Serbia, the war in Afghanistan, the invasion of Iraq, are represented in 
discourse as humanitarian wars and as such those conducting war confer to themselves 
not just righteousness and authority, but the right of judgement and articulation.  
Opposition to war is represented as a discourse of complacency and, at worse, as 
complicitous appeasement of tyranny.106 
To think critically in a time of war is to reject this attitude of righteous superiority and moral 
certitude and to engage in the political practice of thinking otherwise.   
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Identity/Difference 
A related theme in poststructural thought is a concern with alterity, with those regarded as 
other.  Disturbing settled concepts vis-à-vis the state and liberal cosmopolitanism encourages a 
broader conception of identity, where political subjects identify not only or even primarily as 
citizens of a territorial state, but as members of diverse groups.  Poststructural theorists call for a 
politics of responsibility, and, in particular, political action on behalf of marginalised groups.  
Campbell maintains that for Foucault, the overriding concern is the struggle foror on behalf 
ofalterity rather than a struggle to efface, erase, or eradicate alterity.107  A states-based or 
liberal cosmopolitan system is seen as erasing alterity by presenting subjects as homogeneous 
citizens, be it of a particular state or of a globalised world.  Foucaults notion of an inescapable 
responsibility for the other is an ethically transcendent principlenot prescriptively universal, 
but a new form of universality that does not rely on any a priori sense of essential sameness.108  
He advocates a different form of solidarity, one that aims to disturb the moral hierarchies of the 
liberal cosmopolitan project.     
 
Campbell argues that the interface between identity and difference is central to the modern 
condition, but that it is also unstable and shifting: 
our condition can be characterised by the problematic of identity/difference, where 
neither term can be understood except in relation to the other, and because of which 
claims about secure identities, traditionally authorised grounds, and the political 
                                                
107 Campbell, Why Fight, p. 513, emphasis in original. 
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necessities said to flow from them are met with a critical scepticism, even as they have 
to be invoked and rearticulated in responding to summons of alterity.109 
A concern with difference challenges prevalent notions about politically relevant identities; ones 
political identification need not be limited to being a citizen of a state.  However, the relationship 
between identity and difference is complex; in challenging the notion of stable identities and 
related political obligations in order to support difference and alterity, one is simultaneously 
invoking the notion of identity, albeit of a different form.  
 
A theoretical concern with alterity and difference has a strong affinity with the identity politics 
movements of the 1980s and 1990s, when a distrust of grand narratives led those on the Left 
away from a focus on class struggle and economic exploitation and towards a concern with 
recognition, particularly of marginalised groups.  Broad political projects with grand narratives, 
such as Marxism, were seen as suppressing particularity, just as a states-based political system 
suppressed difference.  Advocates of identity politics encouraged collective action in the form of 
affirmative action and an increased sensitivity to difference in language.110  But, as we shall see, 
it also shifted focus from broader issues such as economic marginalisation and redistribution of 
resources, and it has led to the reification of identity, oversimplifying its complexity and 
multiplicity.111 
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Poststructuralism: Shortcomings 
A poststructural approach to thinking about world politics disturbs settled assumptions and 
established hierarchies in a sophisticated and challenging way.  However, in unsettling settled 
hierarchies there is a tendency to overemphasise the previously neglected side of a hierarchy to 
the detriment of its other.  Susannah Radstone argues that the deconstruction of binaries, such as 
private and public, individual and social, was intended to challenge dominant approaches to 
scholarship but that it has led to a slippage in theory that leads from an initial questioning of 
binaries to a focus on only one side of the pair.112  In this section, I point to three areas in which 
the deconstruction of binaries has led to an imbalanced emphasis.  I argue that a focus on 
recognition displaces concern with economic injustice; a focus on the particular displaces 
attention from public and institutional fora; and a focus on encircling the traumatic real 
displaces attention from the relief of real-world suffering and can lead to passive melancholy.     
 
The narrow focus on identity and difference in certain strands of poststructural thought has 
displaced attention from broader issues such as class and economic marginalisation.  Benjamin 
Arditi illustrates this problem with reference to the metaphor of a walking stick that Lenin is 
purported to have used: in order to straighten it, one needs to bend the handle in the opposite 
direction; however, there is always a risk that one will apply too much or too little pressure.  
Arditi maintains that in identity politics, too much pressure has been applied: The radicalization 
of the critique of grand narratives and the relentless vindication of particularism served to part 
ways with, say, the class reduction of Marxism, but it also turned the question of difference into 
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something akin to the essentialism of the totality it criticized.113  This overcorrection has 
distracted attention from economic structures and from the issue of redistribution, which are 
perceived as totalising, homogenising narratives that distract from difference and particularity.    
 
As well as distracting from underlying economic structures through the reification of identity, a 
focus on identity politics can have a negative cultural and political backlashwhat Arditi terms 
the underside of difference.  The destabilisation of identity and proliferation of alternative 
modes of being is heralded as emancipatory and progressive; however, the link between 
difference and emancipation is by no means certain.  Indeed, many people feel threatened by the 
increasing complexity of a postmodern world, in which options abound.  Arditi argues that one 
particularly worrying response is a turn to fundamentalism, where simple answers provide 
assurance and a sense of stability in an uncertain world.114  Other problematic responses include 
apathy and retreat from the public sphere,115 and an indefinite deferral of judgment out of respect 
for multiplicity and difference.116  He argues that at the root of the underside of difference is an 
emphasis on particularity that devalues universality whilst simultaneously attempting to invoke 
the category of universal rights:  
the emphasis on particularityleads to an ambiguous understanding of the goodness 
of difference and the universality of universals.  But it is a deceptive forgetfulness, for 
the very idea of pure self-referential particularity is inconsistent, if only because the 
dispute about the status of dialects is enounced through the language of rights.117   
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An overemphasis on the particular can also exclude consideration of public and institutional 
forms of political struggle.  In a discussion on the politics of memory, Radstone argues that the 
emphasis on individual suffering and trauma stories has led to the displacement of political and 
historical categories in memory and trauma studies.  She argues that there is a need to revisit the 
maxim the personal is political, taking into account the complex relations between memory 
and the wider social and public spheres within which it is given meaning, screened, recognized 
and misrecognized.118  The wholesale devaluation of the universal and of public and 
institutional categories hinders analysis of global suffering, which is more than the sum of 
individual experiences and cannot be understood without also examining social and historical 
context. 
 
A related critique of poststructural thought is that the desire to avoid domestication and 
depoliticisation can, paradoxically, put limits on actual political struggle.  Edkins relates 
Derridas notion of undecidability and impossible justice to Slavoj ieks notion of the 
traumatic real and the impossibility of closure.  According to iek, all attempts to create a 
meaningful social system use ideology to obscure the real.  iek maintains that to act 
politically is to occupy the place of the lack,119 pointing to the unreality of the constructed 
order and accepted discourses of truth.  He advocates a repeated encircling of the traumatic 
real, a refusal to fall prey to the politics of forgetting.120  Edkins draws on ieks critique of 
ideology in her reflections on September 11, noting: 
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The lesson of trauma is that what we call social reality is grounded in a series of stories 
we tell ourselves.  Trauma demonstrates that these narrativesabout the strength and 
invulnerability of the state, about the security and protection it can give, and about the 
way in which lives lost are lives sacrificed for a greater causecannot prevent 
catastrophe.121  
In response to such a traumatic interruption to social reality, Edkins advocates a repeated 
marking of the site and a refusal to forget.  Such a response cries out against the premature 
closure of wounds and acknowledges the profound challenges that traumatic events present to 
accepted social arrangements.  However, such an approach to social reality and its inevitable 
traumas can result in a failure to integrate it into a broader historical context and can prevent 
eventual working through, for fear of domesticating or gentrifying the moment of the real.  
There is a tension to be negotiated between encircling or marking the real, in ieks terms, and 
relieving suffering; it is important that those who have suffered are not prevented from bearing 
witness and questioning accepted categories in the wake of trauma, but it is also important that 
not forgetting does not become an endless melancholy from which there is no escape, and 
which may itself depoliticise.122   
Conclusion 
The critical turn in international political thought emerged as a response to the perceived poverty 
of liberal ethics, with Habermasian critical theory and poststructuralism being the most 
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prominent strands of critical international theory.  I have argued that these offer a more 
embedded approach to world politics, but that significant limits remain.  Habermasian theory 
remains wedded to a form of problem-solving theory and thus loses its critical edge, while 
poststructural theory overemphasises personal and particular aspects of human experience at the 
expense of communal and universal categories.   
 
According to Habermasian critical theory, the project of modernity remains unfinished and its 
emancipatory potential can prevail over its dark side.  However, it still falls prey to many of the 
limitations of liberal ethics, giving precedence to public and universal categories and abstracting 
from particularity.  Even its more nuanced versions, such as those put forward by Benhabib and 
Fraser, continue to remain wedded to a strong version of moral progress and to emphasise 
rational argument that abstracts from historical context and disallows narrative and emotive 
conversational styles.   
 
Poststructural approaches, in contrast, deepen a critique of liberal approaches to justice: they 
draw attention to particular suffering and the contingencies of accepted social orders, be it the 
Westphalian state system or the emerging post-Westphalian order.  They also point to the 
traumatic real, to the violence underlying accepted social arrangements.  However, in 
challenging established truths and deconstructing binary opposites, there is a tendency in some 
versions of poststructural thought to over-emphasise one side of the binary pair (private rather 
than public, particular rather than universal). There is also a fixation with marking the lack 
rather than working through.  Paradoxically, this can lead to a depoliticisation in the name of 
politicisation.   
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This chapter, then, examines the two major critical strands of International Relations theory and 
judges them both unsatisfactory.  Having set up this dilemma in Part One of the thesis, I turn in 
Part Two to an exposition of critical theory in the tradition of the early Frankfurt School, which 
offers a speculative understanding of suffering in world politics that enables societal critique and 
gestures toward alternative ways of being in the world.  
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PART TWO
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INTRODUCTION 
The first part of this thesis contained a critical review of the most well-known mainstream and 
critical strands of international ethics.  I now move on to deepen and consolidate that critique by 
exposing its roots in an alternative tradition of thought, the tradition of early Frankfurt School 
critical theory, and pointing towards a more appropriate, positive response to suffering. 
 
I begin with Adornos critique of Enlightenment, which informs much of what I had to say in 
Part One about the tendency towards abstract universalism and instrumentalism in liberal, and to 
a lesser extent, Habermasian thought.  Adornos thought contains some echoes of the 
poststructural emphasis on the importance of concrete particularity, the profoundly personal 
nature of lived suffering.  A fuller appreciation of suffering serves as an important corrective to 
tendencies towards universality, abstraction, instrumentalism and an over-developed sense of 
progress that characterise liberal and Habermasian thought.  The reductive instrumental 
rationality of Enlightenment thought delivers repression in the name of freedom and shuts down 
social critique.  Suffering plays a central role in Adornos challenge to this tradition.  It grounds 
a negative dialectics, which seeks to cling to the particular and the non-identical in an attempt to 
challenge the instrumentalism of Enlightenment thought.  However, Adorno also refuses to 
succumb to the solipsist tendencies of poststructuralism whose fragmentary approach rejects 
broader social categories.  Instead, he asserts the importance of mediation between subject and 
object, thought and being, particular and universal.  The purpose of negative dialectics is to 
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preserve space, within the totalising impact of Enlightenment thought, for a metaphysics of hope, 
a conception of promise that can operate as a counter to bleak reality in order to guard against 
despair and inaction. 
 
Adorno, famously, did little to flesh out what this kind of hope or promise might look like, 
though some fragmentary ideas can be gleaned from his writings on art and education.  However, 
other writers have drawn on Adornos legacy in ways that move his approach forward. In 
Chapter Four I consider one of these thinkers, Gillian Rose.  There are strong overlaps between 
Rose and Adornos work.  As in Adornos writings, Roses thought is rooted in an acute 
awareness of suffering and a refusal to take refuge in simple answers and generalities (as in 
modern ethics) or in resignation and exclusive particularity (as in much poststructural thought).  
However, in contrast with Adornos work, Roses main adversary is postmodernism.  Rose is 
annihilatingly critical of postmodern thought, arguing that its refusal to negotiate binary 
oppositions is an avoidance of the work of social theory, which requires a constant struggle to 
know and understand.  Rose points to the (historical and existential) trauma inherent in so much 
of human experience, and argues that unless these traumas are worked through, they can exert 
profound societal damage.  For Rose, the process of working through involves inaugurated 
mourning, which entails a struggle to know and to be known.  She juxtaposes this concept of 
mourning against the postmodern tendency to take refuge in melancholy, refusing to work 
through trauma for fear of domesticating the real. Rose maintains that endless melancholy 
depoliticises.  Traumatic experiences must be worked through in order to facilitate constructive 
political engagement, so as to avoid the political withdrawal or search for revenge that is so often 
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the legacy of trauma.  The relationship between particular suffering and the broader political and 
social order, then, is a dialectical one. 
 
In chapter five, I support Rose and Adornos arguments, and draw out some of their potential 
implications for dealing with trauma and violence, through an engagement with literature on the 
concrete historical experience of trauma and world politics.  I argue that the disasters of 
modernitypolitical violence, extreme poverty, displacementengender unspeakable suffering 
for countless millions and that any analysis of global society cannot ignore the category of 
trauma.  A more nuanced understanding of trauma enhances our understanding of world politics, 
pointing to the contingency of social arrangements and to the dangers of unhealed trauma, and 
also challenges us to think and respond differently to suffering.  I examine two broad responses 
to trauma: acting out and working through.  Individuals and communities who act out 
repetitively relive their traumatic experience(s), trapped in the past that so deeply wounded them.  
In order to make sense of their experience, they take refuge in meaning-making narratives, 
painting the world in simplistic terms of good and evil and, at times, finding purpose in a search 
for revenge.  Acting out in response to trauma is euporia, the easy way.  Working through, in 
contrast, requires struggle: unflinching, painful reflection on the particular traumatic experience 
and on the wider implications for society.  It involves reflection on the particular to illuminate 
broader social processes and gradually enables constructive political reengagement.  In Roses 
terms, working through involves knowing and being known; the being known requires that 
narratives of suffering are attended to and learned froma defiant rejection of the solipsistic 
individualism of so much of modern society.  
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Overall, I point to a different way of thinking about violence and suffering.  I advocate a return 
to critical theory in the tradition of the early Frankfurt School: social theory that looks beyond 
immediate problems to the historical, social, and psychological processes that preceded them and 
seeks a deeper, critical understanding before rushing forward with quick-fix solutions.  I 
advocate the creation of public fora for critical self-reflection and discussion, but of a different 
kind to that advocated by Habermasian theorists.  Rather than adversarial debate with rational 
consensus (Habermas) or understanding (Benhabib) as its goal, I argue that what is needed is an 
opportunity for stories to be told and, above all, listened to, so that they might challenge those 
closely-held beliefs and practices that damage ourselves and others.  Such an approach does not 
reject the notion of moral progress, but perceives its fragility and maintains that a notion of 
progress is more useful as a counter to distressing reality than as the perceived inevitable result 
of following good guidelines for living.  Nor does it reject reason, although it refuses to accept 
an instrumental rationality that seeks measurable, generalisable solutions to easily-identifiable 
problems.  Theory in this tradition has a speculative Hegelian core: it takes concepts such as 
universality and particularity, public and private, identity and difference, and attempts to hold 
them together in thought and practice, seeking to understand how they are mediated by one 
another.  Where Habermasian critical theory effectively reinforces the traditional hierarchies of 
binary opposites in Western metaphysics, privileging abstract universals over particulars, and 
poststructuralism privileges the previously neglected side of the pair, emphasising the particular 
over the universal, a speculative critical theory insists upon the negotiation of both, interrogating 
the ways in which they illuminate each other whilst also acknowledging their refusal of the other.  
Above all, it does not take refuge in the cowardice of abstract thought that shuns the sensuous 
101 
 
present in monkish fashion,1 but attends to suffering, creating space for giving voice to bodily 
and psychological pain.2  This attention to concrete particularity helps us to understand more 
general societal processes in turn, providing a comprehensive analysis of society and gesturing to 
possibilities for its transformation. 
                                                
1 Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion III, trans. E. B. Spiers and J. B. Sanderson (New York: The 
Humanities Press, 1962), p. 101, cited in Adorno, The Experiential Content of Hegels Philosophy, p. 78. 
2 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 203. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
ADORNO, SUFFERING, AND PROMISE 
In this chapter, I turn to the early Frankfurt School of critical theory and argue that it offers a 
more sensitive and balanced approach to violence and suffering in world politics than that 
proffered by Habermasian or poststructural theories.  Although a number of thinkers outside 
International Relations theory are drawing on the early Frankfurt School as an alternative to 
mainstream contemporary ethics,3 it remains under-explored in International Relations.  I focus 
primarily on the thought of Theodor W. Adorno, one of its most prominent intellectuals, and 
argue that his approach to suffering is more attuned to concrete human experience and the 
difficulty of positive intervention in a culture so wedded to the status quo than the approach of 
the later Frankfurt School.  He advocates the situating of bleak reality in historical and social 
context, not forgetting immediate pain but also looking beyond this to its complex and often 
hidden antecedents.  Alongside this sensitivity to human suffering, Adorno holds firm to a 
utopian hope in the possibility of reconciliation, a sense of future promise that keeps despair and 
resignation at bay. I argue that Adornos negative dialectics provide a more convincing analysis 
                                                
3 See, for example, Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics; Geuss, Outside Ethics; Martin Jay, Refractions 
of Violence (New York: Routledge, 2003).   
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of society than the critical alternatives that sound loudest in international political thought: 
Habermasian and poststructural theory.   
 
Adornos critical theory falls quite deliberately outside contemporary, problem-solving ethics.  
He abhors the instrumental rationality of modern ethical thought; his critique of Enlightenment 
thinking offers a powerful corrective to the abstractions of normative international political 
theory.4  His work also offers a profound challenge to Habermasian discourse ethics, tempering 
the pursuit of emancipation with attention to particular suffering.  Habermas maintains that an 
increasingly discursive society marked by public argumentation is unambiguously positive; 
Adorno does not, seeing it as requiring careful management and pointing to the difficulty of 
rational debate after traumatic experience.  Habermas also puts forward the ideal of consensus, 
reached by open, rational communication, as being something to aspire to.  Adorno, in contrast, 
believes that consensus is more likely to lead to conformism than to a free and open society and 
points to the importance of critical reflection and the preservation of alternatives to the status 
quo.5   
 
Adornos work also offers a challenge to poststructural theory.  Although his approach has 
strong affinities with poststructuralism, with its emphasis on concrete particularity as a 
correction to historical progressivism, his dialectical approach means that he also attends to 
broader social processes and institutions and the ways in which these constitute (and are 
                                                
4 For an excellent book dealing with the ethical dimensions of Adornos thought, see Bernstein, Adorno: 
Disenchantment and Ethics.  
5 Theodor W. Adorno, Minima Moralia, trans. E.F.N. Jephcott (London: Verso 1974/2005), §§ 44, 50, 93; Geuss, 
Outside Ethics, p. 236, fn. 10. 
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constituted by) particularity.  He also continues to hold fast to Enlightenment ideals and the 
utopian hope that things might yet get better, arguing that to reject these would be to take refuge 
in despair and resignation and prevent analysis of totalising repression under modernity.  He 
argues that what ails society is not too much Enlightenment but too little and that critical 
intellectuals have a responsibility to enlighten Enlightenment through attention both to 
particularity and to social structures.   
 
My exposition of Adornos work deepens my earlier critique of liberal approaches to violence 
and suffering and gestures towards an alternative approach to international political thought.  I 
begin by briefly situating Adorno in the context of the early Frankfurt School before discussing 
his critique of modernity, noting his debts to Hegel and Marx.  I then examine his response to 
pervasive suffering under modernity, which is twofold: to enlighten Enlightenment with attention 
to suffering and particularity, and to gesture towards a metaphysics of hope.  I argue that his 
negative dialectics offer a way of negotiating binary opposites that does not fall into the violent 
hierarchies of modern philosophy, or into the inversion of those hierarchies in poststructural 
thought, and that his notion of promise keeps despair at bay despite pervasive suffering.   
Adorno and the Critique of Enlightenment 
The Frankfurt Institute for Social Research facilitated the development of the strand of post-
Marxist thought known as the Frankfurt School of critical theory, providing the forum and the 
105 
 
means for interdisciplinary social research.6  The Institute was established in 1923 at the 
prompting of Felix Weil, the son of an affluent merchant.  Weil obtained the means to found and 
support the Institute so that it might be independent from any demands the Academy or 
government might otherwise exercise; although there was a formal link to the University of 
Frankfurt, the Institute was able to remain essentially autonomous.   
 
The first director of the Institute, Carl Grünberg, was a staunch Marxist for whom the purpose of 
the Institute was to promote a Marxism that challenged the status quo without seeking absolutes.  
Although these Marxist roots continued to be influential, the unimaginative methodologies 
linked with the strongly Marxist bent of the early years were soon challenged by Max 
Horkheimer, who followed Grünberg as director from 1931.  Those with orthodox Marxist 
leanings were criticised for overemphasising the economic substructure of society and neglecting 
other important realities.7  Two tenets of Marxism in particular were abandoned: the concept that 
economic life was central and social life epiphenomenal; and the concept that societal 
development was heading in a positive direction.   
 
Horkheimer was an enormously influential director who attracted an outstanding group of 
thinkers to the Institute.  He actively encouraged a multidisciplinary approach that drew on 
philosophical and social theory alongside social scientific research.  In his inaugural address to 
the Institute, he spoke of the need to work together to broaden the focus of social research:  
                                                
6 See the following book for a detailed account of the genesis of the Frankfurt School: Martin Jay, The Dialectical 
Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950 (Boston: Little, 
Brown and Company, 1973). 
7 Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, p. 55. 
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Todayall depends on organizing research around current philosophical problematics 
which, in turn, philosophers, sociologists, political economists, historians, and 
psychologists engage by joining enduring research groups in order to do together what 
in other areas one is able to do alone in the laboratory and what all true scientists have 
always done: namely, to pursue their philosophical questions directed at the big picture 
with the finest scientific methods, to transform and to make more precise these 
questions as the work progresses, to find new methods, and yet never to lose sight of the 
whole.8   
Horkheimer did not seek solutions to these philosophical problematics with multidisciplinary 
research, but he hoped that greater understanding of society would serve the truth9 and lead to 
its gradual transformation.   
 
Adornos friendship with Horkheimer brought him into contact with the Institute, which he was 
loosely associated with from 1928, and he soon became one of its most prominent intellectuals.  
Adorno was born in 1903, and grew up in Frankfurt, where he also undertook his university 
studies.  He spent three years in Vienna from 1925-1928, studying composition under Alban 
Berg, during which time he became a part of the culturally avant-garde circles around Arnold 
Schoenberg and Karl Kraus.  This period instilled in him an appreciation of high culture that 
never mellowed and that has invited criticism by those who consider his writings to be elitist, 
self-indulgent, and apolitical.10  After returning to Frankfurt, he wrote Kierkegaard: 
                                                
8 Max Horkheimer, The State of Contemporary Social Philosophy, in Stephen Eric Bronner and Douglas MacKay 
Kellner (eds.), Critical Theory and Society: A Reader (London: Routledge, 1989), p. 32. 
9 Horkheimer, Contemporary Social Philosophy, p. 36. 
10 This is particularly the case in postmodern critiques of Adornos writings on culture.  See, for example, the 
critique of Adorno in Jim Collins, Uncommon Cultures: Popular Culture and Postmodernism (London: Routledge, 
1989).  For a discussion (and refutation) of the popular designation of Adorno as elitist and therefore unworthy of 
sustained engagement, see Calvin Thomas, A Knowledge That Would Not Be Power: Adorno, Nostalgia, and the 
Historicity of the Musical Subject, New German Critique, Vol. 48 (1989), pp. 155-175. 
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Construction of the Aesthetic, which was submitted as a Habilitationsschrift in 1931 and 
published as a book in 1933, on the day that Hitler took office.11   
 
The place of the critical intellectual in Germany became tenuous after the Nazi rise to power.  
The Institute was doubly unwelcome, being both Marxist and staffed by individuals of Jewish 
descent; it was soon accused of exhibiting tendencies hostile to the state and forced into exile.12  
The locus of the group shifted initially to Geneva, with other centres in Paris and London, and 
later to New York, where it established links with Columbia University.  Adorno spent the first 
four years studying in Oxford, before joining the others in the United States and officially joining 
the Institute in 1938.  Throughout these years, the Institutes journal Zeitschrift Fur 
Sozialforschung continued to be published (in Leipzig, Paris, and then New York), which 
provided a continuity and sense of community for the group, despite their exile.  The Institute 
remained in exile until 1950, when it returned to Frankfurt.  
 
Adorno was a major figure in the early Frankfurt School.  Indeed, he was the only member of the 
Institute to influence Horkheimer as strongly as Horkheimer did him.13  His writings are 
notoriously complex and cover a wide range of subject matter: aesthetics, musicology, sociology, 
cultural studies, literature and philosophy.  However, at the heart of his work is a critique of 
Enlightenment thinking, a concern that he shared with Horkheimer and other early Frankfurt 
School theorists.  He maintains that the Enlightenment project has been usurped by an obsession 
                                                
11 Theodor W. Adorno, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic, trans. Robert Hullot-Kentor (University of 
Minnesota Press, 1989). 
12 Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, p. 29. 
13 Jay, The Dialectical Imagination, p. 289. 
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with instrumental rationality; progress has brought new means of enslavement rather than the 
promised liberation.  Adornos critique of Enlightenment thinking is profoundly influenced by 
his readings of Marx and Hegel.  He draws on Marxs theory of value, but rejects his emphasis 
on the analysis of production as the basis upon which to understand society.  He also draws on 
Marx and Engels critique of Hegel; however, his debt to Hegel goes beyond a Marxist 
interpretation, inspiring his negative dialectics as well as his reflections on hope.  In the 
remainder of this section, I trace the influence of Marx and Hegel on the development of his 
critique of Enlightenment thought. 
 
For the early Frankfurt School, Enlightenment thinking is committed to a group of values that 
includes first of all, a substantive commitment to certain principles of humanity, noncoercion, 
rationality, the right of individuals to pursue their happiness; second, a particular view about how 
these goals can best be attained, namely by the systemic pursuit and implementation of a certain 
kind of knowledge.14  Adorno does not advocate that we turn our back upon Enlightenment 
ideals; on the contrary, he notes that reification of life results not from too much enlightenment 
but too little15 and argues that it would be barbaric to wipe away the whole [of Enlightenment 
thought] with a sponge.16  However, he abhors the type of knowledge with which these ideals 
are pursued.   
 
Enlightenment knowledge has three major properties: first, knowledge is held to be enhanced 
when objects or things can be subsumed into a general concept and where the constituent things 
                                                
14 Geuss, Outside Ethics, p. 164. 
15 Adorno, Prisms, p. 24. 
16 Adorno, Prisms, p. 32.  
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may substituted for one another; second, it is held to be instrumental, that is, useful for the 
organisation and control of the environment; and third, any meaning must be related to the 
identifying, instrumental nature of what is known.17  It prescribes useful solutions that will 
benefit user groups, and leads to a hyper-rationalist or problem-solving ethics.  Adorno is highly 
critical of such a shift in thinking, noting that [no] notion dares to be conceived any more which 
does not cheerfully include, in all camps, explicit instructions as to who its beneficiaries are.18   
 
In Dialectic of Enlightenment, Adorno and Horkheimer maintain that the desire for ever-
increasing control that springs from the pursuit of Enlightenment knowledge works against the 
attainment of Enlightenment ideals.19  The Enlightenment has stripped reason of rational ideals 
and reduced human interaction to power relationships and economic transactions.  This assertion 
draws on Marxs theory of value, which states that capitalism depends upon exchange value, 
whereby commodities have no intrinsic value apart from what they are worth on the market.20  
Adorno asserts that under modernity, human beings are treated as commodities: substitutable 
entities valued merely for their instrumental uses or ability to command market resources; even 
where commodification is resisted, the overriding pull of society is toward the status quo and 
those forms that are valued by society.  The mind thus shapes itself into socially acceptable, 
marketable forms and freedom becomes an illusion, made all the more dangerous and difficult to 
resist because of the appearance of freedom.  This is not the fault of Enlightenment ideals as 
such, but the instrumental use of these ideals in the promotion of a rational, efficient system: 
                                                
17 Geuss, Outside Ethics, p. 164. 
18 Adorno, Prisms, p. 29. 
19 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
20 The fullest discussion is contained in Karl Marx, Capital: Critique of Political Economy Vol. 1, trans. B. Fowkes 
(Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990). 
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The network of the whole is drawn ever tighter, modelled after the act of exchange.21  The 
driving force in society that Adorno and Horkheimer term the culture industry22 has numbed 
individuality and creativity: [the spirit] cannot survive where it is fixed as a cultural commodity 
and doled out to satisfy consumer needs.  The flood of detailed information and candy-floss 
entertainment simultaneously instructs and stultifies mankind.23  In such an atmosphere, social 
criticism becomes extraordinarily difficult; where worth is determined in terms of exchange, 
categories such as beauty and social worth become null and void, and things in themselves, 
including human beings and the natural world, lose their inherent value.    
 
Adorno maintains that the repression of humankind under Enlightenment can be challenged 
using Hegelian dialectics.  In doing so, he is influenced by Marx and Engelss critique of Hegel 
and their adoption of Hegels dialectical method.  Friedrich Engels distinguishes between the 
whole dogmatic content of the Hegelian system [which] is declared to be absolute truth, in 
contradiction to his dialectical method, which dissolves all dogmatism.24  This distinction 
between Hegels system, which is rejected, and his dialectical method, which is adopted, is a 
left-Hegelian move that is followed in part by Adorno.  On the one hand, Adorno perceives 
Hegel as a conservative thinker who provides an apology for the status quo25 and a defence of 
                                                
21 Adorno, Prisms, p. 21. 
22 See Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, pp. 120-167; Theodor W. Adorno, The Culture 
Industry: Selected Essays on Mass Culture (London: Routledge, 1991). 
23 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. xv. 
24 Friedrich Engels, Ludwig Feuerbach and the Outcome of Classical German Philosophy1888, (C. P. Dutt (ed.), 
New York: International Publishers, 1970 (1941)), p. 13, cited in Gillian Rose, The Melancholy Science: An 
Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1978), p. 57, emphasis in 
original. 
25 Adorno, Prisms, p. 19. 
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the State; on the other, he perceives Hegel as a revolutionary par excellence, whose dialectical 
method provides a means of challenging the status quo.  
 
Adorno points to Hegels critique of Kants dualisms as revealing the radical nature of his 
dialectics:  
The poles that Kant opposed to one anotherform and content, nature and spirit, theory 
and praxis, freedom and necessity, the thing in itself and the phenomenonare all 
permeated through and through by reflection in such a way that none of these 
determinations are left standing as ultimate.  In order to be thought, and to exist, each 
inherently requires the other that Kant opposed to it.26 
Instead of posing opposites that must be thought separately, Hegel sees the reflection of one 
extreme in the other, arguing that it is impossible to think one concept without also thinking its 
opposite.  He posits the category of mediation between the two concepts, examining the ways in 
which they constitute one another, without proposing a weak middle way.  For Adorno, this is 
the radical aspect of Hegels thought, setting his philosophy apart from traditional metaphysics, 
with its insistence on an ultimate principle from which everything must be derivable27 and from 
new philosophy or ontology, with its melancholy resignation.28  He finds in Hegels thought an 
alternative to Kantian dualism, and its reductionist legacy in modern liberalism, and to 
poststructural thought, with its overemphasis on the previously neglected side of a binary pair.  
Instead, he emphasises the importance of mediation (Vermittlung), which is an interpretive 
category that never settles on a middle ground between two poles, but operates in and through 
                                                
26 Theodor W. Adorno, Aspects of Hegels Philosophy, in Hegel: Three Studies, trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1993), p. 8.  
27 Adorno, Aspects of Hegels Philosophy p. 9. 
28 Adorno, The Experiential Content of Hegels Philosophy, p. 68. 
112 
 
the extremes.29  For Adorno, the content of Hegels philosophy is the notion that truthwhich 
in Hegel means the systemcannot be expressed as a fundamental principlebut is the dynamic 
totality of all the propositions that can be generated from each other by virtue of their 
contradictions.30  So where poststructural thought focuses on the categories of fragmentation, 
particularity, and alterity, and largely ignores notions of totality, universality, and collective 
solidarity, Adorno attends to the relations between the two sets of concepts.  He maintains that 
concrete particulars are shaped by wider social processes, and that attention to these particulars 
enhances our understanding of those processes.  
 
Adorno draws on Hegels dialectics to attack the notion of a complete separation of subject and 
object.  He maintains that such separation is false and masks the repression of the object by the 
subject.   The repression to which Adorno refers is not merely of the human other, though this 
is of central importance; it also refers to human domination of the natural world.  However, like 
other left-Hegelian interpretations of Hegel, Adorno firmly rejects Hegels identity theory, which 
posits the underlying unity of subject and object, thought and being, and leads to the belief that 
contradictory ideas and ways of life are part of a total truth.31  He maintains that identity theories 
lead to reification and a suppression of difference.  His oft-quoted remark that all objectification 
is a forgetting32 indicates a longing for a space where difference and non-identity might 
flourish.33  Furthermore, he argues that a concept of total truth denies the possibility of reflection 
                                                
29 Adorno, Aspects of Hegels Philosophy, p. 9. 
30 Adorno, Aspects of Hegels Philosophy, p. 12. 
31 Shierry Weber Nicholsen and Jeremy J. Shapiro, Introduction in Theodor W. Adorno, Hegel: Three Studies, 
trans. Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1993), pp. xiv-xv. 
32Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 230. 
33 Martin Jay, Adorno, (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1984), p. 68. 
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and leads to a withdrawal from human effort.  Instead, he proposes a conception of subject and 
object, thought and being, whereby they cannot be thought without reference to each other and 
are therefore neither completely separate nor in complete unity.34  He stresses the ways in which 
the concepts mediate one another, showing how thought is shaped by societal discourses and 
institutions, and society is shaped by thought and practice. 
 
Although Adorno is strongly influenced by a Marxist interpretation of Hegel, he does not 
uncritically accept a left-Hegelian reading; indeed, in many ways the critical theory of the early 
Frankfurt School can been seen as a return to Hegel from Marx.35  Unlike most Marxists, Adorno 
posits his method of immanent critique against Hegels fundamental antinomies.  He argues 
that whilst the Hegelian system silences thought through the reification of philosophical 
categories, its power can be appropriated in order to criticise itself, by holding the system up 
against the categories it sets forth.36  Thus, Adorno stays true to Hegels philosophy, resisting his 
concluding moves and finding truth amidst the untruth: Hegelian dialectic finds its ultimate 
truth, that of its own impossibility, in its unresolved and vulnerable quality, even if, as the 
theodicy of self-consciousness, it has no awareness of this.37  Adornos appropriation of Hegel 
is therefore not only in the separation of his method from his system; Hegels speculative 
philosophy and continual critical self-reflection provided substantive inspiration for the 
                                                
34 Jay, Adorno, pp. 61-64.  
35 Nicholsen and Shapiro, Introduction, p. xxi. 
36 Rose, The Melancholy Science, p. 57.  See Adorno, Negative Dialectics, pp. 334-338, for a section entitled 
Dialectics Cut Short by Hegel where he criticizes Hegel for subsuming the particular to the universal and thus 
cutting short dialectics.  See also Gillian Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology (London: The Athlone Press, 1981), for a 
critique of this reading of Hegel.   
37 Adorno, Aspects of Hegels Philosophy, p.13. 
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development of his negative dialectics, his focus on sociohistorical particulars, and his ideas on 
utopian hope.   
 
Adorno finds in Hegel a focus on the negative that informs his critique of modern society.38  He 
maintains that the relentlessly positive, prescriptive, and instrumental forms of knowledge 
associated with the Enlightenment drive out all alternatives to the status quo, and that one of the 
tasks of a critical theory is to preserve those alternatives, ideas, and ways of being that cannot be 
neatly subsumed into socially sanctioned categories.  Through a process of commodification and 
reification, the Enlightenment has stripped language of the possibility of thinking outside 
accepted social parameters, promoting what Marcuse famously termed one-dimensional 
society.  Language is unable to give voice to pain and suffering or to express critical alternatives; 
instead, all difference degenerates to a nuance in the monotony of supply.39  Adornos negative 
dialectic, in contrast, is a dialectic of resistance40 that determinedly preserves the non-identical: 
that which cannot be understood, manipulated, or controlled by reason.  He draws on Hegels 
negative reason,41 which dismantles Kants rigid dualisms without reifying them, preserving a 
sense of mobility and process rather than a fixed notion of being.   
 
Hegel has been accused of being abstract, particularly in contrast to the phenomenological, 
anthropological, and ontological schools of thought.  However, Adorno maintains that this is far 
from the case, saying: he brought infinitely more concreteness into his philosophical ideas than 
                                                
38 Adorno maintains that Hegels philosophy is indeed negative: critique (Adorno, Aspects of Hegels 
Philosophy, p. 30).   
39 Adorno, Prisms, p. 21. 
40 Nicholsen and Shapiro, Introduction, p. xii. 
41 Adorno, Aspects of Hegels Philosophy, p. 8. 
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those approaches.42  His work is marked by sensitivity to reality and sociohistorical specificities.  
Hegel located truth not in abstract ideas, as in traditional metaphysics, asserting that truth is not 
a minted coin that can be given and pocketed ready-made,43 but in process and in the 
specificities considered beneath philosophical consideration.44  Adorno, too, sought to juxtapose 
sociohistorical particulars against the universal, believing that abstract universals suppressed 
contradictory realities. 
 
Despite eschewing Hegels identity theory, his belief that contradictory ideas and ways of life 
were all part of a total truth, Adorno argues that even this aspect of his thought contains a 
moment of truth.45  He argues that Hegels belief in eventual reconciliation and his doctrine of 
absolute spirit can be interpreted as a further negative move, a preservation of non-identity in the 
face of identity, of something non-immanent in the face of relentless positivity.  A key tenet of 
Enlightenment thinking is its rejection of that beyond what we can see or control; it was 
perceived as a coming of age, whereby society no longer needed to look to priests or rulers for 
guidance, but could rely instead on our individual reason and judgement.  Adorno finds in 
Hegels idealism a preservation of utopia, and inspiration for his own utopian belief that success 
might be achieved anyway, despite evidence to the contrary: 
The rigor of Hegels attempt to rescue the ontological proof of God in opposition to 
Kant may be questioned.  But what impelled him to do it was not a desire to eclipse 
reason but on the contrary the utopian hope that the block, the limits of the possibility 
of experience, might not be final; that success might be achieved anyway, as in the 
                                                
42 Adorno, Aspects of Hegels Philosophy, p. 67. 
43 Georg W. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977),  p. 22. 
44 Adorno, Aspects of Hegels Philosophy, pp. 35-40. 
45 Adorno, Aspects of Hegels Philosophy, p. 40. 
116 
 
concluding scene of Faust: that spirit, in all its weakness, limitations, and negativity, 
resembles truth and is therefore suited for knowledge of truth. 46   
Thus for Adorno, Hegels idealism, his belief in the absolute, is not unreasonable but rather a 
preservation of reason in the face of manipulative, fragmented rationality.  Adorno also finds in 
Hegels idealism a wholesome corrective to the philosophy of being propounded by Heidegger 
and his followers:   
If at one time the arrogance of the Hegelian doctrine of absolute spirit was rightly 
emphasized, today, when idealism is defamed by everyone and most of all by the secret 
idealists,47 a wholesome corrective becomes apparent in the notion of spirits 
absoluteness.48 
Adorno finds this new philosophy profoundly unsatisfactory with regards moral or substantive 
issues, accusing its proponents of secret idealism and pathos-filled narcissism.49  For Adorno, 
the abandonment of enlightenment ideals hinders social critique; there can be no immanent 
critique if there are no socially accepted values against which to measure society, and there can 
be no transcendent critique if there is no utopian ideal of reconciliation to strive for.  Hegels 
doctrine of absolute spirit provides one such utopian ideal.   
 
Adorno provides an approach to critique which differs markedly from both Habermasian and 
poststructural approaches.  His dialectics insists on attending to both sides of binary oppositions, 
moving back and forth in continual interplay between the knowledge of society of totality and 
                                                
46 Adorno, Aspects of Hegels Philosophy, p. 41. 
47 By secret idealists, Adorno is referring to those philosophers, such as Heidegger, who are concerned with 
questions of ontology. 
48 Adorno, Aspects of Hegels Philosophy, pp. 41-42. 
49 Adorno, Aspects of Hegels Philosophy, pp. 35-47; Rose, The Melancholy Science, p.52. 
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the specific content of the object.50  Thus, where both Habermasian and poststructural theory 
are one-sided in their analyses, privileging universalism and consensus (Habermasian) or 
particularity and dissensus (poststructuralism), Adorno attends to the ways in which these 
opposites constitute one another and contribute to a more comprehensive understanding of social 
reality. 
Adorno and Suffering  
The first part of this chapter has focused on Adornos critique of the ways in which 
Enlightenment ideals are pursued under modernity, tracing the influences of Marx and Hegel on 
the development of this critique.  In the remainder of the chapter, I focus more specifically on 
Adornos response to suffering, drawing particularly on his reflections in the wake of the 
Holocaust.  Can we still pursue emancipation in the face of such inhumanity?  Adorno argues 
that we must.  How should we do this?  In Cultural Criticism and Society, he argues that 
emancipation requires both immanent and transcendent critique of enlightenment: To insist on 
the choice between immanence and transcendence is to revert to the traditional logic criticized in 
Hegels polemic against KantDialectics means intransigence towards all reification.51  
Adornos first response, then, is one of immanent critique, or the enlightening of Enlightenment.  
His negative dialectics point to the bleak, dark side of modernity, drawing attention to that which 
is neglected in contemporary ethical thoughtthe concrete suffering of particular individuals
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and determinedly preserving alternatives to the status quo.  Alongside an immanent critique of 
modernity lies a utopian strand that points to something transcendent: the notion of promise and 
the possibility that things might yet get better.  I examine these two facets of Adornos thought in 
turnimmanent critique and utopian hopeand argue that he offers a stark alternative to liberal 
cosmopolitan and Habermasian approaches to suffering and violence in world politics.  His 
approach resists the pitfalls of liberal thought without denying Enlightenment ideals: where 
liberals propose abstract and universal solutions to modern ills, he refuses to make positive 
suggestions for change; where liberal approaches assume a strong version of moral progress, he 
is acutely aware of its fragility and reversibility; where liberals neglect historical and social 
antecedents of suffering, he insists that the atrocities of history must be given voice and worked 
through; and where liberals neglect individuals inner lives, he draws attention to particular 
suffering and the importance of critical self-reflection. 
Negative Dialectics 
Measuring the Enlightenment against its own standardsthe method of immanent critiqueis 
the first layer of Adornos response to modernity.  As we have seen, Adorno maintains that 
Enlightenment notions of justice and injustice fail to live up to their goal of improving individual 
well-being.  Furthermore, the appearance of progress towards Enlightenment ideals hinders 
critique: the semblance of freedom makes reflection upon ones own unfreedom incomparably 
more difficult than formerly.52  Adorno argues that the mind has fallen increasingly under the 
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anonymous sway of the status quo,53 as an obsession with universality has taken hold in both 
social theory and practicea rational, abstract, generalised universality that neglects concrete, 
sensuous particulars.54  Adornos negative dialectics are an attempt on his part to preserve the 
non-identicalthat which cannot be subsumed under universal concepts and which does not 
conform to closely held liberal assumptions about progress and rationality.   
 
Modern thought points to progress as one of the indisputable cornerstones and justifications for 
its ideology, with the proliferation of human rights discourse seen as evidence of such progress.  
However, Adorno takes issue with a narrative of progress on two counts.  At the most basic 
level, he argues that history does not provide convincing evidence for progressive philosophies 
of history; the calculated attempt to annihilate the Jewish race took place under modernity, and 
indeed, was facilitated by its rationalisation.55  More crucially, however, a progressive 
philosophy encourages us to discount individual suffering by viewing society through a lens that 
looks for progress: 
The philosophy of history repeats a process which occurred in Christianity: the 
goodness which in reality remains at the mercy of suffering is concealed as the force 
which determines the course of history and ultimately triumphs... 56 
An emphasis on progress encourages us to look for confirmation of moral progress in sweeping 
historical trends, discounting evidence to the contrary.   
                                                
53 Adorno, Prisms, p. 21. 
54 Bernstein, Adorno: Disenchantment and Ethics, p. 18. 
55 In Education After Auschwitz, Adorno argues that [t]he pressure exerted by the prevailing universal upon 
everything particular, upon the individual people and the individual institutions, has a tendency to destroy the 
particular and the individual together with their power of resistance.  Theodor W. Adorno, Education After 
Auschwitz in Theodor W. Adorno, Critical Models: Interventions and Catchwords, trans. Henry W. Pickford (New 
York: Colombia University Press, 2005), p. 193. 
56 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment, p. 224.  
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Against liberal notions of progress, then, Adorno draws our attention to the pervasiveness of 
suffering under modernity.  He argues that the concrete reality of human suffering must be given 
voice: The need to lend a voice to suffering is a condition for all truth57 and [p]erennial 
suffering has as much right to expression as a tortured man has to scream.58  The concrete other, 
glossed over by the abstraction of liberal social-contract theory, is often the individual 
experiencing the negative aspects of progress and is precisely the one who suffers in silence.  
The articulation of particular pain challenges the abstractions of liberal social-contract theory, 
which neglect the bodily and psychological dimensions of human experience.  Adorno maintains 
that bodily pain tells our knowledge that suffering ought not to be, that things should be 
different.59  It is at this intersection, where physical reality challenges closely held beliefs about 
the way the world is and should be, that the material world meets with the philosophical world 
and prompts criticism and social change.   
 
Part of Adornos emphasis on particular suffering as a corrective to abstract universals is his 
insistence that historical experiences of extreme suffering must not be glossed over or forgotten.   
There must be fora for telling the truth about the past, for enlightening those who do not know or 
who do not want to know about the horrors that have taken place under modernity: 
Enlightenment about what happened in the past must work, above all, against a forgetfulness 
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58 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 362. 
59 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 203. 
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that too easily goes along with and justifies what is forgotten.60  This truth-telling is crucial if 
humanity is to learn about itself, and what it is capable of, and to seek to do things differently.61  
Adorno argues that negative dialectics can bring a healing awareness as society perceives the 
marks of unreason in its own reason.62 
 
Adornos experience of living through the period of the Holocaust, albeit in exile, prompted 
agonised reflections on the unspeakable horrors and death suffered by millions deemed other 
by Nazi Germany and on what they meant both for Germany as a nation and also for humankind 
in general.  He famously stated that [t]o write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric,63 arguing that 
poetry cannot help but be co-opted by the dominant social forces which shut down and 
commodify alternative voicesthose same social forces that allowed Auschwitz to take place.  
Adorno uses the place name Auschwitz to refer to the Nazi genocide because it emphasises the 
concreteness and historicity of the events.64  He abhorred the detachment with which the 
atrocities were discussed just a decade after the fact:  
All of us today also recognize a readiness to deny or belittle what happenedhowever 
difficult it is to conceive that people are not ashamed to argue that it was surely at most 
                                                
60 Theodor W. Adorno, What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?, trans. Timothy Bahti and Geoffrey 
Hartman, in Geoffrey Hartman (ed.), Bitburg: In Moral and Political Perspective (Bloomington: Indiana University 
Press, 1986), p. 125. 
61 Although Adorno does not hold out great hope that this learning will take place, he maintains that we cannot give 
up reaching for a world in which Auschwitz does not happen again. See Adorno, Education After Auschwitz, pp. 
191-204.   
62 Adorno, The Experiential Content of Hegels Philosophy, p. 74. 
63 Adorno, Prisms, p. 34.  Note that with this phrase, Adorno has powerfully shaped Holocaust discourse.  His 
pronouncement has been transformed into the sound-bite after Auschwitz, putting Auschwitz at the centre of 
public and academic debate.  For reflections on the significance of this statement, put in the context of Adornos 
wider thought, see Michael Rothberg, After Adorno: Culture in the Wake of Catastrophe, New German Critique, 
No. 72 (1997), pp. 45-81. 
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only five million Jews, and not six million, who were killed.  Irrational too is the 
widespread settling of accounts about guilt, as if Dresden made up for Auschwitz.  
There is already something inhuman in making such calculations, or in the haste to 
dispense with self-reflection through counter-accusations.65 
Against such rationalisation and denial, he pushes for remembrance and reflection, arguing that 
what is repressed or unconscious will do much more damage than that which is made conscious.  
He argues that effective remembrance is extraordinarily difficult; it does not begin and end with 
reproach, but requires one to [endure] the horror through a certain strength that comprehends 
even the incomprehensible.66   
 
As well as drawing our attention to the particular horrors of past suffering, Adorno maintains that 
we have a responsibility to reflect upon how they came about.  In an essay on coming to terms 
with the past, Adorno asks what objective social conditions might have brought about the turn to 
National Socialism in Germany.67  He explores several conditions that might have facilitated the 
rise of fascism.  He argues that economic insecurity, combined with a need to conform to the 
                                                
65 Adorno, What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?, p. 116.  See also Saul Friedlander, Trauma and 
Transference in Saul Friedlander, Memory, History, and the Extermination of the Jews in Europe (Bloomington: 
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66 What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?, p. 127. 
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and cultural context in which the events took place.  Jay M. Bernstein argues that for Adorno, the destruction of the 
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instrumental rationality and the devastating efficiency of the Nazi machine.  See Zygmunt Bauman, Modernity and 
the Holocaust (New York: Cornell University Press, 2001).   
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status quo to preserve what little security they had, served to prevent citizens from becoming 
autonomous, politically mature agents who sought to hold their leaders accountable.  This 
insecurity, combined with the all-encompassing culture industry, meant that autonomous thought 
required painful intellectual effort, which was close to impossible under the circumstances.  In 
his words: 
The necessity of such adaption [to the given circumstances], to the point of identifying 
with the status quo, with the given, with power as such, creates the potential for 
totalitarianism, and is reinforced by the dissatisfaction and rage which that forced 
adaption itself produces and reproduces.  Because reality doesnt provide the autonomy 
or, finally, the possible happiness that the concept of democracy actually promises, 
people are indifferent to democracy, where they dont secretly hate it.68 
Although democracy promised freedom and happiness in the place of unfreedom, this was 
proved untrue.  Once again, Enlightenment ideals did not match concrete reality, provoking a 
dissonance and anger that paved the road for fascism, which promised security, integration, and 
collective greatness in the place of insecurity, disintegration, and humiliation. 
 
For Adorno, the enlightening of Enlightenment is a negative exercise.  He does not prescribe 
positive prescriptions for change, for fear that this will further hinder peoples ability to act as 
autonomous agents and to make judgements based on the conditions they face in a particular 
time and space:  
Men must act in order to change the present petrified conditions of existence, but the 
latter have left their mark so deeply on people, have deprived them of so much of their 
life and individuation, that they scarcely seem capable of the spontaneity necessary to 
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do soConcrete and positive suggestions for change merely strengthen this 
hindrance.69  
Adornos negativitywhere the maxim men must act is held alongside a rejection of concrete 
and positive suggestions for changeis the antithesis of the kind of tidy moral theory that helps 
us to feel better that is the substance of much international thought.  In shunning a positive moral 
theory, Adorno was in accord with Benjamin, who had a profound distrust of progressive 
historicism and famously maintained that there is no document of civilization which is not at the 
same time a document of barbarism.70  In part, the reluctance to flesh out critical theorys 
utopian impulses stemmed from the Jewish heritage of many of the Frankfurt School, with its 
prohibition on describing God.71   
 
Although Adorno refuses to seek solutions for the ills of modernity,72 he gestures towards a 
different kind of being that might ameliorate its worst excesses.  In What does Coming to Terms 
with the Past Mean? he points to political education as centrally important, arguing that 
although those who are likely to be receptive to such instruction are not those who are likely to 
be attracted to fascism in the first place, it is in no way superfluous to strengthen, through 
enlightened instruction, even this group against non-public opinion.73  He hopes that in doing 
so, cadres of self-reflective, critical intellectuals may develop who will then go on to have 
broader societal influence.  Part of the political education that Adorno advocates is critical self-
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reflection that enlightens the public about the past and its antecedents.  He suggests that we need 
a deeper understanding and acceptance of the principles of psychoanalysis and that although 
mass analysis is unlikely to take place, rigorous psychoanalysis should be firmly embedded in 
the institutions of intellectual circles.  At the very least, he argues, this would encourage 
intellectuals to avoid apportioning blame to others but instead turn their gaze on themselves and 
their own (often frustrated) reaction to societal conditions.  In his words, coming to terms with 
the past in the sense of aiming for enlightenment is essentially that sort of turn towards the 
subject: reinforcement of a persons self-consciousness and, with that, a sense of self.74  
Alongside critical self-reflection and enlightenment, though, should be a pragmatic appeal to 
self-interest: reminding the public of the disastrous consequences of war, of the horrific 
consequences not just for those deemed other whose lives were targeted to be eliminated, but 
also (albeit to a lesser extent) for those ordinary citizens whose lives were irrevocably 
damaged.75   
Promise 
Negative dialecticsthe enlightening of Enlightenmentis the minimal necessary response to 
the ills of modernity, and it is this which receives most attention from scholars reading Adorno.  
However, as we have seen, Adornos thought is not wholly negative.  Shierry Weber and Jeremy 
Shapiro argue that his negative dialectics are an essential vehicle for the individual trying to 
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75 Note that this appeal to self-interest shows a political awareness that many commentators are reluctant to ascribe 
to Adorno, who they consider apolitical and irrelevant.  However, in What does Coming to Terms with the Past 
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live an authentic life under modernitythey preserve the truth about society, looking beyond 
the slick façade of everyday life,76 as well as the truth about oneself.  However, this negation is 
only a part of Adornos response.  Alongside his often bleak reflections on modernity lies a 
thread of hope that gestures to something beyond the rational and immediate: 
while the expression of this negation is a part of the truth, it is only a partially 
developed form of it.  For the real truth about reality includes awareness of the 
potentiality, the desire, and the justification for transcending the perverted world.  It 
must go beyond the merely dialectical to what Hegel calls the speculative, in which the 
antagonism of the dialectic are resolved.77 
The second strand of Adornos response to modernity is his writings on utopia and promisethe 
transcendent critique to which he referred in his essay on cultural criticism and society.  It is to a 
consideration of this second response that I now turn. 
 
Adornos metaphysics are an important counterbalance to his negative dialectics and fall outside 
ethics.  His notion of promise is non-immanent and thus at odds with the immanency Geuss 
identified as the second pillar of contemporary ethics.  It points to something beyond that which 
can be seen, measured, and predicted and sits in stark contrast to the instrumental rationality of 
modern liberal ethics.  Part of what Adorno objects to in modern thought is precisely the 
marginalisation of metaphysics; he finds an answer to Kants refusal to look beyond the finite in 
Hegels reaching for the infinite.  Adornos notion of promise also differs markedly from a 
Habermasian idea of progress.  It is not something that can be known or achieved; where 
Habermas pursues an already existing consensus through rational argument, Adorno clings to the 
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notion of an unknowable, indefinable utopia.  The idea of a utopia is a negative move, preserving 
hope in the face of bleakness: The ray of light that reveals the whole to be untrue in all its 
moments is none other than utopia, the utopia of the whole truth, which is still to be realized.78  
We cannot let go of the Hegelian hope that we might yet succeed.79  The notion that the whole 
truth might one day be known inspires continued social criticism and praxis.  This hope softens 
the darkness of extreme suffering; it tells us that we should not give up trying to come to terms 
with what has happened to us or what we have inflicted on others.  Without this hope before us, 
we might give ourselves to despair, abandoning the struggle that is so central to Adornos 
reading of Hegel.80    
 
A reading of Meditations on Metaphysics gives the most concentrated insight into the place of 
metaphysics in Adornos thought.81  He eschews the possibility of traditional metaphysics after 
Auschwitz, saying Our metaphysical faculty is paralysed because actual events have shattered 
the basis on which speculative metaphysical thought could be reconciled with experience.82  The 
material world has collided with the metaphysical, yet it has not completely annihilated it.  The 
notion of promise, of hope remains.  In answer to the question What is a metaphysical 
experience? Adorno points to particularity, to fugitive ethical events83 that creep into everyday 
life.  He illustrates his metaphysics with reference to the childhood experience of happiness:  
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[W]e are most likely to visualize it, as Proust did, in the happiness, for instance, that is 
promised by village names like Applebachsville, Windgap, or Lords Valley.  One thinks 
that going there would bring fulfilment, as if there were such a thing.  Being really there 
makes the promise recede like a rainbow.  And yet one is not disappointed; the feeling 
now is one of being too close, rather, and not seeing it for that reason84 
This promise of happiness is a metaphysics of the particular;85 it gestures to the possibility of 
transformation in a world in which despair rather than hope sounds loudest.  A childs naïve 
sense of wonder and magic in imaginative play invokes the metaphysical: a sense of the non-
identical, whereby the particular is not perceived as fungible, or able to be substituted for 
another, but as a thing of value in itself.86   
 
For Adorno, great art also points to the metaphysical.  Under the culture industry, art has 
succumbed to commodification and the god of profit has come before criticism and truth.  
However, this was not always the case:   
Culture, in the true sense, did not simply accommodate itself to human beings; but it 
always simultaneously raised a protest against the petrified relations under which they 
lived, thereby honoring them.  Insofar as culture becomes wholly assimilated to and 
integrated in those petrified relations, human beings are once more debased.87 
The role of culture is to raise a protest against the commodification of human beings.  The arts 
can help to express pain where words fail; they resist universality and instrumentalism and point 
to the possibility of transformation.  They can help those who have undergone extreme suffering 
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to begin the process of living with and through their pain.88  The arts also preserve hope in the 
face of despair.  They point to something beyond the now; they say to us that everything is not 
just nothing.89  For Adorno, great artists like Beethoven gesture to what lies beyond the 
suffering and contradictions of modernity.  He maintains that great works of art express hope 
more powerfully than the traditional theological texts.90  In pointing to art and culture as part of 
a response to suffering, Adorno opens himself up to accusations of esoteric elitism and a poverty 
of politics, but evinces a much more human understanding of what it is to suffer. 
Conclusion 
Adornos work addresses the limitations of the Enlightenment thinking that underpins modern 
international ethical thought.  Enlightenment thinking encourages a way of viewing the world 
whereby objects and entities fall into general categories and are able to be substituted for one 
another.  Identity thinking and an emphasis on rationality encourage a discounting of individual 
human beings in a way that strips them of their humanity in any real sense.  Rawlsian social 
contract theory and its inheritors abstract from particularity, silencing the concrete other in the 
search for generally advantageous social arrangements and placing justice at the centre of liberal 
thought.  Adornos voice is an important counterbalance to the hyper-rational, problem-solving 
approach that holds sway in ethical thought.  Suffering does not prompt him to moral theory, 
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where prescriptions abound.  On the contrary, he believes that every time one tries to rationalise 
the bodily impulse, the urgency that propels one to action is lost.91  Adorno holds in balance the 
maxim that men must act, prompted by suffering, with the warning that this action must not be 
an instrumental, prescribed response.   
 
Adornos approach to suffering also offers an important corrective to Habermasian discourse 
ethics.  In denying the existence of an already existing path to Enlightenment that can be 
uncovered through rational discussion, Adornos response to suffering evinces a greater 
awareness of the aftermath of trauma and its assault on the ability to assimilate the experience 
into communicable categories.  Where individuals and communities have suffered greatly, the 
notion that they might be able to engage in dialogue with the hope of reaching a mutually-
acceptable consensus based on the force of the better argument is both insensitive and likely to 
be counterproductive.  Those who have suffered most are least likely to be able to participate in 
rational debate; their suffering needs to be given voice, but voice of a different kind.  Adorno is 
sensitive to the bodily and psychological dimensions of suffering and argues that these should be 
communicated in all their horror to challenge accepted social categories, not domesticated for 
general palatability and instrumental ends.   
 
Although Adorno focuses on concrete particularity and the details of everyday life as a counter 
to general social analysis, he also considers the ways in which larger social forces, structures, 
and institutions mediate concrete experience, and how attention to particularity sheds light on 
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those broader processes.  Thus, although his work anticipates poststructural thought in its social 
critique and emphasis on particularity, it differs significantly in its refusal to reject universal 
categories and in its insistence on a dynamic dialectical analysis that mediates between the two.  
Thus, Adorno is able to analyse the twin forces of fragmentation and totalisation in 
contemporary society, while poststructural theory, with its rejection of dialectics and macro-
theory, is less well equipped for analysis of homogenous repressive trends or collective historical 
struggle. 
 
Adornos refusal to prescribe solutions to the failings of modernity makes his writings 
unpalatable to many.  However, an Adornian approach is neither wholly negative nor wholly 
pessimistic.  He calls for the active preservation of alternatives to the status quo and gestures 
toward ways in which we might preserve pockets of self-reflection and social critique in the 
modern world.  Above all, however, he proposes a different way of being in the world, one that 
perceives the world as it is, fully aware of the contradictions and oppression that permeate 
existence, but that also sees beyond these failings to what could be, remaining alive to the 
possibility of beauty and kindness.  In Nicholsen and Shapiros words, this approach  
discerns and experiences the good, the true, and the beautiful through their 
deformationsas the negation of the latter, and as real in this negation.  It pursues 
freedom and happiness in a repressive and oppressive society without ideologically 
denying this repression and oppression.  It pursues the life of a critical intellect without 
suffering the deformation and rigidification that is the normal form of intellectual life in 
critical society.92 
                                                
92 Nicholsen and Shapiro, Introduction, p. xvii. 
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By determinedly perceiving the potential for the good and beautiful in the deformed, Adorno 
proposes a way of being that refuses to fall into flat despair or cynicism, preserving a critique 
that remains hopeful and mobile, whilst not denying the overwhelming bleakness of experience.     
 
Adornos notion of promise remains vague and ill-defined: he sees glimpses of hope, but is 
reluctant to flesh these out, leaving his writings as a message in a bottle for future 
generations.93  To get a better idea of what Adornos ideas can offer international political 
thought, we do indeed need to turn to the generations to whom he bequeathed them.  In the next 
chapter, I discuss the writings of Gillian Rose, a social theorist who was profoundly influenced 
by Adornos thought and found in his work a focus on suffering and a refusal to shy away from 
the disasters of modernity that informed her own.  She moves from Adornos negative response 
to suffering towards a more constructive, politically engaged response of mourning and political 
risk.  
                                                
93 This quote appears to be anecdotal. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
GILLIAN ROSE: FROM DIALECTICAL TO SPECULATIVE 
THOUGHT 
In the previous chapter, I drew on Adornos work to extend and deepen my critique of liberal 
approaches to international ethics, and to point to a different way of thinking about suffering.  
Adorno argues that we need to enlighten Enlightenment by highlighting the mismatch between 
ideals and reality, and advocates a negative dialectics that meets the universal with the particular, 
the abstract with the concrete, and narratives of progress with narratives of suffering.  In this 
way, his thought disturbs the accepted universalist, instrumental, rational approach to global 
suffering.  Alongside this negation, Adorno gestures to a fragile promise of something to come; 
however, his notion of promise is ephemeral and fragmented.  It is helpful to turn to those to 
whom he bequeathed his thought in order better to elaborate the implications for global politics.   
 
In this chapter, I examine the writings of Gillian Rose: an inheritor of Adornos thought who 
combines the humanity and multiplicity of early critical theory with a concern for acting 
politically.  She offers a different way of being in the world that mourns pervasive human 
suffering whilst also emphasising the need to negotiate the break between law and ethics and to 
take the risk of political engagement.  Like Adorno, Rose is acutely aware of the trauma 
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pervasive in modern life and draws on psychoanalysis in her social and political theorising.  Her 
approach to ethical thought has a consideration of pain and the struggle to respond at its heart.  
However, she is critical of Adornos dialectical method, which she considers dour, judgemental 
and work-shy1 and drawn to the speculative thinking of Hegel and Kierkegaard.  She uses their 
thought to elaborate her response to the brokenness of modernity: a response that calls for 
mourning and political risk.  Furthermore, where much of Adornos work is formulated in 
response to Enlightenment thought, Roses thought is primarily situated in response to 
postmodern thought, taking the critique of modern ethics as given.  As such, where the previous 
chapter deepens the critique of liberal responses to violence and suffering, this chapter deepens 
the critique of the critical (and especially poststructural) turn in international political thought. 
 
This chapter is divided into three sections.  The first section situates Roses work in relation to 
the Frankfurt School, and in particular to the thought of Adorno, which was the subject of her 
doctoral thesis.  The second section traces her move from dialectical thinking to speculative 
thinking, influenced by her readings of Hegel, Nietzsche and Kierkegaard.  The third examines 
her response to the disasters of modernity2a response that works through suffering and stakes 
itself politically, taking the risk of action alongside mourning.  
                                                
1 Caygill, The Broken Hegel, p. 25. 
2 Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, p. 76. 
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 Rose and the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory 
Rose is best known for her philosophical memoir, Loves Work, which points to her struggles 
with life and love, a life that ended before its time in 1995 after a battle with ovarian cancer.  The 
epigraph to her book, which she wrote in the last months of her life, is Keep your mind in hell, 
and despair not.3  Loves Work was not merely the title of her memoir, but her lifes work: 
loves work, the work I have been charting, accomplishing, but, above all and necessarily, 
failing in, all along the way.4  Rose began reading philosophy at the age of seventeen, and found 
in Platos Republic and Pascals Pensées a way of thinking to which she was inexorably 
attracted: 
Perplexed, aporetic, not dogmatic, they indicated the difficulty of the way, and the 
routes to be essayed.  I never discovered in them any euporia, any easy way or solution, 
any monologic, imperialist metaphysics.  Philosophy intimated the wager of wisdom
as collective endeavour and solitary predicament.  It redeemed the earnest stupidity of 
my schooling.5  
The earnest stupidity of her schooling was soon replaced by the even deeper stupidity of 
reading philosophy at Oxford as an undergraduate.   Rose found her education at St Hildas 
College dull and irrelevant, lacking in engagement with interesting societal and ethical questions.  
Fortunately, in her third year she encountered Jean Floud, who pointed her to sociological theory 
                                                
3 Attributed to Staretz Silouan 1866-1938.  
4 Rose, Loves Work, p. 71.  
5 Rose, Loves Work, p. 120. 
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and facilitated her rediscovery of an open, speculative, and critical consideration of society and 
ideas.6 
 
Roses ventures into the world of social theory led her to the Frankfurt School of critical theory.  
Her engagement with their works profoundly influenced the development of her own thought.  
Roses doctoral studies and first book focused on Adorno, with a sophisticated analysis of his 
thought that was far more than the introduction indicated by its title: The Melancholy Science: 
An Introduction to the Thought of Theodor W. Adorno.7  She was attracted to Adornos writings 
in part because of his insistent interdisciplinarity and his rejection both of liberal thinking and of 
the new philosophy of such thinkers as Heidegger and Husserl.8  Like Adorno, she found 
poststructural thought uninspiring and unconvincing, and unable to engage with the substantive 
concerns of traditional philosophy.  Indeed, her later works are in large part devoted to a critique 
of poststructural approaches to law and ethics.9  Despite finding much of value in Adornos 
work, however, his work left her unsatisfied on a number of counts.  She argues that his 
obsession with method leads to proceduralism, that his thought is insufficiently grounded in 
social and historical context, and that he loses sight of the political. 
 
Rose maintains that although Adorno is generally characterised as a Hegelian Marxist, he is 
better understood as a neo-Kantian Marxist: he falls into neo-Kantian dualisms and 
                                                
6 Rose, Loves Work, p. 122.  
7 Rose, The Melancholy Science. 
8 Rose, The Melancholy Science, p. 52.  According to Rose, Adorno believed the new philosophy did not raise 
substantive and moral issues as profoundly as the classical tradition had done, and this was partly because of the 
development of individual social sciences which had taken over some of the traditional concerns of philosophy. 
9 See, for example, Gillian Rose, Dialectic of Nihilism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1984); Rose, Mourning Becomes 
the Law; Gillian Rose, Judaism and Modernity: Philosophical Essays (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993).   
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methodologism despite his critique of Kant.10  Rose is unconvinced by Adornos immanent 
critique, noting that even at its most immanent, this form of critique succeeds at the expense 
of transforming all philosophy into epistemology, even when such philosophy consists of a 
radical attempt to renounce epistemology.11  Adornos obsession with method and style stems 
from his theory of society and his desire to negate dominant concepts, but leads him to 
methodologism all the same.12   
 
Rose welcomes Adornos broadening of Marxist thought beyond the economic to the cultural, 
but maintains that he pays too little attention to its historical and practical aspects.  She argues 
that he does not delineate an historical account of capitalism  that he rejects all forms of 
historicism13  and that his writings lack an adequate account of the state.14  His emphasis on the 
individual at the expense of the underlying socio-political context is limited and short-sighted:  
...Adornos emphasis on the formation or deformation of the individual did replace any 
further definition of the macro-factor, the form of domination.  He might at least have 
detailed the mechanisms by which power has become diffuse but omnipotent, and how 
that is related to change in the organisation of production.  Ideology, domination, and 
reification are simply equated with each other, and the individual is not satisfactorily 
reinserted into the socio-political context.15  
According to Rose, Adorno forfeits the benefits of adopting a Marxian approach, an approach 
that might have allowed him to situate individuals in their particular societal and political milieu 
                                                
10 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, pp. 27-33.  
11 Rose, The Melancholy Science, p. 76. 
12 See Roses chapter on Adornos ideas on method and concern with style in Chapter Two The Search for Style in 
The Melancholy Science, pp. 11-26.  His fragmentary style is perhaps best represented in his book Minima Moralia. 
13 Rose, The Melancholy Science, p. 37. 
14 Rose, The Melancholy Science, p. 4. 
15 Rose, The Melancholy Science, p. 95. 
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through an analysis of the means of production and social relations.  Instead, she argues, he 
makes it impossible to do so, failing even to locate a social subject.16   
 
Related to this failure to locate individuals socially and politically, Rose argues, Adorno fails to 
make room for praxis.17  Despite his call for interventions, he does not put forward any political 
goals.  She terms Adornos critique of Heidegger for the disconnect between his moral and 
political philosophy embarrassing, as Adornos own writings evince such a gap.18  His praxis is 
a praxis of thought; although it is more nuanced than a Marxian perspective, it has lost its 
emancipatory edge because of an emphasis on method and an abstraction from socio-historical 
particulars.  Adornos negative dialectics were developed as a response to the Hegelian dialectic; 
however, he inherits Marxs non-speculative misreading of Hegel, interpreting Hegels thought 
as a series of oppositions and characterising him as a dialectical dogmatist19 whose thought 
perpetuates the status quo.20   
 
Roses critique of Adorno does not do him justice; his interpretation of Hegel was much more 
nuanced than she gave him credit for, and his later writings, in particular, are concerned with 
broader social analysis and political intervention.21  Although Adorno does not make a clear 
                                                
16 Rose, The Melancholy Science, p. 141. 
17 Rose, The Melancholy Science, p. 37. 
18 Rose, The Melancholy Science, p. 76. 
19 Rose, Judaism and Modernity, p. 62. 
20 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 331. 
21 Adorno was periodically involved in public education, particularly upon his return to Germany after exile in 1949, 
and gave a number of radio broadcasts and public lectures in the hope of encouraging wider social critique.  See, for 
example, Adorno, Education after Auschwitz; Adorno, What does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?.  See 
also Lydia Goehr Reviewing Adorno: Public Opinion and Critique in Theodor W Adorno, Critical Models: 
Interventions and Catchwords, trans. Henry W. Pickford (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005) pp. xiii-lvi. 
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distinction between Hegels dialectical and speculative thought, he does discuss its speculative 
core and his concept of mediation enables him to hold oppositions together in thought and to 
examine the ways in which they constitute one another.  Furthermore, despite his rejection of 
Hegels identity thinking and his doctrine of absolute spirit, he found in these aspects of Hegels 
thought a wholesome corrective that could be used to counter ungrounded, fragmentary 
poststructural thought, and in the ideal of eventual reconciliation, Adorno found an important 
utopian counter to bleak reality.  However, Adornos reading of Hegel is essentially negative; 
even his insistence on the idea of utopia is a negative move.  Although he gestures towards a 
more positive, politically-engaged way of being in the world, Roses work on mourning and 
political risk speaks more directly to the problem of coming to terms with the past.  In the 
following section, I explore Roses speculative account of Hegel, focusing particularly on the 
trinity of ideas that he developed in reply to the limitations of Kantian thought: 
phenomenology, absolute ethical life, and logic.  I then examine her writings on the broken 
middle, the violent diremption of law and ethics, and the struggle to negotiate this brokenness 
without proposing to mend it.   
From Dialectics to Speculative Thought 
Roses criticisms of Marxian-influenced interpretations of Hegels thought in The Melancholy 
Science prompted a deeper engagement with Hegel; indeed, this became the focus of her next 
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project, Hegel Contra Sociology.22  In this book, Rose outlines the wide variety of readings 
inspired by Hegels work, and convincingly proffers an alternative account of his thought.  Her 
distinctive re-reading of Hegel portrays him speculatively and comprehensively.23  In many 
ways, Roses work on Hegel lays the foundation for her subsequent thought; some understanding 
of her interpretation of his thought is necessary if one is to understand her later work.24  
 
Roses reading of Hegel posits a speculative account of his work.  She does not separate his 
method (phenomenology) from his system (the idea of an absolute ethical life); she sees these as 
inextricable parts of the whole of his thought.  Hegel himself referred to his thinking as 
speculative, and distinguished it from dialectical thinking.25  In a letter to Friedrich Immanuel 
Niethammer dated 23 October 1812, Hegel considers the problem of how to introduce 
schoolchildren to philosophy.26  He distinguishes three forms of philosophical reasoning: 
abstract, dialectical, and speculative.  Abstract thought, he maintains, takes place primarily in the 
realm of thought and is the so-called understanding which holds determinations fast and comes 
to know them in their fixed distinction.  Dialectical thought, in contrast, is the movement and 
confusion of such fixed determinateness; it is negative reason...  Hegel maintains that 
                                                
22 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology. 
23 I do not engage with other interpretations of Hegels thought in this chapter, as my purpose in exploring Roses 
account of Hegel is to facilitate a deeper understanding of her thought, not to evaluate her interpretation in the light 
of others. 
24 For a more accessible speculative account of Hegel, see Hutchings, Hegel and Feminist Philosophy, particularly 
Chapter Two: Philosophy as the Task of Comprehension.  Hutchings interpretation of Hegel is influenced by 
Roses holistic approach (p. 161, fn. 2) and her book demonstrates how Hegel can be used as a resource for moving 
beyond dualistic thinking (with particular reference to feminist thought).  
25 However, he was not consistent in this distinction, and at times uses speculative and dialectical interchangeably.  I 
am grateful to John Milbank for this observation (personal communication, 30 January 2008).   
26 Hegel, The Letters, trans. Clark Butler and Christine Seiler (Bloomingham: Indiana University Press, 1984), pp. 
280-282, cited in Rose, Judaism and Modernity, pp. 60-61. 
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speculative reason, on the other hand, is positive reason, the spiritual, and it alone is really 
philosophical.  He goes on to describe it in more detail: 
...the truly speculative form [is] knowledge of what is opposed in its very oneness, more 
precisely, the knowledge that the opposites are in truth one.  Only this speculative stage 
is truly philosophical.  It is naturally the most difficult; it is the truth...[l]aw, self-
consciousness, the practical in general already contain in and for themselves the 
principles or beginnings of the speculative.  And of spirit and the spiritual there is, 
moreover, in truth not even a single nonspeculative word that can be said; for spirit is 
unity in itself with otherness.27   
The speculative form maintains that it is impossible to comprehend concepts in isolation; they 
must always be thought in relation to their other: each thing is defined by not being another, 
lives in and only in the absence of another, and so passes over from being a discrete object to 
being a moment in a complex movement.28  It is a continual interplay between irreconcilable 
oppositesparticular and universal, religion and statethat attends to the ways in which they 
constitute one another (are in truth one) whilst also acknowledging their diremption, their 
brokenness, a brokenness that cannot be fully mended.  However, there is always an element of 
promise in speculative thoughtthe utopian hope that Adorno pointed to in his studies of 
Hegelthe promise of eventual reconciliation.  It is in the spirit of speculative reason that Rose 
reads Hegels thought and that she finds resources for thinking ethically and politically.29 
 
Hegels writings have provided inspiration to thinkers across the spectrum in sociology.  Those 
influenced by him are generally characterised as falling into one of two camps: right-Hegelian or 
                                                
27 Hegel, The Letters, pp. 280-282, cited in Rose, Judaism and Modernity, pp. 60-61. 
28 Rowan Williams, Logic and Spirit in Hegel, in Phillip Blond (ed.), Post-Secular Philosophy: Between 
Philosophy and Theology (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 118. 
29 I am grateful to John Milbank for pushing me to be clearer about the nature of speculative thought (personal 
communication, 30 January 2008).  
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left-Hegelian.  A right-Hegelian reading maintains that the real is rational and supports a 
conservative status-quo in law and religion.30  It emphasises the world of the mind and ideas, 
rather than the world of existing concrete reality.  During the 1840s and 1850s, this was the 
semi-official philosophical view in Berlin; Hegel was perceived as having elevated Protestant 
Christianity and the Prussian state to a position of supremacy in world history.31  In contrast, a 
left-Hegelian reading maintains that the rational is real, that philosophy should study the 
concrete realities of human experience.32  Thinkers such as Ludwig Feuerbach and Karl Marx 
criticised Hegel for his emphasis on abstract ideas at the expense of the material; Marx 
maintained that for Hegel [t]he real becomes an appearance.33  However, they also perceived in 
Hegels writings resources that could be used to oppose existing law and religion, separating his 
dialectical method from the larger body of his work, and especially from his metaphysics.   
 
According to Rose, however, both these traditions of interpretation have mystified Hegels 
thought.34  Both readings fail to understand the speculative nature of Hegels thought, which 
grew out of his critique of the abstract oppositions of finite and infinite, phenomena and 
noumena, to be found in Kant and Fichte.  Both readings also omit Hegels notion of the 
absolute.  In Roses words: 
In their very different ways, both the non-Marxist and the Marxist critiques of Hegel 
attempt to drop the notion of the absolute, but, at the same time, retain the social 
                                                
30 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, p. 211. 
31 For a modern incarnation of a right-Hegelian thinker, see Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last 
Man (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1992). 
32 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, p. 211. 
33 Karl Marx, Critique of Hegels Philosophy of Right, in David McLellan (ed.), Karl Marx: Selected Writings 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 27.  
34 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, p. 41. 
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import of Hegels thought.  In the case of non-Marxist sociology, the attempt depends 
on extracting a social object from Hegels philosophy, objective spirit.  In the case of 
Marxism, the attempt depends on extracting a method whose use will reveal social 
contradictions.  But the absolute is not an optional extra, as it were.  As we shall see, 
Hegels philosophy has no social import if the absolute is banished or suppressed, if the 
absolute cannot be thought.35 
Rose thus proffers an alternative reading: one that sees Hegels system and method as 
inextricably linked and does not attempt to ignore his concept of the absolute.  Her speculative 
account of his thought attempts to demystify Hegel and sees him as a resource for thinking 
ethically and politically.36    
Hegel Contra Kant 
In order to understand Roses speculative account of Hegel, one must have some understanding 
of Hegels critique of Kant and Fichte; his thought developed out of his reaction to the 
limitations of theirs.  Kants transcendental method attempts to delineate universal principles and 
laws that apply generally, regardless of particularity.  According to Kant, we can only know the 
finite; the infinite is unknowable.  Hegel refutes this approach to the social world.  He maintains 
that we cannot restrict the realm of knowledge to the finite; this limits our understanding of 
ourselves and our place in the socio-historical world.  In Roses words:  
The unknowability of what Kant calls, among other names, the unconditioned or the 
infinite results in the unknowability of ourselves, both as subjects of experience, the 
transcendental unity of apperception, and as moral agents capable of freedom.  Pari 
                                                
35 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, p. 42. 
36 Roses use of Hegel as a resource for thinking ethically and politically is clearest in her later works: Mourning 
Becomes the Law and Judaism and Modernity. 
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passu, the unknowability of ourselves means that the social, political and historical 
determinants of all knowledge and all action remain unknown and unknowable37 
Kants neutral method closes off knowledge rather than facilitating it.  It does not allow us to 
think beyond what is; as such, we lose part of our humanness, our ability to think in the realm of 
possibility.  If we cannot know ourselves, and if the infinite is designated unknowable, then our 
power to imagine and change those social and political conditions that underpin our existence is 
limited.  
 
Rose identifies a trinity of ideas that Hegel puts in the place of Kants transcendental method: 
the idea of a phenomenology, the idea of absolute ethical life (absolute Sittlichkeit), and the idea 
of a logic.38  These ideas are at the heart of Roses reading of Hegel and they deserve 
consideration in turn.  
 
The idea of a phenomenology is central to Hegels thought and is posited as a different 
theoretical approach to knowing to that proffered by Kant.  Simply put, phenomenology is the 
immanent exploration of how things are experienced39 and the Phenomenology of Spirit40 traces 
the development of human consciousness and capacity for judgement in the context of the 
philosophy of science, ethics, European history, art, and religion.   Perhaps not surprisingly, 
given its wide-ranging nature, the Phenomenology has been subject to chronic misreading.  
Right-Hegelians interpret it conservatively, seeing it as a teleological account of the end of 
                                                
37 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, p. 45.  
38 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, p. 45. 
39 Hutchings, Hegel and Feminist Philosophy, p. 35. 
40 Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit. 
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history41 and using it as a justification for a strong state and religion.  Left-Hegelians reject the 
substance of the Phenomenology, which they perceive as totalitarian, but adopt Hegels 
dialectical method, which they deem revolutionary.  However, both of these are non-speculative 
readings that fail to capture the kernel of Hegels thought.  Hegels phenomenological method 
was a response to Kants account of knowing, positing an alternative to Kants sharp distinctions 
between such oppositions as: things as we perceive them (phenomena) and things as they are in 
themselves (noumena), reason and nature, finite and infinite.  Rose maintains:  
The only consistent way to criticise Kants philosophy of consciousness is to show that 
the contradiction which a methodological, or any natural, consciousness falls into when 
it considers the object to be external, can itself provide the occasion for a change in that 
consciousness and in its definition of its object.  The new procedure and the new 
definition of the object may also be contradictory, in which case they, too, will change, 
until the two become adequate to each other.42 
The Phenomenology has been portrayed as presenting a series of dualisms that are reconciled in 
favour of one or the other and as presenting a strong teleology towards universalism and the 
good state.  However, this was not Hegels intention; he sought knowledge of the whole, a 
speculative knowledge that moved beyond Kantian thinking in terms of binary opposites.43    
 
Hegels idea of an absolute ethical life (absolute Sittlichkeit) was intended as an alternative 
means of thinking Kants justification of moral judgements, which always proceeded from, and 
never exceeded, the finite.  Hegels reference to the absolute does not refer to a known infinite; 
on the contrary, it refers to an infinite that is always present but not yet grasped, an infinite that 
                                                
41 See, for example, Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man. 
42 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, pp. 45-46.   
43 Hutchings, Hegel and Feminist Philosophy, pp. 32-44. 
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should not be dismissed from the outset as unknowable.  The absolute thus refers to the unity 
of the finite and the infinite; Sittlichkeit, ethical life, refers to the unity of the realms of 
morality and legality.  Contra Kant, one cannot pre-judge morality or ethical life: 
the morality of an action cannot be judged apart from the whole context of its 
possibility.  It cannot be judged by separating its morality from its legality, by 
separating its meaning from the social whole.44 
Thinking the absolute, therefore, means thinking in terms of past and present, morality and 
legality, finite and infinite.  It is comprehensive thought, and it is worked towards and achieved, 
not pre-decided.  Contrary to popular conceptions of Hegels idea of absolute ethical life, then, it 
is not closed and totalitarian but open and revisable. 
 
Thirdly, Hegels idea of a logic refers to his work Science of Logic:45 another phenomenological 
work in which method is not discussed but demonstrated through the description of a series of 
experiences.  Rose asserts that the experiences of logic do not illustrate the progression of a 
natural consciousness learning from its mistakes; instead: the experience of philosophical 
consciousness in the Logic is to rediscover the unity of theoretical and moral reason and natural, 
finite consciousness through the contradictions of the history of philosophy.46  Rather than 
conceding a disconnect between theoretical and moral reasoning, as the idea of phenomenology 
(as an alternative to theoretical reasoning) and the idea of absolute ethical life (as an alternative 
to practical moral reasoning) might suggest, the idea of a logic presupposes the unification of 
theoretical and practical reasoning, with a combination of the preceding ideas.  Hegel does not 
                                                
44 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, p. 47. 
45 Georg W. Hegel, Science of Logic, trans. A. V. Miller (London: Allen & Unwin, 1969). 
46 Rose, Hegel Contra Sociology, p. 47. 
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posit an alternative; rather, he demonstrates it through narrative, through accounts of 
consciousness on a journey to wholeness through the gradual realisation and reconciliation of 
contradictory experiences of awareness. 
 
Roses speculative account of Hegels thought stands in stark contrast to Kantian thought, which 
falls inside ethics, proposing universal guidelines that apply regardless of socio-historical 
context and denying knowledge of the infinite.  Hegels thought falls outside ethics: it is neither 
relentlessly immanent nor centrally concerned with the question of how we ought to live our 
lives.  Any duties that can be gleaned from Hegels thought are not intended to stand alone as a 
guide to living; they do not form a coherent system of thought and will inevitably provide 
conflicting guidelines.47  Instead, making decisions speculatively requires the exercise of 
judgement in the light of broader social, political and historical processes.   
The Broken Middle 
Rose carried her speculative account of Hegels work into her subsequent projects: her reading of 
Hegel provides the foundation for everything that follows.  Her first work focuses on Adornos 
neo-Marxist critical social theory; in her later works, it is postmodernism that attracts the bulk of 
her often devastating critique.  Rose agrees with the postmodern position that contemporary law 
has given rise to proud and deadly dualisms48 which must be transcended and that discourses of 
                                                
47 See the Introduction and Chapter One of this thesis.  See also Geuss, Outside Ethics, pp. 11-28, 46-52. 
48 Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, p. 76. 
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human rights mask the realities of inequality and domination.49  However, she disagrees with the 
postmodern assertion that human law is inherently violent:50 For if all human law is sheer 
violence, if there is no positive or symbolic law to be acknowledgedthen there can be no work, 
no exploring of the legacy of ambivalence, working through the contradictory emotions aroused 
by bereavement.51  She describes postmodernism as despairing rationalism without reason52 
and argues that  
by disqualifying universal notions of justice, freedom, and the good, for being 
inveterately metaphysical, for colonising and suppressing their others with the 
violence consequent on the chimera of correspondence, postmodernism has no 
imagination for its own implied ground in justice, freedom and the good.53 
Postmodern theorists rightly criticise the liberal approach to ethics for positing an ideal world in 
which rights are given and duties performed; this picture abstracts from the gritty realities of 
contemporary life.  However, Rose believes that just as liberals often operate in a fantasy world 
where easy answers reign, so too do postmoderns.  A postmodern approach to ethics sees the 
suffering and trauma pervasive in modern life and yet all too often shies away from reflecting on 
the broader social processes that might facilitate particular suffering and from taking the risk of 
political action.  Rose equally abhors this reluctance to engage in the work of the political, urging 
instead an approach that attends to particular suffering but also insists on public reflection and 
working through.   
 
                                                
49 Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, p. 71. 
50 See, for example, Derrida, Force of Law. 
51 Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, p. 70. 
52 Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, p. 7, emphasis in original. 
53 Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, p. 7. 
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In Roses most challenging work, The Broken Middle, she deepens her critique of old (liberal) 
and new (postmodern) philosophythe old, for its prescription and progressivism, and the new, 
for its rejection of the struggle to know and to judge.  Drawing on Hegels speculative thinking, 
she asserts the need for philosophys grey in grey;54 a grey in grey that contrasts with the 
colour on colour of postmodernity, with its exuberant rejection of traditional philosophy.  She 
continues: 
Philosophys grey in grey was never intended to damage its endeavour: to keep it 
quiescent, modestly contemplative, servile or resigned.  This subtle array, this grey in 
grey, would turn hubris not into humility but into motile configuration.  Grey in grey 
warns against philosophys pride of Sollen, against any proscription or prescription, any 
imposition of ideals, imaginary communities or progressive narrations.  Instead, the 
idealizations of philosophy would acknowledge and recognize actuality and not force 
or fantasize it.  They act as the third, the middle, their own effectivity at stake between 
the potentiality and actuality of the world and engaging at the point where the two come 
into a changed relation: not ex post facto justification, even less a priori rejuvenation, 
but reconfiguration, oppositional yet vitalsomething understood.55 
Roses subtle philosophical approach does not set forth prescriptions based on the abstract 
reasoning of an imagined community of people, unlike a Rawlsian or cosmopolitan approach to 
ethics.  She perceives such an approach as inexorably rules-bound and lacking in nuance or 
recognition of contingency.  However, her approach also sets its face against a sweeping 
rejection of the insights of Western metaphysics; it acknowledges the importance of struggling 
with the contraries of freedom and unfreedom, law and morality.56  Like Adornos negative 
dialectics, Roses speculative approach refuses to privilege one concept over its opposite; she 
argues that both sides of a binary opposition must be continually engaged with and negotiated.   
                                                
54 Gillian Rose, The Broken Middle: Out of Our Ancient Society (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), p. xi.  
55 Rose, The Broken Middle, p. xi, emphasis in original. 
56 Rose, The Broken Middle, pp. xii-xiii. 
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The broken middle to which Rose refers can be characterised in several ways: a break between 
the potentiality and actuality of the world, between universal and particular, between freedom 
and unfreedom, between legality and morality.  It is both modern and ancient: Rose maintains 
that the shape of life we are experiencing now has always been already ancient.57  The Broken 
Middle is a reaction to an attempt on the part of postmodern thinkers to mend this brokenness; an 
attempt that Rose deems doomed to failure.   
[Postmodern thought] would mend the diremption of law and ethics by turning the 
struggle between universality, particularity and singularity into a general sociology of 
control.  Yet the security of this new spectatorship is undermined by the tension of 
freedom and unfreedom which it cannot acknowledge for it has disqualified the 
actuality of any oppositions which might initiate process and painany risk of coming 
to know.58  
Rather than negotiating the broken middle, postmodern thought looks towards a (premature) 
reconciliation or an eventual redemption;59 in so doing, however, it passes over the struggle of 
living in a world full of contradiction and suffering.  
 
In The Broken Middle, Rose builds on her previous work, embarking on a deeper exploration of 
Hegels diremption of law and ethics.60  The Broken Middle draws on a variety of thinkers, with 
                                                
57 Rose, The Broken Middle, p. xi. 
58 Rose, The Broken Middle, p. xiii. 
59 For example, the idea of messianic redemption in Walter Benjamins writings, which has more in common in this 
respect with poststructural thought than with Marxist thought in the tradition of the Frankfurt School.  See 
Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History, in Illuminations, pp. 245-255.  For a discussion of Benjamins 
notion of messianism, see Anson Rabinbach, In the Shadow of Catastrophe (Berkeley: University of California 
Press, 1997).  For an engagement with contemporary writing that draws on Benjamins messianism, see Benjamin 
Arditi, Talkin bout a Revolution: the End of Mourning, in Arditi, Politics on the Edges of Liberalism, pp. 107-
147. 
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a particular focus on Søren Kierkegaard.  Just as in Dialectic of Nihilism Rose reinterprets 
Nietzsche, rescuing him from the charge of antinomian nihilism, in The Broken Middle, Rose 
recasts Kierkegaard, rescuing him from the charge of antinomian repetition.  Rose argues that 
both are perceived as being fundamentally opposed to law and knowledge, but maintains that 
these are serious misreadings.  Roses alternative reading of Nietzsche and Kierkegaard returns 
diremption to where it cannot be overcome in exclusive thought or in partial actionas long as 
its political history persists.  The complementarity of comprehension to diremption involves 
reflection on what may be venturedwithout mending diremption in heaven or on earth.61  
Rose does not propose a negotiation of the middle that is able to fix what is broken; that would 
be euporia, the easy way.62  Instead, she draws on thinkers such as Hegel and Kierkegaard who 
suggest that the aporias, the difficulties, of life must be engaged and negotiated.  
 
Rose is attracted to the struggles apparent in Kierkegaards thought and to his willingness to 
wrestle with the difficult questions of ethics and law without reaching settled conclusions.  Like 
Hegel, Kierkegaard brings the non-immanent concept of Revelation to philosophy, without 
systematising it or pointing to a realised or realisable redemption.  For both thinkers, Revelation 
serves to leave the ethical open and unresolved.63  Negotiating life is not easy; it must be 
undertaken with fear and trembling.64  
                                                                                                                                                       
60 Rose uses the term diremption to refer to a rending in two, but not of something that was perfectly unified in the 
first place: Diremption draws attention to the trauma of separation of that which was, however, as in marriage, 
not originally united (The Broken Middle, p. 236). 
61 Rose, The Broken Middle, p. xv. 
62 Rose, Loves Work, pp. 115-116. 
63 Rose, The Broken Middle, p. 18. 
64 A reference to Kierkegaards book by that name: Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling (London: Penguin 
Books, 1985). 
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Kierkegaard did not write simply as himself; he employed a number of pseudonyms and wrote 
from their perspectives as well.  This has not always been taken into account in the reception and 
analysis of his writings and Rose maintains that this has facilitated their misinterpretation.  In the 
guise of de silentio, one of his pseudonyms, Kierkegaards Fear and Trembling tells the story of 
Abraham preparing to sacrifice his son Isaac on Mount Moriah, a story that, if laboured over, 
will cause fear and trembling.65  Adorno points to the dialectical nature of Fear and Trembling, 
characterising it as pitting against each other such oppositions as spirit versus nature and loss 
versus gain, with the oppositions eventually being mythically reconciled in a paradoxical 
sacrifice.66  However, according to Rose, in his retelling of the story, de silentio does not present 
it in terms of oppositions.  Instead,  
de silentio pits story against story, crisis against crisis, to educate the reader by bringing 
out the difference between resignation, which accepts the opposed dichotomies of loss 
and gain, infinite and finite, spirit and nature; and faith, which is repetition or 
plenitude without possession or presence.  These positions are not oppositions  they 
can be suffered simultaneously.  They do not even share the tertium comparationis of 
being positions: the former, resignation, may be a position  a swimming position: 
for or against the tide of infinite pain  but the latter, faith, is a matter of floating: for 
which de silentio admits he is not strong enough.67   
Adornos reading of Fear and Trembling perceives reconciliations where they do not occur, and 
thus misses the struggle, the anguish, and the confessions of failure.  However, according to 
Rose, di silentio presents Abrahams story in order to illustrate the risk of living: life must be 
risked in order to be gained...only by discovering the limits of lifedeathis life itself 
                                                
65 Rose, The Broken Middle, p. 11. 
66 See Adorno, Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic. 
67 Rose, The Broken Middle, pp. 14-15. 
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discovered, and recalcitrant otherness opens its potentialities and possibilities.68  de silentio sets 
aside ethical questions in his retelling of this story; this suspension of the ethical is intended to 
set aside what we do and do not know about the story; it aims to transform us into 
contemporaneous witness rather than witness at second hand.69  In so doing, by placing us in 
the position of Abraham, de silentio explores the development of individual faith in its violent 
encounter with love and law.70 
 
The idea of struggle is fundamental to Roses negotiation of the Broken Middle, and for her, this 
is one of the primary attractions of Kierkegaards thought.  In an entry on Luther,71 Kierkegaard 
points out the dangers of Luthers Protestantism, which turned religion into politics, replacing 
the authority of the Pope with the authority of the State.72  In Roses words: 
Instead of arousing restlessness and making spiritual life more strenuous, Luther 
makes it soothing and reassuring.  Transfiguration of anguish, which occurred in 
Luthers own case after twenty years of fear and trembling and of spiritual and scholarly 
discipline, is universalized by Protestantism so that it is made available for all  without 
any one undergoing the intensity of Luthers testing.  This extremely powerful 
resource and reassurance becomes the cloak of an inwardness which everyone has the 
licence to counterfeit.73 
Luther was a reformer who sought to right the wrongs he perceived in Christianity under the 
Pope.  However, despite the suffering and struggle of his own spiritual journey, what he 
proclaimed was a Protestantism that encouraged an inward faith and allowed outward 
                                                
68 Rose, The Broken Middle, p. 16. 
69 Rose, The Broken Middle, p.148. 
70 Rose, The Broken Middle, p. 151. 
71 Luther, in Soren Kierkegaards Journals and Papers, Vol. 3, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1970) cited in Rose, The Broken Middle, p. 157. 
72 Rose, The Broken Middle, p. 157. 
73 Rose, The Broken Middle, pp. 157-158. 
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compromise with the established secular authority in the pursuit of selfish individualism.  
Luthers emphasis on faith to the detriment of works was just as dangerous as the prior emphasis 
on works to the detriment of faith.  Kierkegaard warns that Christians must be aware of and sit 
with both dangers  the double danger that is the mark of proper Christianity  in order to 
avoid falling into the opposite of any spiritual, social or political inversion.74 One must remain 
with the anxiety of beginning and equivocation of the middle,75 to use Roses own terms.  
 
 But how does one rediscover this equivocation of the middle?  Rose maintains that to discover 
the political, the ethical must be suspended.76 The equivocation of the middle comes about when 
one stands in the present with an understanding of the historical processes that have determined 
the present; when one perceives the specific histories and inversions that have shaped ones 
culture; when one perceives the difficulty in staking oneself politically but yet realises that one 
must confront the aporia of negotiating the break between universal and particularwithout 
taking refuge in individualism or communitarianism and thus falling into yet another inversion.  
Knowledge of the political present through an understanding of the historical processes that 
formed it enables one to imagine the possibility of the ethicalto see glimpses of the absolute 
in the present and to stake oneself, placing oneself in the middle: trying, failing, learning, and 
trying again. 
 
Hegels phenomenology is an example par excellence of the difficulties of negotiating the 
broken middle.  Hegel addresses the double danger of aporetic and agapic danger.  The 
                                                
74 Rose, The Broken Middle, p.158.  
75 Rose, The Broken Middle, p. 159. 
76 Rose, The Broken Middle, p. 163. 
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aporetic danger is the danger of legal status, dramatised by Hegel as the spiritual animal 
kingdom.  Spiritual refers to universal law, the legally enshrined kingdom of ends that serves 
the good of all, and animal to the reality of politics, where ones own interests are served above 
those of the other.77  In modern law, the stated spiritual goal is subject to animal reality:  modern 
law is that of legal status, where those with subjective rights and subjective ends deceive 
themselves and others that they act for the universal when they care only for their own 
interests.78  The aporetic danger, then, is the danger of self-interest cloaked as moral, law 
abiding behaviour, which trumps universal good. 
 
The second danger Hegel addresses is that of agapic danger, where a denial of the world and of 
politics accompanies pietism.  Goethes story the beautiful soul is central to his novel Wilhelm 
Meisters Apprenticeship and borrowed by Hegel in Phenomenology of Spirit to illustrate this 
danger.  It portrays an educated aristocratic woman who rejects the pleasures of worldly life so 
as to develop her inner religious piety.  However, she is unable to translate this piety into useful 
public life.  This picture of the beautiful soul represents the asceticism of Protestant inwardness 
as understood by Goethe and Hegel, and, later, Walter Benjamin.  In Roses words, 
[h]ypertrophy of the inner life is correlated with atrophy of political participation.79  The agapic 
danger explored in the story of the beautiful soul is also pointed to by Hegel, Weber, and 
Kierkegaard as the Pietism of the late eighteenth centurythe moment when the Lutheran 
reform is turned on its head.  In Pietism, politics [is] delivered to the heart of religion; it 
reproduces inner poverty and outer ruthlessness at the collective as well as at the individual 
                                                
77 Rose, The Broken Middle, p. 174.   
78 Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, p. 73. 
79 Rose, Judaism and Modernity, p. 180.  See also Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 383-409. 
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level.80  A withdrawal from political life and responsibility in the name of piety produces a 
selfish individualism.  
 
Rather than fall prey to either dangeraporetic or agapicone must remain in the equivocation 
of the middle; negotiating the diremption of law and ethics.  The anxiety to which Rose 
continually refersthe anxiety of beginning which is equally the beginning of anxiety81is 
experienced in relation to the law and to ethics.  The law to which Rose refers is the form that 
emerges from a negotiation of the middle: Law...emerges as the predicament which elicits 
form out of the equivocation of the ethical and the anxiety of beginning.  Law emerges as the 
agon of these [Kierkegaard and Kafkas] authorships.82  The form of law always already exists; 
indeed, Rose asserts that Kierkegaards authorship is ethical precisely because of the assumption 
of an already-given law.83  It can never be fully known; however, we cannot abandon the attempt 
to articulate it.  The anxiety, then, arises as one begins to negotiate this law.  Rose contrasts 
Kierkegaards position with a postmodern one, which by refusing the system of law, refuses 
anxietyparadoxically creating certainty in the name of uncertainty: 
When attention is focused at the beginning of a work on discrediting the System, its 
historicism, its closure etc., in the name of existential freedom or the released other, 
this, in effect, proudly obsoletes freedom and otherness  political or existential.  Such 
apparent house-clearing amounts to a recollection which is itself a refusal, an 
unreadiness, for anxiety.  It awards itself a certainty while claiming to breed no 
certainties.84 
                                                
80 Rose, The Broken Middle, p. 178. 
81 Rose, The Broken Middle, p. 85. 
82 Rose, The Broken Middle, p. 84. 
83 Rose, The Broken Middle, p. 87. 
84 Rose, The Broken Middle, p. 88. 
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Passing over the contradictions and challenges of law and ethics in favour of the concept of the 
momentsuch as freedom or identityruins ethical initiative, initiative which would think 
speculatively, engaging in the work of negotiating the broken middle.   
 
The Broken Middle poses a political challenge: how might we think differently about politics?  
How can we negotiate the challenges of living in a broken world?  The brokenness to which 
Rose refers has been discussed in different ways by different thinkers: Hegels diremption of law 
and ethics, Benjamins decay of experience,85 and Adorno and Horkheimers dialectic of 
enlightenment.86  For some, it is exemplified by the Holocaust, the Shoah, which they perceive 
as the ultimate expression of the brokenness of modernity.  As we saw in the previous chapter, 
Adorno responded to this brokenness with negative dialectics and the promise that things might 
yet get better.  However, Rose is dissatisfied with mere glimpses of hope in a broken world.  
Instead, she articulates a two-fold response of mourning and political risk: one that works 
through the traumas of modernity, mourning losses, whilst also taking the risk of acting 
politically. 
                                                
85 Howard Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The Colour of Experience (London: Routledge, 2006). 
86 Adorno and Horkheimer, Dialectic of Enlightenment. 
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Mourning and Political Risk:  
A Response to the Brokenness of Modernity 
Roses embedded and emphatic approach to ethics and the political emerges from an engagement 
with the trauma that results from a diremption of law and ethics in modernity, an engagement 
that is built upon a speculative reading of Hegels thought.  The trauma arising out of the broken 
middle can be conceptualised on two levels: actual, historical trauma and a more generalised, 
existential trauma.  Dominick LaCapra distinguishes between historical and structural trauma.  
He notes that historical trauma is associated with a specific event or loss and that only the 
particular individuals who experience a historically-specific traumatic event experience historical 
trauma.87  Structural trauma, in contrast, is not associated with an event or limited to particular 
persons; instead, it is linked to the potentiality of historical trauma and everyone may suffer the 
anxiety associated with it.88  Roses conception of trauma encompasses both aspects.  She speaks 
of the disasters of modernity,89 whereby much is promised but not delivered; the persistence of 
suffering and trauma is a constant reminder of modernitys shortcomings.   
 
Approaches to suffering in a liberal framework tend to involve bestowing rights upon 
individuals; this is intended to provide a safety-net against the worst atrocities, but does not 
assess the ability of those affected to claim those rights, remaining abstract and removed from 
                                                
87 Note that not everyone that suffers historical trauma suffers clinical levels of trauma as defined by the American 
Psychiatric Association in DSM-IV.  American Psychological Association, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders, 4th edition, (Washington: American Psychiatric Publishing, 2004).  
88 LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma, pp. 78-82. 
89 Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, p. 76.  
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the political.  Rose claims that the Enlightenment reason in which modern law is grounded is 
disembedded and disembodied:  
grounded in an overweening claim to absolute and universal authority, without 
awareness of history, language or locality, enlightened reason sweeps all particularity 
and peculiarity from its path.90   
Liberal ethics pass over the traumas of modern life, turning too quickly to the codification of 
rules in order to create a safer world.   
 
While liberal approaches too often forget the suffering that prompted reflection, postmodern 
approaches too often remain focused on actual and existential losses without working through 
those losses and moving forward to social and political (re)engagement.   
Post-modernism in its renunciation of reason, power, and truth identifies itself as a 
process of endless mourning, lamenting the loss of securities which, on its own 
argument, were none such.  Yet this everlasting melancholia accurately monitors the 
refusal to let go91 
Approaches to suffering in a postmodern framework tend to advocate the encircling of trauma
an endless mourning that remains in the past lest the pain be forgot.92  However, Rose argues that 
we cannot mourn personal, communal and global suffering without also taking the risk of acting 
politically. 
     
                                                
90 Rose, Loves Work, p. 128. 
91 Rose, Mourning, p. 11. 
92 See, for example, Edkins, Poststructuralism and International Relations, pp. 140-142; Jay, Refractions of 
Violence, pp. 11-24; Slavoj iek, For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor, 2nd ed. 
(London: Verso, 2002), pp. 272-273. 
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Rose offers an approach to ethics that is neither liberal nor poststructural; it is reflective, but 
politically engaged.  She is critical of instrumental reasoning, but does not turn her face against 
reason in general.  She argues that while exclusive and excluding reason is not to be 
encouraged, neither is exclusive otherness.93  On the contrary, she advocates a nuanced, self-
aware and empathic reason that she maintains is the cornerstone of an ethical and politically 
engaged life.  She describes such reason as relational, responsible, and reconstructive and full 
of surprises.94  We can never fully know or know with certainty, but we must never give up the 
attempt.  Rose draws on Hegelian speculative thought in her attempts to negotiate the broken 
middle, reaching towards the possibility of an ethics which does not remain naïve and ignorant 
of its historical and political presuppositions and hence of its likely outcomes.95   
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I outline Roses twofold response to the trauma so pervasive in 
our modern world: mourning and political risk.  This response was most clearly outlined in her 
posthumously published Mourning Becomes the Law and is framed in opposition to a 
postmodern response to brokenness of modernity.  Before turning to Roses response, however, I 
first outline that which she is reacting against: aberrated mourning in the face of brokenness. 
Responses to trauma: Benjamin and aberrated mourning 
In the wake of the World Wars I and II, the dominant narratives in response to the pain of those 
suffering loss, disfigurement, and mental torture were those of heroism and sacrifice for the 
greater good of ruler and country.  However, challenges to traditional forms arose both in 
                                                
93 Rose, Judaism and Modernity, p. 4. 
94 Rose, Judaism and Modernity, pp. 4, 9. 
95 Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, pp. 70-71. 
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popular response and in political thought, particularly after the horrors of World War II and the 
Holocaust.  Walter Benjamin was ahead of his time in prefiguring this disaffection; he 
profoundly opposed traditional forms of mourning from his early writings.  He detested the 
culture of commemoration that sprung up following the First World War; he believed that 
monuments that honour the sacrifice of those who died in the war and that pay homage to 
national unity prematurely restore order and acceptance to traumatised communities.  In his 
writings, Benjamin emphatically rejects responses to suffering that offer false consolation and 
refuses to tarry with the pain and confusion of the horrors of war.  He is against a collective 
working through of grief: he maintains that collective mourning discourages individuals from 
looking more deeply at their pain, a pain that he believes has deeper sources than war alone.  
Benjamin argues that the allegedly healthy process of working through pain only forecloses 
deeper consideration of the catastrophe.96   
 
Benjamins reflections on Baudelaire provide a window on to his perspective on war and trauma.  
He is highly critical of Baudelaires shock-parrying: Baudelaire made it his business to parry 
the shocks [of modern life], no matter where they might come from, with his spiritual and his 
physical self.97  He argues that Baudelaires shock-parrying was tantamount to self-anaesthesia, 
a refusal to register pain in any depth in order to impose control upon his world.  Benjamin 
suggests instead that we respond to war and the ensuing suffering with a ritualistic melancholy 
that, in Martin Jays words, would keep the wound open in the hope of some later utopian 
                                                
96 Jay, Refractions of Violence, pp. 11-24. 
97 Walter Benjamin, On Some Motifs in Baudelaire in Benjamin, Illuminations, p. 160.  
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redemption, understanding ritual and repetition as a placeholder for a future happiness.98  His 
attraction to the Baroque mourning play Trauerspiel is outlined in his work Origin of German 
Trauerspiel.  He advocates an open-ended melancholy, a melancholy that holds fast until the 
deeper sources of pain are addressed.99   
 
Although Benjamin rightly opposes the premature restoration of order and a veneration of war, 
the mourning that he advocates shuts off the possibility of working through.  LaCapra terms it 
impossible mourning, saying that the politics it engenders is often a blind messianismeven at 
times apocalyptic politics or what I call hope in a blank utopia.100  Rose terms it aberrated 
mourningthe mournfulness of desertion,101 a rigid and petrified102 mourning that precludes 
the exercise of political judgement and engagement.  She points to the profoundly negative 
consequences of unmourned loss, not just for the individuals concerned, but for society as a 
whole.103  Against Benjamins Angelus Novus, the angel of history that watches, frozen in horror, 
as the debris of history piles up before him, Rose posits another of Klees angels, Angelus 
Dubiosus: 
hybrid of hubris and humilitywho makes mistakes, for whom things go wrong, 
who constantly discovers its own faults and failings, yet who still persists in the pain of 
                                                
98 Jay, Refractions of Violence, p. 22.  
99 More recent poststructural accounts of trauma advocate a similar response, as discussed in Chapter Two.  In 
International Relations, Edkins draws on ieks work to emphasise the need to encircle trauma, again and again, in 
order to prevent its domestication and depoliticisation (Edkins, Poststructuralism and International Relations; 
Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics; iek, For They Know Not What They Do). 
100 LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma, p. 152. 
101 Rose, Judaism and Modernity, pp. 186-187. 
102 Rose, Judaism and Modernity, p. 195. 
103 Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, p. 51. 
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staking itself, with the courage to initiate action and the commitment to go on and on, 
learning from those mistakes and risking new ventures.104 
She describes this angel as the humorous witness who must endure.105  Not for this angel the 
speechlessness and inaction that characterises Benjamins traumatised angel.  Angelus Dubiosus 
gives voice to its suffering and moves forward (and backward) in an attempt to reengage 
ethically and politically. 
Responses to trauma: Roses mourning and political risk 
Roses criticisms of Benjamin mirror her criticisms of postmodern approaches to ethics, which 
she maintains [proceed] dualistically and deconstructively. Against these, Rose poses her own 
response, which she maintains comprehends the dualisms and deconstructions of the first 
response as the dynamic movement of a political history which can be expounded speculatively 
out of the broken middle.  She describes her response as: comicthe comedy of absolute spirit, 
inaugurated mourning.106  By comedy, Rose refers to the provisional and contingent nature of 
any response, whereby our aims and outcomes constantly mismatch each other, and provoke yet 
another revised aim, action and discordant outcome.107  This response is most clearly elucidated 
in Mourning Becomes the Law.  It has two dimensionsmourning and political riskand draws 
on Jewish hermeneutical thought to offer an alternative reflective yet positive way of being and 
acting in a broken world.  I examine these strands of Roses response in turn.  
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Inaugurated mourning 
Rose proposes that our first response to trauma be one of mourning: not an unthinking, passive 
melancholy, but a self-reflective, active work of mourning, a mourning she terms inaugurated 
mourning.  [I]naugurated mourning requires the relation to law that is presented by the comedy 
of absolute spirit as found in Hegels Phenomenology.108  That is, it requires a constant 
negotiation and renegotiation of individual and communal actions in light of (often unintended) 
consequences, as well as a continual evaluation and re-evaluation of laws and institutions in the 
light of their effects on local, regional and global politics.   
 
Inaugurated mourning is not easy; it involves work.  It is the the ability to know and be 
known.109  Such mourning does not shy away from the horrors of trauma or the challenges of 
modernity.  It gives voice to suffering, creating a space for stories to be told and listened to, a 
space in which pain is acknowledged.  It is not a solitary work: Roses speculative Hegelianism 
leads her always towards contextualisation, towards a consideration of the broad social, political 
and historical processes that have influenced present circumstances and towards a being-in-the-
world that is embedded both in local community and in wider social structures.  In Howard 
Caygills words, such working through is not the achievement of an isolated I but is a 
communal effort which is expressed, for Rose, in culture and the institutions of state and civil 
society.110   
 
                                                
108 Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, p. 74, emphasis in original. 
109 Rose, Judaism and Modernity, p. 202. 
110 Caygill, The Broken Hegel, p. 23. 
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Communal working through involves the creation of spaces that encourage a critical 
remembering of what has gone before and the contestation of settled concepts.  Dori Laub, 
cofounder of the Video Archives for Holocaust Testimonies at Yale University, has created one 
such space.  Laub believes that knowing and being known are imperative if survivors are to have 
a life worth living: 
The survivorsneeded to tell their stories in order to survive.  There is, in each 
survivor, an imperative need to tell and thus come to know ones story, unimpeded by 
ghosts from the past against which one has to protect oneself.  One has to know ones 
buried truth in order to be able to live ones life.111  
Telling ones story enables one to know ones own story as well as to communicate it to others.  
Both dimensions of knowing are integral to inaugurated mourning and these must take place in 
community.  
 
This work of mourning, be it the failings of modernity in general, or historically specific trauma, 
leads to the political.  It is to an examination Roses second response to traumathe risk of 
engaging in political actionthat I now turn.    
Political risk 
Traumatised individuals and communities are estranged from one another and from the wider 
socio-political context.  Part of the process of working through is rediscovering agency, the 
ability to engage in political processes and to influence them in some way.  Roses critique of 
Benjamin is that he does not allow for a practical wrestling with the political, placing his hope in 
                                                
111 Dori Laub, Truth and Testimony: The Process and the Struggle, in Cathy Caruth (ed.) Trauma: Explorations in 
Memory (Maryland: Johns Hopkins University, 1995), p. 63. 
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an eventual flash of redemption, what LaCapra terms hope in a blank utopia.112  Roses 
inaugurated mourning has a clear political goal, however: to overcome the powerlessness and 
numbing associated with trauma, thus enabling reengagement with social and political life.   
 
Reengaging politically is not easy, nor should it be.  The experience of trauma, be it first hand or 
through bearing witness to anothers trauma and allowing oneself to become unsettled in the 
process, highlights the complexity of modern life, the struggle of ethical action in a damaged 
world.  How should we think in such a world?  How might we act?  Rose speaks of the need to 
draw upon political and theological resources to negotiate the broken middle.  She maintains that 
there is no easy path: 
If metaphysics is the aporia, the perception of the difficulty of the law, the difficult 
way, then ethics is the development of it, the diaporia, being at a loss yet exploring 
various routes, different ways towards the good enough justice, which recognises the 
intrinsic and the contingent limitations in its exercise.  Earthly, human sadness is the 
divine comedythe ineluctable discrepancy between our worthy intentions and the 
ever-surprising outcome of our actions.  This comic condition is euporia: the always 
missing, yet prodigiously imaginable, easy way.113 
The negotiation of the diremption of law and ethics involves a realisation of the difficulty of 
doing so alongside a refusal to give up working toward this good enough justice.114 
 
Rose draws upon Jewish hermeneutics in her discussion of political risk, and in particular, on the 
concept of Midrash.  Midrash is the traditional method of textual interpretation in Jewish biblical 
                                                
112 LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma, p. 152. 
113 Rose, Loves Work, pp. 115-116. 
114 Note the similarities with Derridas account of the difficulties of pursuing justice in Derrida, Force of Law.  
Derrida maintains that no decision is fully just and that we must commit to exercising political judgement that 
involves wrestling with the undecidable in order to make an impossible decision (p. 24).  
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hermeneutics.115  Those who utilise it recognize the fluid boundaries between text and 
interpretation, rather than the imperious unity of the primary text, and tend to emphasize 
conversation over objectivity and systematic uniformity in interpretation.116  The rabbinic 
community maintain that there is no whole truth wholly available in any text, and evince 
considerable tolerance for varying interpretations:  
[T]he continuity of Israelderives from the paradoxical situation of the exegetes 
submission to the oldest revelation at Sinai and yet freedom for new interpretation of 
the Divine Word through the strange midrashic conversation.  This intertextual 
dialogue, conducted for thousands of years by multiple voices who understand one 
another as contemporaries, must also continually reformulate meanings relevant to the 
adjudication of current problems in Jewish life.117 
The need for a continual reformulation of meaning is at the root of Roses insistence that any 
political action we risk must be reflected upon and revisited in the light of the present.  It 
resonates with a Hegelian approach to thinking ethically: our understandings of knowledge and 
law must continually be renegotiated in the light of changing historical and political 
conditions.118  
 
                                                
115 A rabbinic hermeneutical approach, with its respect for difference and advocacy for multivocality, has become an 
important methodology in contemporary literary theory, profoundly influencing such deconstructionists as Harold 
Bloom and Geoffrey Hartman.  The re-emergence of Midrash, the discourse that has attracted the most scholarly 
attention, must be seen in part as an assertion of Jewish identity in the wake of the Holocaust, or Shoah.  Midrash 
differs markedly from traditional Christian exegetical methods, which do not give as elevated a place to the 
interpretation of divine revelation.  Although Christian scholars such as Augustine acknowledge the existence of 
ambiguities in biblical text, the biblical text is believed to portray a coherent message and there is little toleration for 
contradiction.  Beth Sharon Ash, Jewish Hermeneutics and Contemporary Theories of Textuality: Hartman, Bloom, 
and Derrida, Modern Philology, Vol. 85, No. 1 (1987), p. 67. 
116 Ash, Jewish Hermeneutics, p. 65. 
117 Ash, Jewish Hermeneutics, p. 68. 
118 In practice, the meaning of legal guidelines is never fixed but is open to interpretation: see Jan Klabbers, The 
Meaning of Rules, International Relations, Vol. 20, No. 3 (2006), pp. 295-301.  However, Rose is advocating a 
challenge to the meaning of rules that goes beyond legal wrangling by those authorised to define their meaning; she 
advocates a broader and deeper challenge.  
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Rose does not advocate the delineation of a positive or concrete programme of political action, 
emphasising the contingency of both theory and praxis.  
In both the world of politics and in the intellectual world, there seems to be a low 
tolerance of equivocation.  The result of this intolerance and unease is the reproduction 
of dualistic ways of thinking and of formulating public policy Wisdom, theoretical 
and practical, develops when the different outcomes of ideas and policies are related to 
the predicable modifications and to the unpredictable contingencies affecting their 
meaning and employment.  Wisdom works with equivocation.119  
Inaugurated mourning and political risk require deepening our understanding of the roles we play 
in the structures of power, both by our action and inaction.  Our decisions (and indecision) will 
have consequences we do not anticipate; part of the work of mourning is to perceive more clearly 
our place in the wider community and to revise our actions and reactions in the light of this.  
Rose argues that we must redraw, again and again120 the boundaries that define the way we 
live: acknowledging the impossibility of perfect arrangements in a contingent and changing 
world, but refusing to give up the attempt to shape and reshape our responses in the communities 
in which we are embedded. 
                                                
119 Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, pp. 2-3 
120 Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, p. 122.  The full quote states that the work of mourning involves: [coming] to 
learn that will, action, reflection and passivity have consequences for others and for oneself which may not be 
anticipated and can never be completely anticipated; which comes to learn its unintended complicity in the use and 
abuse of power; and hence to redraw, again and again, the measures, the bonding and boundaries between me and 
me, subject and subjectivity, singular and individual, non-conscious and unconscious.  This is activity beyond 
activityThe work of these experiences bears the meaning of meaning  the relinquishing and taking up again of 
activity which requires the fullest acknowledgement of active complicity (emphasis in original).  
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Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have traced the development of Roses thought from her early engagement with 
Adorno to her later writings on law and ethics.  At the core of Roses work is a speculative 
Hegelianism that guides her reflections on other thinkers and broad themes.  Rose has a unique 
voice: her interpretation of Hegel is shared by few others;121 she is critical of both liberal and 
poststructural thought; and she draws on widely divergent thinkers and ideas to produce 
notoriously difficult but profoundly insightful works.   
 
Roses Hegelianism is a form of speculative thought: she refuses to perceive the world in terms 
of irreconcilable binary opposites such as universal and particular, law and ethics, finite and 
infinite.  Instead, she holds these ideas together in thought, aware of the ways in which the one 
mediates our understanding of the other.  Part of the function of comprehensive thought is to 
facilitate a broader and deeper understanding of individuals and their place in the world, a deeper 
understanding of their humanity.  Thus, Rose emphasises the necessity of understanding 
embedded in historical, social and political context, arguing against fixed and abstract guidelines 
that neglect the particular.  Her thought struggles to negotiate particular pain whilst always 
striving towards the (constantly revised and revisable) universal; it learns from and mourns the 
past whilst working towards a different future; and it perceives the fragility of moral progress 
whilst continuing to take political risks in the hope of engendering positive outcomes.  Rose 
                                                
121 Raymond Geuss is another thinker who emphasises the speculative account of Hegels thought, as is Kimberly 
Hutchings, one of Roses former students, and Rowan Williams.  See Geuss, Outside Ethics; Hutchings, Hegel and 
Feminist Philosophy; Williams, Logic and Spirit in Hegel.  
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maintains that approaching life with such a sensibility will inevitably involve struggle and 
failure; however, it also inspires hope and a deeper sense of community. 
 
Roses reflections on the brokenness of modernity are very much in the spirit of speculative 
Hegelianism.  For Rose, this brokenness requires negotiation; it cannot be fixed by legal 
remedies (in the spirit of liberalism) nor should it be endlessly mourned (in the spirit of 
postmodernism).  Instead, she posits a response of mourning and political risk to the disasters of 
modernity.  The mourning she advocates is inaugurated mourning: an acknowledgment of the 
suffering and loss that we have experienced as individuals, as communities, and as bystanders, 
and a commitment to work through this loss.  Inaugurated mourning involves both knowing and 
being known: it is communal as well as deeply personal and involves a deep awareness of the 
historical and social processes that have contributed to present pain.   
 
Inaugurated mourning leads naturally to political action.  Contra liberal prescription, Rose does 
not prescribe fixed guidelines based on unchanging truths, and contra post-modern despair, she 
does not focus exclusively on particularity, assuming that there is no room to apply what is 
learned in one situation to another.  Instead, her Hegelian sensibility encourages comprehensive 
knowledge and a search for wholeness, thinking past and present, universal and particular, and 
potential and actuality at the same time.  Engaging in political risk involves questioning closely-
held assumptions about oneself, others, and current social and political arrangements, and daring 
to think and act differently in response.  It involves a commitment to act, to evaluate the 
outcomes of ones action, and to act again, knowing that perfection can never be reached but 
refusing to give up the attempt to reach towards a good enough justice.   
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Roses speculative Hegelianism falls outside ethics in Raymond Geuss formulation.122  She 
posits a way of being in the world that has political effects; her purpose is not to formulate 
abstract guidelines for living or solutions with which to solve the problems of modernity, but to 
articulate a way in which we can approach the inevitable brokenness of the world around us.  
Underlying this is a different way of knowing, one that eschews both fixed truths and absolute 
contingency, forging a path which holds the pursuit of truth and an awareness of contingency 
together, negotiating a way of being that avoids the danger of falling into one or other 
opposition.  It is a way of being that involves work and struggle, acknowledging that there is no 
easy path forward in a broken world.  Alongside this, however, is a sense of the joy that can 
accompany the process of learning about oneself and others in the working through, and the 
richness that accompanies a life embedded in and supported by community. 
 
 
                                                
122 Indeed, Geuss proffers Hegel as an example of a thinker who breaks with the modern form of ethics, and instead 
puts forward an inherently nonindividualistic and inherently speculative, that is nonpractical, enterprise (p. 46).  
He remarks that for Hegel, it does not make sense for the philosopher to speak in terms of ought; if you want to 
know what to do in some particular situation, consult your local authorities, judge, policeman, rabbi, imam, or 
priestit is not the philosophers job to tell anyone what to do, resolve conflicts or dilemmas, or invent new ways of 
acting. (p. 51).  Geuss, Outside Ethics, pp. 46-52.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
ACTING OUT AND WORKING THROUGH: 
TRAUMA  AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
 
In the two preceding chapters, I drew on Adorno and Roses works to suggest a different 
approach to suffering.  Adorno insists that we attend to particular suffering, which tells us that 
things ought to be different, allowing concrete experiences of pain to illuminate and challenge 
broader social processes and institutional arrangements.  He advocates a dialectic of resistance, 
which disturbs the status quo by determinedly preserving the non-identical: negative dialectics.  
Rose argues that traumatic experiences must be worked through, contrasting her notion of 
inaugurated mourning with Benjamins call for melancholy repetition.  She emphasises the 
notion of struggle as central to the work of mourning, saying that it is an extremely difficult 
process and that it requires both coming to know ourselves and the society in which we live.  Her 
conception of mourning is political: it involves critical reflection on closely held assumptions 
about social and political structures, and encourages political action in response.  She does not 
prescribe what form that action might take; instead, she advocates a different way of being in 
community, one that is self-reflective, critical, and politically engaged. 
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In this chapter, I argue that the category of trauma is often ignored in global politics, where the 
traditional focus on managing observable collective violence precludes consideration of its 
hidden effects.  Where trauma is taken seriously, it is often medicalised and its sufferers 
depoliticised; this shuts down critical reflection and preserves the status quo.  However, I 
maintain that Roses notion of working through trauma provides an alternative response that 
takes the need to mourn past and present suffering seriously, whilst also insisting on the need to 
critically reflect on the social and political arrangements that facilitated that suffering.  I apply 
Roses ideas to the experience of actual historical trauma (rather than structural or existential 
trauma) in order to elucidate further her approach to ethics and the political.  I primarily examine 
trauma in the wake of violence because trauma is the other of violence, the traditional focus of 
International Relations literature; however, Roses approach of working through is also relevant 
to less communal, more private examples of trauma.   
 
 Trauma, be it actual historical trauma or structural trauma, is a persistent feature of the past, 
present, and future of modernity.  Nancy L. Rosenblum points to the web of violence that 
encircles modern society.  Drawing on examples gleaned from the New York Times during a 
week in 1999, she argues: 
The wanton Taliban destruction, the torturous murder of Matthew Shepard,1 and the 
terrifying school shootings are not isolated events.  They are moments in cycles of 
hatred.  Each is part of an identifiable social history or life history of conflict and 
revenge that does not end with the latest round.  We see the cycle of hatred at work at 
                                                
1 Matthew Shepard was a gay student at the University of Wyoming, murdered in a brutal hate crime whereby his 
body was then publically displayed as a warning to others. 
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every levelCrimes of hate have a past; sadly, they have a future, too, as each 
contributes to the climate of demonization and the desire for revenge.2 
Responses to trauma differ both in theory and praxis.  Liberal efforts to deal with violence rely 
heavily on legal remedies;3 these are backed up by the state monopoly on violence, be it wielded 
by police or in the course of war waged to preserve security or to defend the liberal order.  
Within international security studies, there is an emphasis on securing and defending world 
order; however, the search for security looks to the future without placing events in their socio-
historical context and does not deal with the past.  Poststructural attempts to think about trauma 
tend towards the other extreme; they focus on the past, encircling the trauma repeatedly and 
refusing to integrate it into a broader historical context for fear of domesticating or depoliticising 
the experience.4  In this chapter, I examine political and communal responses to historical trauma 
and argue that Roses notion of working through can be used to articulate a positive, balanced 
response to the horrors of modernity. 
 
In applying Roses thought to the experience of trauma, I draw upon her speculative, neo-
Hegelian approach to ethics and the political.  A speculative approach locates subjects within 
their actually existing social and political context and advocates a historical understanding of 
                                                
2 Nancy L. Rosenblum, Introduction: Memory, Law, and Repair, in Martha Minow, Breaking the Cycles of 
Hatred: Memory, Law, and Repair, with Nancy L. Rosenbaum (ed.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 
p. 3.    
3 See, for example, the range of legal remedies outlined in Nancy L. Rosenblum Justice and the experience of 
Injustice in Martha Minow, Breaking the Cycles of Hatred: Memory, Law, and Repair, with Nancy L. Rosenbaum 
(ed.) (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 77-106. Rosenblum details three collective legal responses to 
the call to do something in the wake of violent atrocities: criminal prosecution, where individuals are held 
accountable for crimes against humanity in criminal trials; truth commissions, where those who have suffered and 
perpetrated political crimes testify publically and a public record of the tragedies is compiled; and reparations, where 
concrete restitution is made for what has been taken or lost.     
4 See Chapter Two of this thesis.  
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how the present conditions came to be.  The possibility of transformation is embedded in a 
phenomenological understanding of the social and political conditions that underlie present 
existence.  Hegels search for comprehensive knowledge requires reaching beyond the easy path 
of thinking in terms of binary oppositions such as right and wrong, agent and structure, 
oppressed and oppressor, perpetrator and victim.  It involves the negotiation of both concepts, 
acknowledging the ways in which they constitute one another, whilst also accepting that they are 
always already dirempted, and that this diremption can never be mended.  Roses call for 
mourning and political risk, then, is a call for more comprehensive understanding of the past and 
present first, aware that this understanding must always be partial, followed by the exercise of 
political judgement in the light of this understanding.  To illustrate the application of Roses 
thought to historical trauma, I draw on a number of empirical examples gleaned from academics 
and practitioners who write about trauma: these are drawn from history, literature, cultural 
studies, psychiatry, and peace studies.5  These varied sources paint a coherent picture about the 
process of working through traumatic experiences: a process that is not visibly present in 
theoretical or empirical International Relations literature on violence and trauma.6 
 
                                                
5 See, for example, Cathy Caruth, Unclaimed Experience: Trauma, Narrative, and History (Baltimore: Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1996); LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma; Herman, Trauma and Recovery; Imre 
Kertész, Fatelessness, trans. Tim Wilkinson (London: The Harvill Press, 2005/1975); Rena Moses-Hrushovski with 
Rafael Moses, Grief and Grievance: the Assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, trans. Tim Wilkinson (London: Minerva 
Press, 2000); Siegfried Sassoon, The Complete Memoirs of George Sherston (London: Faber and Faber, 1937/1972); 
Volkan, Blood Lines; Jay Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning: The Great War in European Cultural History 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995); Carolyn Yoder, The Little Book of Trauma Healing: When 
Violence Strikes and Community Security is Threatened (Intercourse, PA: Good Books, 2005) 
6 Note that a discussion of trauma is beginning to find its way into the field of International Relations.  See, for 
example, Duncan Bell, Memory, Trauma and World Politics: Reflections on the Relationship between Past and 
Present (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2006); Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics; Fierke, Trauma, political 
solipsism and war; and Pupavac, Pathologizing Populations and Colonising Minds.  
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This chapter is divided into three sections.  In section one, I examine trauma in general terms, 
noting its individual, social and political dimensions.  In section two, I examine acting out in 
response to trauma, with a particular focus on the meaning-making narratives that individuals 
and groups adopt in order to make sense of their traumatic experiences: the heroic soldier, good 
and evil, and redemptive violence.  In section three, I examine the notion of working through 
trauma.  I argue that Roses concepts of mourning and political risk are the key dimensions of a 
healthy, enabling working through, and that it is the mourning dimension that is so often 
missing in critical discussions of agency and the political.7  They allow an interplay between 
universal and particular, social and individual, by encouraging individuals and communities to 
mourn past and present suffering, but also to consider how things might be different and to take 
the risk of acting to challenge the status quo.   
Trauma: Socio-Historical Reflections  
Consideration of trauma and its ramifications has largely been ignored in the field of 
International Relations.  This is in part because trauma is perceived as being experienced by 
individuals first and foremost, and as having little relevance at an international level.  However, 
as we shall see, trauma also has social and political dimensions.  Cathy Caruth describes trauma 
                                                
7 See, for example, Anthony Lang, Agency and Ethics: The Politics of Military Intervention (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 2001) and Brent J. Steele, Ontological Security in International Relations (London: 
Routledge, 2007).  Both have interesting and nuanced discussions of agency: Lang from an Arendtian perspective 
and Steele drawing on Anthony Giddenss notion of intersubjectivity.  However, neither author deals sufficiently 
with the notion of trauma as a problem for agency: when individuals are 'stuck' in defensive patterns of behaviour 
post-trauma, then this can shut them down from engaging politically, or else it can prompt them to acting in counter-
shaming (often violent) ways. 
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as broadly encompassing an overwhelming experience of sudden or catastrophic events in 
which the response to the event occurs in the often delayed, uncontrolled repetitive appearance 
of hallucinations and other intrusive phenomena.8  She points to the paradoxical and 
unknowable nature of trauma, whereby an event is not assimilated at the time of its occurrence, 
but later returns to bear delayed and repeated witness to the wound.9  Not knowing is an inherent 
element of trauma: the traumatic event is so overwhelming that it is not fully experienced in the 
moment and it is not until later that the enormity of what has happened begins to sink in.  
Trauma simultaneously defies and demands our witness.10  It defies our witness in that it is 
never able to be fully known or understood; memory does not and cannot record the event in full.  
Alongside this defiance, however, is a demand: the suffering that attends trauma cries out to be 
acknowledged and given voice.11   
 
Trauma also affects larger social groups, particularly where individuals experience political 
violence or natural disasters.  Kai Eriksons study of survivors of the Buffalo Creek disaster in 
the United States points to the social dimensions of trauma.  He observes that trauma 
simultaneously creates and destroys community.  Paradoxically, estrangement becomes the 
basis for communality12 as those marked by trauma seek out others who have had similar 
experiences and thus understand one anothers numbness and pain.  Erikson refers to this as a 
                                                
8 Caruth, Unclaimed Experience. 
9 Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, p. 4. 
10 Caruth, Unclaimed Experience, p. 5. 
11 This aspect of trauma is captured well by Adorno who is torn between the insistence that we cannot express 
horrific events in words (To write poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric) and that suffering must be expressed (The 
need to lend a voice to suffering is a condition for all truth).  See Adorno, Prisms, p. 34; and Adorno, Negative 
Dialectics, pp. 17-18.  
12 Kai Erikson, Notes on Trauma and Community, in Cathy Caruth (ed.), Trauma: Explorations in Memory 
(Maryland: Johns Hopkins University, 1995), p. 186. 
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gathering of the wounded.13  However, the overwhelming effect of trauma on a community is 
one of profound damage.  The communality that brings survivors together is not a positive or 
therapeutic community; it is corrosive.14  Its members are united by a sense of being set apart 
from those who have not suffered, sharing a distinct set of perspectives as a result of their 
experiences.  Erikson notes [t]raumatized people calculate lifes chances differentlythey can 
be said to have experienced not only a changed sense of self and a changed way of relating to 
others but a changed worldview.15  They expect danger, feeling out of control and at the mercy 
of an uncertain world.   
 
Trauma is not only experienced in the aftermath of single, dramatic events; it can also be 
ongoing and structurally induced as, for example, in the case of extreme poverty or ongoing civil 
war, where day-to-day life is a struggle for security and survival.  Martha Cabrera, a psychologist 
who heads a team that works towards community reconstruction throughout Nicaragua, describes 
her country as a multiply wounded, multiply traumatized, multiply mourning country.16  This 
multiple wounds phenomenon has consequences on a variety of levels: individual, social, and 
political.  Another example of ongoing trauma is where unhealed trauma is passed down 
generationally; this can happen on a small scale, for example, where a parent has been sexually 
abused, or on a larger scale, such as in the aftermath of slavery or a civil war.  Such trans-
generational transmission of trauma can occur regardless of whether the next generation knows 
                                                
13 Erikson, Notes on Trauma, p. 187. 
14Erikson, Notes on Trauma, p. 189. 
15 Erikson, Notes on Trauma, p. 194, emphasis in original. 
16 Martha Cabrera, Living and Surviving in a Multiply Wounded Country,  
http://wwwu.uni-klu.ac.at/hstockha/neu/html/cabreracruz.htm (last accessed 21 March, 2008). 
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of the trauma of the elder generation or not.17  Other forms of trauma include secondary trauma, 
where people in a helping or observational role experience second-hand trauma because of what 
they see and hear, and participation-induced trauma, where the perpetrators of trauma suffer in 
the wake of harming others.18 
 
Alongside the individual and social dimensions of trauma, be they experienced in the aftermath 
of a single event or more complex in causality, are disturbing political dimensions.  Karin Fierke 
argues that we cannot isolate psychological and political considerations in the aftermath of war.  
She maintains that [p]olitical trauma is larger than the sum of traumatised individuals in a 
context19 and as such it must be considered separately.  She illustrates this with reference to the 
trauma that followed World War I.  The shame and sense of betrayal that the German population 
felt in its aftermath and the widespread physical and psychological trauma due to the horrors of 
trench warfare and the loss of lives combined to produce political trauma.  This was then 
manipulated by Hitler to create a solipsist Germany, ever vigilant in its relations to a dangerous 
external world and equally dangerous internal enemies.20  Psychological trauma and political 
humiliation brought into being a revenge-seeking political solipsism.  As well as prompting 
acting out behaviours, such as the pursuit of revenge, trauma can also prompt acting in 
behaviours, such as political withdrawal.  Cabrera points to the political consequences of trauma 
in multiply-wounded Nicaragua, where citizens are uninterested in political involvement: 
                                                
17 Volkan, Blood Lines, pp. 43-44.  
18 Yoder, Trauma Healing. 
19 Fierke, Trauma, political solipsism and war, p. 482. 
20 Fierke, Trauma, political solipsism and war, p. 487. 
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When a person does not or cannot work through a trauma right away, its social 
consequences, the most frequent of which are apathy, isolation and aggressiveness, are 
only revealed over time.  We understood that theres a close connection between so 
many accumulated wounds and traumas and the behavior that can be seen today in the 
large number of Nicaraguans who insist they dont want to know any more about 
politics, or dont want to get involved in anything.  Unprocessed traumas and other 
wounds and grief explain much of the current lack of mobilization.21  
Contrary to mainstream conceptions within International Relations, then, widespread trauma 
takes on a life of its own that is greater than individual suffering, and can profoundly influence 
the course of global politics.  As such, approaches to global suffering that adopt a rational, 
forward-looking analysis can have only a limited understanding of violence and its fall out.  In 
order to reach towards a deeper understanding of the cycles of violence and suffering, social and 
political analyses must also consider the emotional and psychological undercurrents operating in 
the lives of communities and the ways in which their histories influence their current realities.  
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I examine responses to historical trauma, drawing on Dominick 
LaCapras broad distinction between acting out and working through.22  Acting out occurs where 
sufferers become stuck in the past and live a restricted life characterised by hypervigilance and 
a desire for security.  It is normal and adaptive in the immediate aftermath of trauma; however, 
prolonged acting out becomes pathological and prevents a healthy working through of trauma.  
This can be seen not only in individuals, but also in larger social groups.  Working through is a 
much more difficult response to trauma; it does not paint the world in stark black and white or 
                                                
21 Cabrera, Living and Surviving in a Multiply Wounded Country. 
22 LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma.  See also Yoder, Trauma Healing, for an accessible introduction to 
different responses to trauma.  In this model, what LaCapra terms acting out is referred to by Yoder as 
reenactment, encompassing both acting out, where trauma energy hurts others, and acting in, where trauma energy 
hurts oneself, for example, with anxiety and depression.  LaCapras notion of acting out encompasses both these 
maladaptive responses to trauma. 
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good and evil, as acting out tends to do, and it requires work.  Roses writings on mourning and 
political risk fall under the category of working through; they do not prescribe easy answers or a 
linear progression through pain, but instead involve self-examination, struggle, and critical 
engagement.  I examine acting out and working through in turn.23   
 Responses to Trauma: Acting Out 
Acting out involves a compulsive and repetitive re-living of the trauma; individuals who act out 
have difficulty distinguishing between the past and the present and struggle with notions of 
future.  They are haunted by their experience and trapped in the past that wounded them.24  This 
is unavoidable following trauma; however, in order for traumatised individuals to negotiate their 
way through the constriction that characterises their lives and to reengage with life in the here 
and now, they must begin to work through their traumatic experience.  They must give voice to 
their trauma if they are to move beyond its most debilitating symptoms; these include hyper-
arousal, where the traumatised individual lives in fight-or-flight mode; intrusion, where she 
experiences flashbacks and nightmares; and constriction, where she withdraws from normal 
social engagement, living a greatly restricted life.25   
 
                                                
23 I draw on a variety of different literatures to illustrate acting out and working through: historical, medical, 
political theory, literature, and peace-building.  There is a broad consensus on ideas about traumathe effects of 
traumatic experiences on individuals and communities and the ways in which these change over timeacross these 
literatures.  My examples are chosen for illustrative purposes, and are necessarily a partial representation of a much 
broader range of possible examples that could have been included had I had more space.  
24 LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma. 
25 For a thorough delineation of the symptoms of trauma, see Herman, Trauma and Recovery. 
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Just as whole communities experience trauma, so too do whole communities fail to work through 
that trauma.  People search desperately for meaning in the wake of disaster; this leads to the 
construction of meaning-making narratives26 in order to explain what happened and to bring 
comfort.  Unfortunately, these narratives take refuge in simplistic explanations that both prolong 
existing suffering and beget further suffering.  Three common narratives are the traditional 
heroic-soldier narrative, which allows only a truncated form of mourning that shuts down the 
questioning of self and other; the good versus evil narrative, which leads to a demonisation of the 
other; and the redemptive violence narrative, which prompts revenge-seeking behaviours.  I 
examine these in turn. 
Meaning-making narratives: the heroic-soldier 
People often search for meaning in the losses they suffer in an attempt to attenuate the pain and 
bring comfort.  Jay Winter examines the loss that attended World War I and its aftermath and 
how the vast number of those affected by the war dealt with their grief.27  He notes that 
traditional forms of mourning dominated, forms that drew upon classical, romantic, and sacred 
sources.  These forms allowed a search for meaning among the chaos and wreckage the war left 
in its wake.  State-sponsored mourning encourages this search for meaning, particularly in the 
wake of war; it has a vested interest in its citizens accepting and supporting its armed 
engagements, despite the cost in lives.  In his semi-autobiographical novel, Memoirs of an 
Infantry Officer, Siegfried Sassoon remarks that during World War I the media colluded in this 
portrayal of war as heroic and glorious: somehow the newspaper men always kept the horrifying 
                                                
26 Yoder, Trauma Healing, p. 37. 
27 Winter, Sites of Memory, Sites of Mourning. 
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realities of the War out of their articles, for it was unpatriotic to be bitter, and the dead were 
assumed to be gloriously happy.28    
 
However, the mourning that the state encourages is generally a truncated form of working 
through that prioritises memorialisation.  It allows very little room to tell ones story and does 
not encourage social re-engagement outside the orthodoxy.  Edkins argues that the 
medicalisation and normalisation of traumatised individuals from armed forces results in 
depoliticisation and the preservation of the status quo.  They are returned to service as soon as 
possible or, if they are unable to be reintegrated into the armed forces, they are labelled as 
suffering from post-traumatic stress disorder.  In both scenarios, individuals are discouraged 
from engaging politically.29  Edkins maintains: In contemporary culture victimhood offers 
sympathy and pity in return for the surrender of any political voice.30  Vanessa Pupavac also 
warns against the depoliticisation of entire populations in the wake of conflict, arguing that 
labelling whole societies as traumatised can strip them of the right to govern themselves and 
legitimise indefinite international administration.31 
Meaning-making narratives: good and evil 
A second meaning-making narrative that people employ to make sense of trauma is the narrative 
of right and wrong, good and evil.   Individuals and societies perceive themselves as innocent 
                                                
28 Siegfried Sassoon, Memoirs of an Infantry Officer, in Sassoon, The Complete Memoirs of George Sherston, p. 
364.  
29 The phenomenon of labelling resulting in loss of agency is also discussed in Karin Fierke, Critical Security 
Studies (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007), p. 125.  For a personal account of medicalisation and depoliticisation 
during WWI, see Sassoons autobiographical novels, The Complete Memoirs of George Sherston. 
30 Edkins, Trauma and the Memory of Politics, p. 9. 
31 Pupavac, Pathologizing Populations and Colonising Minds, pp. 489-511. 
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victims and the perpetrators as evil.  In the wake of the attacks on the World Trade Centre in 
New York on September 11, 2001, President George W. Bush immediately began to employ the 
rhetoric of good and evil.  In the first speech he made in the wake of the attack, he announced: 
Today, our nation saw evil.  Peter Singer remarks: In his brief speech to the nation that 
evening, he used the word evil four times, setting the tone for the months and years to come.32  
 
The trauma in the wake of September 11 affected not only those individuals who suffered loss of 
family and friends; it affected whole communities and, indeed, the wider American public, many 
of whom perceived the attacks as being perpetrated on American values such as freedom and 
democracy.  However, the mourning that took place was truncated prematurely: there was no 
official or media space for questioning, or for telling stories that did not mesh with the 
administrations chosen response to the attacks.  The binary division of the world into good and 
evil does not allow for self-examination.  In his reflections on the events and the aftermath of 
September 11, iek points to subtle media censorship in the days that followed: 
when firefighters widows were interviewed on CNN, most of them gave the 
expected performance: tears, prayersall except one who, without a tear, said that she 
does not pray for her dead husband, because she knows that prayer will not bring him 
back. Asked if she dreams of revenge, she calmly said that that would have been a true 
betrayal of her husband: had he survived, he would have insisted that the worst thing to 
do is to succumb to the urge to retaliatethere is no need to add that this clip was 
shown only once, then disappeared from the repetitions of the same interviews.33   
                                                
32 Singer, The President of Good and Evil, p. 143. 
33 Slavoj iek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real! Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates (London: 
Verso, 2002), pp. 13-14, fn8. 
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This unacceptability of expressing alternative viewpoints, such as that expressed by the 
firefighters widow, only intensified as the war on terror progressed.34   
 
Judith Butler also discusses the rise of censorship in United States in the post-September 11 
environment.35  She notes that Bushs bald black-and-white statementEither youre with us or 
with the terroristsleft no room for the rejection of both statements and meant that those who 
did not support the war were seen by the administration as terror sympathisers.  Similarly 
vilifying of those who dared to question the war on terror was the (liberal Left) New York Times 
labelling of those who sought a broader understanding of events as excuseniks.36  Butler argues 
that this was tantamount to the suppression of dissent and that one can (and should) both 
condemn the violent attacks on September 11 and ask what the historical, social, and political 
antecedents were that facilitated the attack.37  iek is similarly critical of the polarisation of 
rhetoric post-September 11.  Those who unconditionally condemned the attacks were perceived 
as supporting a position of American innocence under attack by Third World Evil and those 
who pointed to socio-political facilitators for Arab extremism were seen as labelling America as 
a deserving victim.  iek maintains that we must resist the temptation of taking either position: 
The only possible solution here is to reject this very opposition and to adopt both positions 
                                                
34 Any questioning took place largely underground.  Bushs assumptions created a clear political agenda that did not 
allow for official alternatives, but in civil society individuals and groups did begin to question the US 
administrations response.  One such organisation is Peaceful Tomorrows, founded by people who lost family 
members in September 11, and who advocate non-violent alternatives to the Bush administrations response.  See 
http://www.peacefultomorrows.org/index.php (last accessed 2 October 2007).  See also Underground Zero, a 
collation of independent filmmakers responses to September 11: 
http://www.jayrosenblattfilms.com/undergroundzero/ (last accessed 2 October 2007).  
35 Judith Butler, Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and Violence (London: Verso, 2004), pp. 1-18. 
36 Butler, Precarious Life, p. 9. 
37 Butler, Precarious Life, p. 15. 
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simultaneously; this can be done only if we resort to the dialectical category of totality: there is 
no choice between those two positions; each is one-sided and false.38   
Meaning-making narratives: redemptive violence 
The silencing of dissenting voices and a refusal to allow questioning truncates the mourning 
process.  Caroline Yoder, director of Strategies for Trauma Awareness and Resilience (STAR), 
maintains that incomplete mourning at a societal level can lead not only to a feeling of 
victimhood but also to aggression: 
Regardless of the reasons for incomplete mourning, the resulting grief thwarts healing 
and keeps populations more susceptible to acting out of low-mode brain states.  Normal 
fear can morph into panic and paranoia, pain into despair, anger into rage, humiliation 
and shame into an obsessive drive for vindication.  The quest for measured justice can 
be confused with retaliation and revenge.39  
Such aggression was certainly in evidence in the wake of the September 11 attacks.  Bush made 
it perfectly clear that he would make no distinction between the perpetrators of terror and the 
nations that support and give refuge to terrorists, a doctrine he elaborated over the next weeks 
and followed with action when the United States began bombing Afghanistan on October 7, 
2001.  Singer describes Bushs actions as the most aggressive choice among a range of options 
that had not been adequately explored...A peace-loving president would have been more 
convincing in trying all other options.  That would have been emotionally and politically difficult 
in the days immediately following September 11, but it was what Bush ought to have done.40   
 
                                                
38 iek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real!, pp. 49-50 
39 Yoder, Trauma Healing, pp. 36-37. 
40 Singer, The President of Good and Evil, p. 152-3. 
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Meaning-making narratives are not only deployed in the wake of single traumatic events, such as 
September 11, they are also employed in situations of ongoing trauma.  In her reflections on grief 
and grievance in the wake of Yitzhak Rabins assassination, Israeli psychoanalyst Rena Moses-
Hrushovski examines the ongoing Israeli-Palestine conflict and the complex trauma that so many 
suffer as a result.  In a situation of ongoing trauma, each new loss triggers past losses and old 
wounds are reopened.  In the case of Rabins assassination in 1995, the murder of a man who had 
given his life to work for peace and freedom from terror served to reinforce the deeply held 
belief that Israel could not trust anyone, that justice was unachievable, that the unthinkable had 
happened once again.41  Moses-Hrushovski uses the term deployment to describe the recurring 
attitudes and patterns of behaviour exhibited by her multiply-traumatised patients, and argues 
that such patterns are also exhibited on a broader social scale in the Arab-Israeli conflict.  She 
summarises the characteristics of deployed individuals and groups as follows: 
deployment entails a rigid self-organisation into a system of attitudes, roles and 
behaviours aimed at protecting ones self-esteem and dignity, at consoling or 
compensating oneself for what one has experienced in the past as unfair, painful, and 
humiliating; and, [sic] all this rather than deal with the hardships involved, mourn the 
losses and disappointments experienced and adopt adaptive and self-realising patterns.42 
One of the adaptive patterns that those embedded in the Israeli-Palestine conflict employ is that 
of violence: hatred and accusation43 were soon substituted for mourning after Rabins 
assassination.  In the ensuing months, the people of Israel elected a Likud government that 
opposed peace, and clashes with the Palestinian police soon followed.44  Although there was 
                                                
41 Moses-Hrushovski, Grief and Grievance, p. 12. 
42 Moses-Hrushovski, Grief and Grievance, p. 44. 
43 Moses-Hrushovski, Grief and Grievance, p. 115. 
44 Moses-Hrushovski, Grief and Grievance, p. 163. 
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partial mourning after Rabins assassination, it was truncated prematurely.  Moses-Hrushovski 
believes that this was in part due to Shimon Peress decision to bring the Israeli elections forward 
and to refrain from capitalising on the assassination in the Labour Party campaign: this cut off 
the expression of grieving and mourning.45  Another contribution to the premature end of the 
mourning process was the defensive reaction by Orthodox and right groups in response to the 
hurling of accusations by those non-religious and left groups.  She explains:  
Their guiltand indeed the guilt of Israelis from all parts of the political spectrumfor 
having contributed to, or having done nothing to prevent the outrageous libels hurled 
against Yitzhak Rabin caused many Israelis to forget, repress or at least not think 
enough about the tragic event itself.  Hatred and accusation took the place of real 
mourning, which would have had to involve the examining of the problems surrounding 
the murder, the admission of direct or indirect responsibility for what had happened and 
the commitment to deal courageously with lessons learned from the tragedy.46 
The uncomfortable suspicion that they were somehow complicit in Rabins assassination was 
repressed; rather than engage in critical self-reflection, many Israelis took refuge in the less 
disruptive (to their own sense of self) strategy of finger-pointing and hatred.  This, combined 
with a rapid switch of focus in the build-up to a new election, truncated the process of mourning 
and working through. 
 
One of the dangers of prolonged acting out after traumatic events is that a failure to work though 
the traumatic experience often perpetuates further violence.  This happens not only in the 
immediate aftermath of trauma, but also decades and even generations later.  Vamik Volkan 
argues that the trans-generational transmission of trauma plays a significant role in violent 
                                                
45 Moses-Hrushovski, Grief and Grievance, p. 113. 
46 Moses-Hrushovski, Grief and Grievance, p. 115. 
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conflict.  He notes that a refusal to mourn a twelfth-century defeat kept a sense of victimhood 
alive in the Serbian community that was later mobilised by Slobodan Milosevic in the Bosnia-
Herzegovina conflict: The defeat of June 28, 1389, became the shared loss that could not be 
mourned but that had to be recalled continually...The Serbs held on to their victimized identity 
and glorified victimization in song.47  Volkan describes such traumas as chosen trauma: 
Adopting a chosen trauma can enhance ethnic pride, reinforce a sense of victimization, and even 
spur a group to avenge its ancestors hurts.48  If we are to arrest such cycles of violence and 
aggression, we must learn how to work through trauma.  It is to a consideration of working 
through that I now turn. 
 Responses to Trauma: Working Through 
Imre Kertész, in his (semi-autobiographical) narrative about a young boy who survived the Nazi 
camps in World War II, recounts an extraordinary conversation between the young boy and his 
family once he returns home. 
Before all else, [the old boy] declared, you must put the horrors behind you.  
Increasingly amazed, I asked, Why should I? In order, he replied, to be able to 
liveone cannot start a new life under such a burden, and I had to admit he did have 
a point.  Except I didnt quite understand how they could wish for something that was 
quite impossible, and indeed I made the comment that what had happened had 
happened, and anyway, when it came down to it, I could not give orders to my memory.  
                                                
47 Volkan, Blood Lines, p. 64. 
48 Volkan, Blood Lines, p. 78.  See also his chapter in the same book entitled Chosen Trauma: Unresolved 
Mourning, pp. 36-49, and Fierkes analysis of acting out in Germany post-World War I and its facilitation of the 
horrors that ensued in World War II in Trauma, Political Solipsism and War. 
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I would only be able to start a new life, I ventured, if I were to be reborn or if some 
affliction, disease, or something of the sort were to affect my mind, which they surely 
didnt wish on me, I hoped.49 
The narrator is astonished at the obtuseness of his family in their pragmatic insistence that he 
must put his experiences in Auschwitz behind him and look to the future.  He could not just take 
off his experiences and dispose of them like he did his prison garb; they were a part of him.  He 
would only be able to move forward by taking steps; he could neither start a new life with a 
blank slate, nor continue his previous existence as if nothing had changed.  He needed to work 
through his experiences, to attempt to make sense of what had happened: I now needed to start 
doing something with that fate, needed to connect it to somewhere or something50  This 
process of doing something with the experiences of suffering is the process of working 
through, a process the narrator begins by trying to describe his experiences in the camps to his 
family.  LaCapra describes working through as an articulatory practice that gradually enables 
one to make distinctions between past, present, and future.  It is not a linear process, nor can 
binary distinctions be made between acting out and working through; on the contrary, the 
process of working through is complex and is never tidily resolved:  
[Working through] requires going back to problems, working them over, and perhaps 
transforming the understanding of them.  Even when they are worked through, this does 
not mean that they may not recur and require renewed and perhaps changed ways of 
working through them again.  In this sense, working through is itself a process that may 
never entirely transcend acting out and that, even in the best of circumstances, is never 
achieved once and for all.51   
                                                
49 Kertész, Fatelessness, p. 256. 
50Kertész, Fatelessness, p. 259. 
51 LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma, pp. 148-149. 
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Working through is rarely discussed in International Relations literature, critical or otherwise.  
There is a call for a return of the political, and for thinking in terms of agency;52 however, before 
one can engage politically, one often needs to work through trauma in order to move away from 
a reliance on damaging meaning-making narratives and acting out behaviours.  Roses call for 
mourning and political risk crucially calls for mourning before and alongside agency.  She points 
to the political dangers of unmourned loss: 
[The] impotence and suffering arising from unmourned loss do not lead to a passion for 
objectivity and justice.  They lead to resentment, hatred, inability to trust, and then, the 
doubled burden of fear of those negative emotionsIt is the abused who become the 
abusers, whether politically as well as psychically may depend on contingencies of 
social and political history.53 
Unless trauma is worked through, it is likely to beget further pain and suffering that could well 
have political consequencesbe it hatred expressed in further violence or political 
disengagement.  LaCapra argues that unless individuals mourn, they will not be able to reengage 
with life, particularly not with its political or social dimensions: 
Mourning involves a different inflection of performativity: a relation to the past which 
involves remembering and taking leave of or actively forgetting it, thereby allowing for 
critical judgment and a reinvestment in life, notably social and civic life with its 
demands, responsibilities, and norms requiring respectful recognition and consideration 
for others.  By contrast, to the extent someone is possessed by the past and acting out a 
repetition compulsion, he or she may be incapable of ethically responsible behavior.54 
Individuals who have undergone extreme suffering have broken through to the real, in ieks 
terms; they have experienced the horrific underside of existing social and political arrangements 
                                                
52 See, for example, Lang, Agency and Ethics; Steele, Ontological Security. 
53 Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, p. 51. 
54 LaCapra, Writing History, Writing Trauma, p. 70. 
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and are in a unique position to enlighten Enlightenment, to challenge the status quo.  Part of 
mourning is this relating of particular suffering to broader social forces.  But what does this 
mourning look like?  What kinds of political risk should we take?  How can we work through our 
losses in the real world?   
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, Rose maintains that inaugurated mourning is the ability to 
know and be known.55  The form of knowledge to which Rose refers is a Hegelian 
comprehensive knowledge: knowledge of what is opposed in its very onenessthe knowledge 
that the opposites are in truth one.56  It is a knowledge that holds together different perspectives 
and different experiences and examines their relation, rather than separating them into closed 
spheres.  To mourn is to express ones own grief and to be heard; it is also to listen to others 
grief.  It refuses to perceive the world in terms of sharply defined spheres of good and evil, 
whilst also refusing relativism.  It evinces a deep awareness of the social and political conditions 
of the present and the historical antecedents that shaped them.  It looks beyond the discourses of 
freedom and rights and perceives the underlying structures of power and domination.  It 
exercises political judgment, doing so with an awareness of contingency and the inevitable 
limitations of any outcome.  It struggles towards a good enough justice57knowing that any 
justice will always be imperfect and that we will never be able to [mend] diremption in heaven 
or on earth.58  It imagines the possibility of ethical life, and takes ethical initiative, but always 
assesses the outcomes and revises law and institutions in response.   
                                                
55 Rose, Judaism and Modernity, p. 202. 
56 Hegel, The Letters, pp. 280-282, cited in Rose, Judaism and Modernity, pp. 60-61. 
57 Rose, Loves Work, p. 116.  
58 Rose, The Broken Middle, p. xv. 
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In what follows, I examine Roses notions of mourning and political risk in turn, suggesting 
ways in which these ideas have been and can be applied in actual historical situations.  Mourning 
takes many different forms and is expressed differently by peoples from different cultures.59  
However, the process of working through grief entails three broad tasks: expressing grief, 
reconstructing events and history in narrative form, and critical judgment.  These in turn prepare 
people for political engagement.  I examine these tasks in turn; however, it is important to note 
that the process of working through is non-linear and that the tasks overlap in practice.60 
Mourning: (creative) expression 
 Part of mourning is expressing grief at the pain and loss that one has suffered.  This can be 
enormously difficult for traumatised individuals and groups; part of the experience of trauma is 
that ones feelings become difficult to access: individuals feel wooden and severed from reality.  
In particular, it can be difficult to use words to express feelings.  At this early stage of mourning, 
creative, often non-verbal, expression can be helpful.  Yoder points to a variety of modes that 
may help to express grief in the wake of trauma, including: art, music, dance, drama, writing, 
                                                
59 To illustrate, Jayne Docherty, one of Yoders STAR colleagues, notes how much more relaxed a man from 
Uganda was than the other participants in one of the workshops she was running.  When she asked him about it, he 
replied that one of the methods his people used to mourn was dancing, and that he utilised the technique to help him 
process his grief and cope with stress. (Personal communication, International Studies Association Annual 
Convention, Chicago, February 2007.)  For a discussion on the problematic application of Western 
psychotherapeutic notions of healing to other cultures, and particularly in relation to the truth and reconciliation 
commissions, see Rosalind Shaw, Rethinking Truth and Reconciliation Commissions: Lessons from Sierra Leone, 
United States Institute of Peace Special Report 130, 2005, http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr130.pdf (last 
accessed February 14, 2008). 
60 Before the broad stages of working through I have outlined can take place, some degree of safety should ideally 
be established.  However, this is not always possible, for example in situations of ongoing conflict.  For an excellent 
chapter dealing with the establishment of safety in personal recovery, see Herman, Trauma and Recovery, pp. 155-
174.    
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prayer, meditation, cultural rituals, and cleansing ceremonies.61  Body-work such as movement 
and dance can also be helpful.    
 
The Harvard Program on Refugee Trauma uses the healing power of the arts to help refugees 
work through trauma.  Richard Mollica, director of the programme, maintains that artistic beauty 
can help people come to terms with pain:  The embrace of beauty by the survivor and healer 
restores a sense of inter-connectedness, well-being and meaning.62  He argues that one aspect of 
the violence perpetrated against refugees has been the destruction of beauty and culture and that 
part of the process of recovery is reconnecting with that which was lost.  Trauma survivors can 
access and express their experiences by rediscovering the artistic expressions of their culture: 
expressing pain through drawing and painting, and telling stories through drama and puppets.63  
In the wake of Rabins death, various forms of creative expression played a part in Israeli 
societys working through.  The square in which he was assassinated became a temple of art: 
masses gathered there to light candles, sing songs, write notes, and weep.64  Music became a 
focal point for the nations grief, with the communal singing of songs such as the Song of 
Peace and the moving performance of Shlomo Gronich at the memorial service that closed the 
seven days of mourning.65    
 
                                                
61 Yoder, Trauma Healing, p. 54. 
62 Richard Mollica, Why Stories?, Harvard Program on Refugee Trauma, http://www.hprt-
cambridge.org/Layer3.asp?page_id=25, accessed April 24, 2007.  See also Mollica, Healing Invisible Wounds. 
63 The HPRT website has various examples of art as a healing tool, including a comic book about a Cambodian 
brother and sister who survived the Khmer regime: Svang Tor and Richard Mollica, Sun and Moon: A Khmer 
Journey, downloadable from http://www.hprt-cambridge.org/Layer3.asp?page_id=28, accessed April 24, 2007. 
64 Moses-Hrushovski, Grief and Grievance, pp. 8, 18. 
65 Moses-Hrushovski, Grief and Grievance, p. 19. 
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Expressing pain and loss in the wake of traumatic experience is an important part of working 
through; it is also difficult.  Creative expression, both alone and in concert with others, can help 
individuals and communities begin to explore the impact of that loss and to make connections 
between the aspects of themselves (emotional, physical, psychological, and spiritual) that are 
often fractured following extreme suffering.  It also prepares the way for a narrative 
reconstruction of what has happened; a reconstruction that should be communicated to those who 
did not experience the trauma(s) in order to facilitate reflection on accepted social practices. 
 Mourning: narration  
Telling the story of a trauma is central to the mourning process.  Psychiatrist Judith Lewis 
Herman describes story-telling as a work of reconstruction that transforms the traumatic 
memory and enables it to be incorporated into the traumatised individuals life story.66  Yoder 
maintains that story-telling helps with the healing process because it counteracts the isolation, 
silence, fear, shame, or unspeakable horror.67  However it is also difficult; it is a part of the 
work of mourning that requires communication with those who (often) do not want to hear. 
 
The story-telling process is communal: without an audience, be it one person or many, it loses 
much of its power.  As discussed in the previous chapter, Laubs work with the Video Archives 
for Holocaust Testimonies points to the double value of survivor testimony: it helps individuals 
not only to know themselves, but to be known by others.68  These two aspects of testimony
knowing and being knowncomprise Roses notion of inaugurated mourning.  In his writings 
                                                
66 Herman, Trauma and Recovery, p. 175. 
67 Yoder, Trauma Healing, p. 53. 
68 Laub, Truth and Testimony: The Process and the Struggle, p. 63.   
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on Holocaust survivor testimony, Michael Nutkiewicz argues that oral testimony is communal, 
didactic, and therapeutic and that it is precisely because it is not privatised but made public that 
it is able to be all these things.69  He argues that survivors can and should speak of the horrors 
they have witnessed, both for the sake of the survivor and for the wider community.  Indeed, the 
element of public testimony has become an integral part of some programmes designed to help 
victims work through their trauma.  Nutkiewicz tells of the founding in 1995 of the Project on 
Genocide, Psychiatry and Witnessing, saying that it was established because traditional psycho-
pathological approaches were obviously not getting at the heart of the victims trauma.  The 
missing element was narrativeallowing the survivors to tell their story in the context of public 
retelling.70  Martha Minnow also points to the therapeutic element of public testimony.  She 
maintains that the power of testimony was demonstrated over and over in South Africas Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC).  She quotes Lucas Baba Sikwepere, who was blinded by 
a policeman during the apartheid era, and who testified at the TRC: I feel what has been making 
me sick all the time is the fact that I couldnt tell my story.  But now Iit feels like I got my 
sight back by coming here and telling you the story.71  This illustrates the facilitation of 
individual working through by public story-telling.   
 
What should a trauma story communicate in order to promote working through?  Drawing on his 
work with refugees, Mollica argues that for a trauma story to aid recovery and healing, it should 
                                                
69 Michael Nutkiewicz, Shame, Guilt, and Anguish in Holocaust Survivor Testimony, The Oral History Review, 
Vol. 30, No. 1 (2003), p. 17. 
70 Nutkiewicz, Shame, Guilt, and Anguish, pp. 18-19.  For details of the Project on Genocide, Psychiatry and 
Witnessing, see http://www.psych.uic.edu/research/genocide/index.htm, last accessed Wednesday, September 12, 
2007. 
71 Testimony before Human Rights Committee of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, quoted 
in Minnow, Breaking the Cycles of Hatred, p. 25. 
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comprise four elements.72  First, the story recounts factually what happened, communicating the 
series of events that triggered their trauma.  Second, the story communicates broader socio-
cultural elements, portraying the history, traditions, and values that underlie the narrative.  
Individuals from different cultures will place varying meanings on events, and different 
responses may be necessary for working through.73  Third, the story involves looking behind the 
curtain of daily life and reflecting on the deeper (personal and societal) implications of their 
suffering.  This may involve rejecting beliefs once held to be true, such as traditional views on 
sexuality in the wake of sexual abuse, or belief in the infallibility of political leaders.  Lastly, the 
trauma story involves building a relationship with a listenerpublic testimony is healing not 
only for those who share their stories, but also for those who listen.  Storytelling is a reciprocal 
relationship: the listener values the person who is sharing their story and this influences both 
lives.  One of the major goals and effects of mourning loss is that it reduces the sense of 
isolation, of being alone with ones shame and terror, and facilitates social reintegration.  Mollica 
warns against a focus on the facts of traumatic experiences to the exclusion of a relationship 
between the storyteller and society.  He argues that society needs to listen to trauma survivors, 
saying they have much to teach us about survival and recovery.  He insists that it is a public 
responsibility to listen and learn:  
The trauma survivor reminds us all of our own vulnerability to tragedy and of the 
potential for society to abandon us.  We know that societys neglect can have a greater 
impact on the fate of the trauma survivor than the violent injury itself.  But another way 
                                                
72 Mollica, Healing Invisible Wounds, pp. 34-48. 
73 For example, Mollica tells of the Khmer Rouge practice of forbidding proper burials and Buddhist ceremonies for 
their victims.  He notes that an important part of working through for those who lost loved ones in this way is to 
conduct a traditional ceremony that remembers those who have died.  See Mollica, Healing Invisible Wounds, pp. 
41-42. 
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is possible, as the story of victimization becomes a story of courage and the story of 
damage becomes a story of recovery.74 
Although listening to others pain is an uncomfortable process, it is irresponsible to avoid doing 
so.  Those who have suffered beyond what many of us can imagine should not be ignored or 
swept aside, but listened to and learnt from.  
 
Storytelling can take place in public speech and in written (historical or literary) form: the public 
has a responsibility to listen and to consider institutional and legal arrangements in the light of 
these narratives.  Mari J. Matsuda argues from a legal perspective that the public needs to hear 
the stories of those who experience racism, hate and violence in order to challenge existing laws 
and precedents that fail to address these problems.  She notes that a typical legal inquiry omits 
the particularity of a victims time and space as well as the experience of a victims group over 
the course of time and space.75  She advocates instead a deep historical consciousness in order 
to lift us out of the neutrality trap.76  Public reception of peoples trauma stories prompts 
reflection and can bring about legal response.  Speaking to a legal audience on the matter of 
racist speech, Matsuda offers a challenge: before we abandon the task of devising a legal 
response to racist speech, we should consider concretely the options available to us. The legal 
imagination is a fruitful one.77  This echoes in concrete historical context what Rose calls for in 
theory: an openness to challenge and revise laws in response to limitations.    
 
                                                
74 Mollica, Healing Invisible Wounds, p. 247. 
75 Mari J. Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech: Considering the Victims Story, Michigan Law Review, 
Vol. 87, No. 8 (1989), p. 2373. 
76 Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, pp. 2320-2381. 
77 Matsuda, Public Response to Racist Speech, p. 2380. 
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Alongside public spoken testimony, there is a place for historical writing in coming to terms with 
historical trauma.  LaCapra suggests that a nuanced account of the traumatic event(s) may help to 
counter melancholy and promote working through.  Such writing exposes both the writer and 
reader to empathic unsettlement that encourages practical ethical response while remaining open 
to utopian ideals and hope.78  This need not be done by an outsider, who pieces together events 
and antecedents after the fact; some of the most powerful historical writings have been literary 
accounts by those who experienced the horrors of war.  Sassoons semi-autobiographical trilogy 
of an officer during World War I describes the frustration that attended attempts to describe the 
torment of war to those who had not experienced it and did not want to hear.  His poetry and the 
trilogy were a way of engaging politically and working through his own pain by putting it in 
narrative form as well as a way of eliciting a response from others.79  Similarly, Imre Kertészs 
Fatelessness is a powerful fictionalised account of his own experiences in a series of Nazi 
concentration camps including Auschwitz during World War II: a searingly personal and 
provocative account that profoundly unsettles.80  Listening to others pain challenges our own 
firmly held preconceptions about the way the world works, it points to the limitations of current 
political and social systems, and it indicates the lack of an easy way. However, it also points to 
hope: a fragile, painful hope, but a hope nonetheless.  Those who have suffered have survived 
and have much to teach us; although our learning will inevitably be partial and fragile, we must 
take the risk of listening and responding.  
                                                
78 LaCapra, p. 42. 
79 Sassoon, The Complete Memoirs of George Sherston. 
80 Kertész, Fatelessness. 
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Mourning: critical judgement  
A third interrelated aspect of mourning loss in the wake of trauma is critical reflection on the 
objective conditions81 that allowed the suffering to take place.  Adornos dialectical approach 
analyses the ways in which concrete suffering illuminates broader social conditions.  He argues 
that pain tells us that things ought to be different, and that we have a responsibility to bear 
witness to the repression of modern society: to enlighten Enlightenment.   
 
Moses-Hrushovski terms this aspect of mourning soul-searching: challenging accepted 
practices and modes of being that may have facilitated the suffering.82  She notes that self-
examination often gives way to other-examination and to pointing a finger of blame, but that 
soul-searching must take place both within groups and also between groups if understanding of 
the whys of extreme suffering is to grow.  In her examination of Israeli society and the social 
and political antecedents of the violence of Rabins assassination, Moses-Hrushovski points to 
three facilitating aspects of Israeli culture: male chauvinism, which leads to violence on the roads 
and in homes; ethnically-related grievances of Jewish immigrants, who have failed to be 
integrated into Israeli society and who experience systematic discrimination; and political 
deployment, where a focus on past traumas precludes consideration of the future.83  Reflection 
and insight into those practices that facilitate violence and trauma is crucial; with enhanced 
understanding, we may be able to challenge the damaging knee-jerk reactions that perpetuate the 
cycle of violence.   
                                                
81 Adorno, What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?, p. 124. 
82 Moses-Hrushovski, Grief and Grievance, pp. 36-43. 
83 Moses-Hrushovski, Grief and Grievance, pp. 67-91. 
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Butler also speaks provocatively of the need for political reflection in the wake of injury.  She 
argues that [t]o be injured means that one has the chance to reflect upon injury, to find out the 
mechanisms of its distribution, to find out who else suffers from permeable borders, unexpected 
violence, dispossession, and fear, and in what ways.84  She maintains that in the wake of 
violence, we should ask the following questions: 
What role will we assume in the historical relay of violence, who will we become in the 
response, and will we be furthering or impeding violence by virtue of the response that 
we make?  To respond to violence with violence may well be justified, but is it finally 
a responsible solution?  Similarly, moralistic denunciation provides immediate 
gratification, and even has the effect of temporarily cleansing the speaker of all 
proximity to guilt through the act of self-righteous denunciation itself.  But is this the 
same as responsibility, understood as taking stock of our world, and participating in its 
social transformation in such a way that non-violent, cooperative, egalitarian 
international relations remain the guiding ideal?85 
Responding to violence with an emphatic denunciation of the perpetrators and a promise that 
they will be punished has popular appeal; large sectors of the public demand strong leadership 
and clearly defined boundaries between right and wrong.  However, it is irresponsible to react 
primarily on the basis of political expediency; it only perpetuates the cycle of violence and 
serves to feed security fears.  Space must be made for the expression of mourning and anger, but 
also for reflection and self-awareness.  Grief and anger, no matter how great or how justified, 
must never drown out public debate and criticism.   
                                                
84 Butler, Precarious Life, p. xii. 
85 Butler, Precarious Life, p. 17. 
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Political risk 
Alongside mourning, in all its dimensions, Rose also advocates engaging in political risk as part 
of the process of working through.  Much of what I have discussed as being part of the process of 
mourning is also political risk; the process of working through is non-linear and it is impossible 
to make clear distinctions between mourning and political engagement.  The process of telling 
ones story, particularly if this is done in a public way, is engaging in political risk.  So, too, is 
the process of listening to others trauma stories.86  The critical assessment of ones own closely 
held assumptions, the questioning of ones own and larger group actions, and engaging in 
dialogue with the other are also courageous political acts. 
 
Roses notion of political risk has a speculative Hegelian negotiation of the particular and the 
universal at its core.  She speaks of the need to act, without guarantees, for the good of allthis 
is to take the risk of the universal interest.87  Taking the risk of the universal requires listening 
to particular pain and suffering and reflecting upon what these might mean more generally for 
institutions and law.  In this sense, it implies a radical democracy where groups of people 
challenge settled norms at various levels: sub-state, state, and supra-state.  It requires giving 
voice to those who are dispossessed and ignored within current systems of power.  It challenges 
tidy liberal categories and forces rethinking rather than blind acceptance of what has gone 
before.  It does not throw out existing laws and institutions; it works both within and without 
                                                
86 See, for example, Nutkiewicz, Shame, Guilt, and Anguish on the issue of the risk involved in telling ones 
trauma story and the risk in listening to the story. 
87 Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, p. 62, emphasis in original. 
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these existing structures to hold them accountable to those ideals they profess to uphold and to 
advocate change where they marginalise and discriminate.    
 
Bonnie Honig proffers a radical account of democratic agency with Rose-ian political risk at its 
core.  Drawing on Freuds depiction of Moses as the foreign founder of Israel in Moses and 
Monotheism, she sketches a model of agency where democratic subjects are always sceptical of 
their leaders and institutions.  For Honig, radically democratic subjects who engage in political 
risk are: 
subjects who do not expect power to be granted to them by nice authorities with their 
best interests at heart; subjects who know that if they want power they must take it and 
that such taking is always illegitimate from the perspective of the order in place at the 
time; subjects who know that their efforts to carve out a just and legitimate polity will 
always be haunted by the violences of their founding; subjects who experience the law 
as a horizon of promise but also as an alien and impositional thing.88 
These subjects live in an agonistic relationship with their law, institutions, and leaders.  They see 
glimpses of promise in the law but do not expect that it is perfect or complete or that it will be 
wielded wisely by those who adjudicate it.  These subjects are also ready to act, to engage in 
political risk, knowing that any action will have imperfect results and that no system will ever be 
complete.  These subjects do not expect to mend diremption in heaven and on earth,89 nor do 
they indulge in an endless melancholy.  Instead, they nurture some ambivalence regarding their 
principles, their leaders, and their neighbors andput that ambivalence to good political use.90   
  
                                                
88 Bonnie Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), p. 39. 
89 Rose, The Broken Middle, p. xv. 
90 Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner, p. 118.  
204 
 
 
Conclusion 
Reflection in international ethics is prompted by the persistence of violence and suffering in 
global politics and by a desire to do something in response.  However, the response that is 
articulated by liberal approaches to global suffering skims too quickly over past and present pain 
in an attempt to sketch a better future, one in which respect for human rights and the rule of law 
prevails.  In liberal international ethics, guidelines for living are determined by what is deemed 
to be best for all; in critical Habermasian theory, guidelines are devised in rational discourse 
between affected individuals.  These imagine an ideal world, in which morality progresses apace 
and rationality reigns.  However, such a world has no space for the messiness of actual living 
with its complicated histories, its difficult present, and its complex emotions.  The pervasiveness 
of violence in the modern worldbe it in the context of civil war or in the homecannot be 
legislated away, nor can its effects be discounted.  We must look suffering full in the face, we 
must sit with stories that make us uncomfortable, and we must allow our tidy assumptions about 
how the world is and should be to be turned upside down.   
 
In this chapter, I have examined the liberal response to trauma in the wake of collective violence, 
and argued that elites and societies take refuge in meaning-making narratives to make sense of 
their pain.  These narrativesthe heroic soldier, good and evil, and redemptive violenceallow 
those whose worlds are disrupted to find comfort in simple formulas, formulas that do not 
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require work or challenge deeply held presuppositions about the world.  In LaCapras 
terminology, such responses to trauma fall under the rubric of acting out.  More difficult, but less 
damaging, are responses that fall under the rubric of working through trauma.  Roses politics of 
mourning and political risk require individuals and communities to work through the trauma that 
is so pervasive in modernity.  She warns of the political consequences of failing to do so, noting 
that those who suffer can go on to inflict suffering if wounds are allowed (or, indeed, 
encouraged) to fester.  Adorno insists that suffering must be given voice; we who profess 
concern for victims of war and violence have a responsibility to provide fora for such testimony, 
to listen and mourn alongside those who suffer, and to critically examine and challenge the 
objective societal conditions that facilitate the suffering.   
 
To engage in political risk is not an easy path.  It involves slow steps, painful questioning, and 
inevitable failure.  But the alternative is an alternative of easy answers and glib responses that 
does nothing to address the underlying structures that perpetuate violence and suffering.  Before 
his death, Rabin spoke of taking calculated risks91 to pursue peace:   
A century of hatred doesnt dissolve suddenly with a handshake in Washington.  Peace 
will be built slowly, day by day, through modest deeds and countless spontaneous 
detailsWe are going slowly and cautiously, one step at a timeExtremists on both 
sides are lying in wait for us, and we Israelis and Palestinians must not fail.  At every 
step we must consider and weigh, check  and beware.92  
Rabin lived a life of political risk, risk that eventually cost him his life.  It takes courage to work 
through trauma, to take the difficult path of mourning and political risk.  It is not a popular path; 
                                                
91 Moses-Hrushovski, Grief and Grievance, p. 24. 
92 Yitzhak Rabin, Article Adapted from Prime Minister Rabins Address in Paris on Receiving the UNESCO Peace 
Prize (1994), cited in Moses-Hrushovski, Grief and Grievance, p. 27. 
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it is disturbing and unsettling.  It is unlikely to be embraced by many elites or decision-makers; it 
must be walked by courageous groups and individuals who are willing to go against settled 
norms and to advocate a different way of thinking and being.  It requires reflection on the 
societal and historical antecedents of suffering, but knows that these insights will rarely be 
welcomed by those in power.  It challenges the structures that perpetuate inequality and 
exclusion, but realises that any progress will be fragile and reversible.  It knows that the deep 
brokenness that attends modern life can never be fully mended, but clings to the promise of a 
measure of healing, despite this.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
A major premise of this thesis is that although ethical reflection in mainstream international 
political thought is prompted by human suffering, it too quickly shifts attention from past and 
present suffering to the articulation of rational, forward-looking solutions.  Established critical 
approaches have attempted to redress this lack, rejecting the technical solutions offered by 
liberalism and proposing either dialogic (Habermasian) or deconstructive (poststructural) 
approaches instead.  However, Habermasian theorists inherit dubious distinctions from modern 
political thought, privileging the universal over the particular, public over private, consensus 
over dissensus, and rational argumentation over acknowledgement and recognition.  
Poststructural theorists disturb these accepted hierarchies, offering a powerful social critique; 
however, they tend to emphasise the previously neglected side of the binary opposition, 
privileging particular and private categories over universal and public, and favouring 
fragmentation over unity.  Both sets of critical theories, then, offer limited accounts of suffering 
under modernity, and the power of their critique is compromised as a result.  I argue that a fuller 
account of suffering in global politics can be gleaned from theory in the tradition of the early 
Frankfurt School, drawing on Adorno and Rose to articulate an approach that allows the 
negotiation of binary opposites without purporting to mend the diremption between law and 
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ethics, universal and particular.  Theory in this tradition has a speculative Hegelian core, which 
maintains that it is impossible to think a particular without also thinking about its relation to what 
it is not.  Instead, there is a mutual constitution of opposites, whereby reflection on one 
illuminates the other and increases our comprehension of the whole, despite its brokenness.   
 
I have chosen the term speculative to describe the approach I develop in the second part of this 
thesis for several reasons.  Both Adorno and Rose draw heavily on a reading of Hegel that points 
to his speculative dialectics as a way of negotiating the broken middle between universal and 
particular, law and ethics, Enlightenment ideals and lived experience.  Speculative thought points 
to the particular, but maintains that the particular cannot be thought in isolation: 
To think a particular is to think this, not that; here, not there; now, not then: to map it 
on to a conceptual surface by way of exclusions or negations, yet in that act to affirm 
also its relatedness, its involvement; from empty identity, thinkable only as a kind of 
absence and indeterminacy, to the specific position, this not that, and by way of that 
contradictory state to arrive at thinking the individual as a convergence of the 
universal and the particular.1 
To reflect on the particular, then, is also to be aware of its relation to the whole.  This works 
against the fragmentation of a poststructural approach, which eschews reflection on the whole, 
and against the universalism of a Habermasian approach, which refuses any particular that 
cannot be subsumed under an overarching universal in the search for a consensus on truth.  Rose 
makes a clear distinction between dialectical and speculative thought, maintaining that Adornos 
reading of Hegel is dialectical and hers speculative;2 however, I maintain that she makes too 
much of the distinction both within Hegels thought and between her own and Adornos reading 
                                                
1 Williams, Logic and Spirit in Hegel, p. 116.  
2 See Chapter Four of this thesis. 
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of Hegel.  I thus use speculative as a short-hand for what could also be termed speculative 
dialectics, choosing speculative rather than dialectical as a descriptor because it carries fewer 
connotations.3  Speculative also points to the non-immanent dimension of Adorno and Roses 
thoughtAdornos notion of utopian hope, and Roses use of the personal to speak to the 
universal.4   
 
 A focus on suffering is central to ethical reflection because it points to the failure of 
Enlightenment ideals to live up to their promise.  Concrete pain tells us that what is ought not to 
be, that things ought to be different.5  Particular suffering must be given voice because it 
challenges the accepted social conditions and structures that have allowed the suffering in the 
first place and acts as a counter to strong versions of moral progress under modernity.  Adornos 
dialectical approach to social criticism enables a fuller comprehension of the ways in which 
broad social conditions and the particular constitute one another.  He advocates a dialectics of 
resistance whereby the particular refuses to be subsumed into the socially sanctioned status quo 
and thus preserves alternative conceptions of reality that more readily conform to human 
experience than what is projected as being normal.  In one sense, then, Adorno advocates pockets 
of resistance, not unlike the local struggles advocated by Foucault.6  However, he argues that 
these acts of resistance, however fractured or local, always shed light on broad social 
structureson the wholeenabling a more comprehensive understanding of those objective 
                                                
3 The term dialectical has strong associations with Marxs critique of Hegel and his development in Capital of 
progressive dialectical materialism.  The use of speculative as an alternative descriptive term draws attention to the 
different way in which Adorno and Rose appropriated Hegels thought (see Chapters Three and Four).     
4 See especially Rose, Loves Work, and Gillian Rose, Paradiso (London: Menard Press, 1999). 
5 Adorno, Negative Dialectics, p. 203. 
6 Rabinow, The Foucault Reader, p. 174. 
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conditions that facilitate suffering and revealing the poverty of the instrumental means with 
which Enlightenment ideals are pursued under modernity.  In this way, Adorno advocates an 
enlightening of Enlightenment, the juxtaposition of bleak reality against abstract ideals. 
 
Attending to concrete suffering draws our focus away from the abstract delineation of guidelines 
that purport to relieve suffering.  It highlights instead the bodily and emotional experience of 
pain and points to the embodied present rather than an idealised future.  A speculative approach 
insists that attention to the present is accompanied by a consideration of the past, of those (recent 
or more distant) historical factors that shape our present and that also have the power to shape 
the future.  Roses emphasis on mourning acknowledges that unless traumatic experiences are 
worked through, they have the power to negatively influence society; we must work through the 
past in order to secure a more positive future.  Working through operates both on the level of 
those actually-experienced historical traumas and also on a more abstract level, where the threat 
of future trauma shapes our actions and reactions.7  For Rose, working through entails a work of 
mourning, where individuals and communities express their pain and critically reflect upon the 
processes and structures that facilitated their suffering.  It involves coming to know ourselves 
and becoming known by others, through critical self-reflection and communication with those 
inside our own communities as well as between communities.  This deeper comprehension 
prepares the way for constructive political (re)engagement.8  To act politically is to take risk, 
however, and will inevitably involve disappointments and failures.  It requires revisiting those 
                                                
7 This second level of trauma is described by Dominick LaCapra as structural trauma, and has been particularly 
influential in the wake of September 11, 2001, where nations security fears have shaped policy and been 
manipulated for political gain.     
8 Although, as noted in Chapters Four and Five, it is impossible to make clear distinctions between mourning and 
political risk; critical self-reflection is itself a political act, changing perceptions of ourselves and of others. 
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sites of action and evaluating the consequences of those acts; and revising, again and again, our 
laws and institutions in response.  It is not euporia, the easy way; it requires work and struggle. 
 
In sum, speculative political theory advocates a broader and deeper social critique that negotiates 
the break between the universal and particular.  Particular suffering is situated in social context, 
taking into account structures, institutions, decision-making processes, and historical context.  
Unlike liberal (or quasi-liberal) approaches that look primarily to the delineation of abstract 
guidelines for the future, speculative social theory takes seriously the influence that past (and 
ongoing) human experience has to shape future behaviour.  In what follows, I revisit the 
limitations of liberal approaches to suffering, and show how my speculative approach addresses 
those failings.  
Revisiting the Limitations of Modern International Ethics 
In Part One, I identified four key limitations of mainstream (liberal) international political 
thought: its rational, problem-solving nature, its assumption of a strong version of moral 
progress, its neglect of social and historical context, and its failure to consider inner lives.  I 
argued that reflection on suffering in mainstream political theory is impoverished and narrow 
and that this leads to the adoption of problematic responses in an effort to fix those problems 
that present at a given moment.  This operates both at the level of theory and practice: viewing 
global suffering through a narrow problem-solving lens encourages simple responses that may 
perpetuate cycles of violence.  A critical theory in the tradition of the early Frankfurt School 
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addresses these limitations, offering an alternative that offers a more comprehensive 
understanding of suffering in world politics and gestures towards alternative responses that 
engage with particular suffering as well as taking the risk of pursuing a good enough justice. 
Rational and problem-solving 
Liberal approaches to suffering in world politics delineate forward-looking guidelines for living 
on the basis of thought experiments.  Rules are established for the good of all behind a veil of 
ignorance that abstracts from particularity, with the assumption that if these guidelines are 
adhered to, global suffering will radically decrease.9  Political theory in this tradition is applied 
ethics; there is little of the political in such an approach and it tends to exclude such 
considerations as human nature, emotion, or motivation.  Habermasian approaches attempt to 
outline a more embedded response to suffering under modernity, replacing the abstract and top-
down prescription of rules with dialogue among all those affected by a given decision.  However, 
although the aims of a dialogic approach are laudable, the conversation is restricted from the 
outset; participants engage in goal-oriented dialogue that works towards consensus (Habermas) 
or understanding (Benhabib).  Furthermore, like liberalism, it privileges universal and public 
responses to suffering, allowing little room for attention to past experiences or alternative forms 
of expression.   
 
                                                
9 This notion of a veil of ignorance refers specifically to Rawlsian approaches to global justice which explicitly 
adopt this approach, but also, more generally, to liberal human rights, which proffer universal guidelines that apply 
to individuals regardless of their present circumstances or past history, but pay little attention to the move from 
codification to enforcement. 
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A speculative approach to suffering offers an understanding of human beings and their relation to 
their world that is grounded in particularity and allows concrete human experience to feed into a 
conception of the whole.  Unlike a Habermasian approach, which places heavy emphasis on the 
possibility and desirability of reaching a rational consensus or understanding, a speculative 
approach allows for dissensus and acknowledges the impossibility of fully perceiving anothers 
point of view.  It encourages interaction with the radically different10 but does not prescribe the 
form in which this might take place.  The emphasis on knowing and being known in Roses 
work, in particular, implies communication within and between groups that goes far deeper than 
rational debate and the exchange of ideas.  It draws attention to those aspects of human 
experience that are largely excluded from consideration under a liberal or Habermasian 
approach, particularly those more private experiences of bodily pain and emotions that are 
generally deemed by liberal approaches as having no place in a public forum.  This encourages 
alternative forms of verbal interaction, including an emphasis on those forms that allow an 
exploration of the emotional world and allow critical reflection on ones own as well as others 
assumptions about the world.  It also enhances the perception of internal and external 
complexity, including echoes of others seemingly dissimilar perspectives in ones own internal 
dialogue.11   
 
                                                
10 As advocated by Habermasian theorists such as Andrew Linklater, Seyla Benhabib, and Nancy Fraser.  See, for 
example, Benhabib, Situating the Self ; Calhoun (ed.), Habermas and the Public Sphere; and Linklater, The 
Transformation of Political Community.   
11 See, for example, Jeffrey Stevenson Murer, Countering the Violence of Simplification: Embracing Complexity as 
a means of Conflict Resolution and Understanding Collective Identity Formation, Conference paper presented at 
Challenging Cultures of Death, Institute for Feminism and Religion, Trinity College Dublin, November 1-4, 2007.  
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Contra liberal (and, to a lesser extent, Habermasian) approaches to suffering, a speculative 
approach insists that the political be brought back into ethics.  Rose maintains that we must 
actively mourn past traumas and work towards a politically engaged present, taking the risk of 
political action despite the uncertainty of what the consequences may be.  This is a difficult task, 
and involves thinking the universal while remaining grounded in the particular.  In Roses words: 
For politics does not happen when you act on behalf of your own damaged good, but 
when you act, without guarantees, for the good of allthis is to take the risk of the 
universal interest.  Politics in this sense requires representation, the critique of 
representation, and the critique of the critique of representation.12 
The negotiation of the broken middle between law and ethics requires political risk-taking with a 
strong communal element; we should interrogate our institutions and laws at the level of the 
state, but also globally.  Such an approach takes account of both the particular and the universal; 
it uses concrete experiences to challenge broad social processes and takes the risk of pursuing a 
good enough justice through legal and institutional avenues.  It also recognises the need to 
monitor the outcomes of such attempts to inscribe general guidelines, and to revise laws and 
institutions where there are unintended (negative) consequences.   
Assumes moral progress 
Underlying problem-solving responses to suffering in global politics are the assumptions that 
suffering can be ameliorated by a given solution, such as human rights or redistribution, and that 
global (generally, elite) actors are willing and able to enact those solutions.  This strong belief in 
moral learning encourages actors to view the world through a lens that looks for confirmation of 
                                                
12 Rose, Mourning Becomes the Law, p. 62, emphasis in original. 
215 
 
progress, and discourages attention to those aspects of human experience that contradict this 
narrative.  Habermasian critical theory is also built on a strong assumption of moral progress.  It 
maintains that moral learning takes place through dialogue, and that in an ideal world this 
dialogue takes place among all persons affected by decision-making.  In this formulation, the 
force of the better argument leads to a rational consensus on how people might best live together 
in community, and the increasing expansion of dialogic communities leads to greater inclusion 
and emancipation from oppression. 
 
A speculative approach to suffering, in contrast, is aware of the fragility of moral progress.  It 
does not fully discount the possibility that global suffering might decrease, but maintains that 
this is far from inevitable and that any progress that is made towards a less oppressive world 
might just as easily be reversed.  A speculative approach encourages giving voice to concrete 
suffering as a counter to universalist narratives of progress, which often mask domination and 
repression.  Adorno warns that the dominant discourses of progress under modernity ring so loud 
that it is difficult to perceive their untruth and that it is the task of engaged intellectuals to point 
to this untruth by articulating alternative realities.  This resistance to the status quo takes two 
forms: it involves countering broad narratives of progress with attention to particular suffering, 
and, in a double negative move, it also involves countering this articulation of bleak reality with 
utopian hope, the belief that success might be achieved anyway, despite evidence to the 
contrary.13  Thus, although Adorno rejects a strong version of moral learning, he clings to a 
notion of promise.  He does not detail what utopia might look like nor does he prescribe a way of 
achieving it; however, he holds the possibility of progress always before him, both as a counter 
                                                
13 Adorno, Aspects of Hegels Philosophy, p. 41. 
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to despair in view of the bleakness of everyday life, and as a motivator to social criticism and 
political struggle.  Rose also clings to a hope that things might yet get better.  She maintains that 
this life is always already dirempted, that it is irrevocably broken, but that we must take the risk 
of acting politically and strive towards its healing despite the awareness that it can never be fully 
mended.   
Neglects history and social context 
The forward-looking orientation of problem-solving approaches to global suffering means that 
they largely ignore those historical factors that shape the present, focusing instead on outlining 
legal guidelines and social arrangements that might minimise that suffering.  The desire to 
delineate universally applicable guidelines means that individual and communal actors are 
essentially stripped of their particular histories and embeddedness in social and economic 
structures.  Habermasian approaches are more grounded in social context, in that they seek the 
inclusion of those actors who are affected by political decisions in the dialogue that precedes 
such decision-making.  However, the belief that the force of the better argument will lead to a 
rational consensus implies that material, social, and historical considerations are at best 
secondary and need not exercise undue influence on the decision-making process.   
 
A speculative approach to suffering, in contrast, insists upon the situation of individuals and 
communities in social and historical context.  Attention to particularity is essential; this sheds 
light on broad social processes.  Adorno argues that we must critically reflect on the social 
conditions that allow suffering to take place.  In his writings on Auschwitz, especially, he 
emphasises his belief that what took place did not indicate an absolute break with what went 
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before (as, for example much of Holocaust theology and social theory posits),14 but rather that 
there was some degree of continuity with that which preceded it.  In his reflections on the notion 
of coming to terms with the horrors of Auschwitz, he argues that attention to particular suffering 
must shed light on those objective social and political conditions that facilitated its planning 
and execution.  Only with critical reflection and increased comprehension might deep social 
changes begin to take placethose changes that must take place if such atrocities are not to 
recur.15   
 
Roses emphasis on the work of mourning also points to the need for attention to those historical 
factors that have shaped the present and, in particular, to historical traumas that are wielding 
social and political influence in communities.  There is a strong tendency to seek simple 
explanations for suffering which, in turn, encourage simple responses.  However, simple 
explanations tend to involve pointing the finger of blamescapegoatingrather than 
encouraging critical reflection on ones own failings as a community of actors and those 
structural or institutional arrangements that may have facilitated the trauma.  It also encourages 
revenge-seeking behaviours, which only perpetuate cycles of violence and despair.16  Rather than 
following the easy way, Rose argues that we must engage in a difficult work of mourning that 
critically reflects on the ways in which we are implicated in the disasters of modernity, and that 
seeks to revise, again and again, those assumptions, conventions, and laws that exclude and 
oppress. 
                                                
14 For a discussion of this kind of literature, see Robert Fine and Charles Turner (eds.), Social Theory after the 
Holocaust (Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 2000).  
15 Adorno, What does coming to terms with the past mean? 
16 See the discussion on acting out following trauma in Chapter Five. 
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Neglects inner lives 
As well as neglecting social and historical context, broadly liberal approaches to suffering 
occlude attention to individuals inner lives.  Individuals are stripped of much of what makes 
them human; they are conceived of as disembodied rational beings without history or emotion.  
Habermasian approaches have a more embedded account of moral progress; however, the 
emphasis on rational dialogue means that those aspects of human experience that are beyond 
words have little or no place in their account of suffering.  Where bodily and emotional pain are 
made central, for example, in Linklaters recent work on harm, it is not valued in itself, as a 
counter to narratives of progress or as a way of illuminating the limitations of existing social 
arrangements.  Instead, it is instrumentalisedtransformed into useful knowledge that can be 
used to motivate forward-looking, problem-solving action.   
 
A speculative approach, in contrast, maintains that bodily and emotional experiences of 
individuals must be given voice, realising that where there has been trauma, narration will take 
time and struggle, and that much of what has taken place may be inexpressible, particularly at 
first.  It also realises that if these experiences are not worked through, they may prevent 
constructive political reengagement or prompt negative responses as simple explanations are 
sought for the pain suffered.   
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Revisiting Poststructuralism 
Much of a speculative critique of mainstream and Habermasian approaches to suffering has 
strong parallels with a poststructural critique of modern (liberal) ethics.  Where liberal 
approaches emphasise the delineation of universal guidelines that would fix contemporary 
problems, poststructural approaches urge attention to the particular and are wary of claims that 
would mend the brokenness of modernity.  Where liberal approaches emphasise rationality, 
poststructural approaches point to those aspects of human experience that cannot be measured or 
predicted such as bodily and emotional pain (and pleasure).  And where liberal approaches are 
forward-looking, poststructural approaches often look to the past and stress a refusal to forget 
those historical traumas that point to the limitations of particular conception of modernity.  All 
these poststructural critiques of modern thought have been echoed in my own critique of modern 
international ethics and my critique has been enriched by borrowing from poststructural thought.  
However, alongside these commonalities, there are also stark differences between speculative 
and poststructural thought.  Indeed, Rose reserves her harshest critique for poststructuralism, 
which she deems melancholic and work-shy; and, conversely, poststructural thinkers find the 
speculative emphasis on working through totalising and depoliticising.17   
 
This thesis argues that poststructural thought disrupts those established hierarchies that 
characterise the liberal status quo (such as universal and particular, public and private) and ends 
up privileging the formerly marginal side of the pair.  An emphasis on the particular and the 
                                                
17 I am grateful to Melanie Lewis, of the University of Manitoba, for engaging so spiritedly with Chapter Four of 
this thesis and for helping me to understand the profound gulf between Rose and Derridas notions of mourning.   
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private becomes valued as an end in itself, rather than feeding back into reflections on the 
universal and (communal) working through.  A speculative approach to suffering, in contrast, 
argues that there must be a dialectical interplay between universal and particular; one cannot 
trump the other.  Particular suffering must be given voice; this is in part for the health of the 
individual who has suffered but it is also for the good of society, in that it sheds light on those 
conditions that passively allow or actively facilitate particular suffering.  Speculative and 
poststructural approaches to political thought also differ significantly in the ways in which they 
respond to historical trauma.  In poststructural thought, there is a refusal to work through the past 
for fear of domesticating the traumatic real and for depoliticising those who have suffered.  In 
contrast, from a speculative perspective, a refusal to engage in a proper work of mourning is 
likely to depoliticise: it could prevent those who have suffered from constructive social and 
political reengagement in life or encourage the adoption of simple meaning-making narratives 
that prompt demonisation and destructive political action.  This thesis argues that contra 
poststructuralism, working through is not a totalising process that encourages the creation of a 
coherent, linear narrative in order to promote closure in the wake of trauma.  On the contrary, 
working through is a process that will never be complete; trauma can never fully be worked 
through or fully mended.   
 
In a discussion of working through in relation to the Holocaust, Saul Friedlander helpfully 
contrasts his notion of working through with a deconstructionist approach, saying that a 
deconstructionist approach would insist upon the impossibility of establishing any direct 
reference to some aspects at least of the concrete reality that we call the Shoah and that it would 
exclude any ongoing quest for a stable historical representation.  He goes on to advocate a 
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notion of working through that struggles towards a more truthful historical account of the Shoah 
whilst simultaneously refusing a naïve historical positivism.18  Such an account would reach 
towards a historical narrative but also includes commentary that disrupts that narrative, 
introducing alternative voices (such as those of the victims) and interpretations of events and 
resisting closure by continually interrogating the evidence.  Friedlanders account of working 
through is very much a speculative account: drawing on particular voices to shed light upon (as 
well as disrupt) a broader historical narrative.  In advocating this approach, he offers an 
alternative to the primary modes of interpretation by Jewish historians which veer between 
hasty ideological closure and a paralysis of attempts at global interpretation.19  He also points 
to the role of literature and art in keeping concrete historical particulars alive in order to prevent 
forgetting and forestall premature closure.20   
 
One of the limitations of this thesis is that, for the sake of clarity, it makes broad generalisations 
that do not always hold true for individual thinkers who would categorise themselves as 
poststructural in theoretical orientation.  While there is a strong tendency in much of 
poststructural thought to focus on the particular and the personal rather than considering the 
universal, this is not always the case.  Indeed, Butlers work comes quite close to Roses in her 
use of Hegel and in her recent writings on mourning.  For example, in a discussion of the risk of 
negotiating the universal and the particular, Butler, like Rose, draws on Hegel to critique the 
                                                
18 Friedlander, Trauma and Transference, p. 131. 
19 Friedlander, Trauma and Transference, pp. 129-130. 
20 Friedlander, Trauma and Transference, p. 134. 
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abstract universality ushered in by Kantian formalism.21  She argues that for Hegel, [n]ot only 
does universality undergo revision in time, but its successive revisions and dissolutions are 
essential to what it is.  The propositional sense of the copula must be replaced with the 
speculative one.22  A speculative understanding of universality thus has revisability at its core.  
Furthermore, this understanding of universality has profound political implications; it encourages 
the wielding of universal categories by those who have been excluded by them, thereby forcing 
their revision.  Butlers insistence on critical self-reflection in the wake of extreme violence also 
has clear links with Adornos writings on coming to terms with the past in the wake of the 
Holocaust.23   
 
In sum, speculative thought offers an approach to suffering that differs substantially from both 
liberal or quasi-liberal and poststructural approaches.  Unlike liberal approaches, it does not too 
quickly reach for universal guidelines in the hope of solving the worlds ills, but conversely, 
unlike poststructural approaches, it does not shy away from taking the risk of political action on 
behalf of the many in the hope of a good enough justice.  Instead, it insists on a dialectical 
interplay between the universal and the particular.  It allows space for mourning and critical 
reflection, for sitting with the stories of particular suffering, in the belief that this will illuminate 
our perceptions of what might be attempted and achieved.  It believes that inaugurated mourning 
allows those who have suffered to know themselves but also to be known by others and, in this 
way, to challenge those socially-accepted arrangements and practices that facilitate suffering.  
                                                
21 Judith Butler, Restaging the Universal: Hegemony and the Limits of Formalism, in Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau 
and Slavoj iek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left (London: Verso, 
2000), pp. 11-43. 
22 Butler, Restaging the Universal, p. 24. 
23 See Adorno, What does coming to terms with the past mean?; Butler, Precarious Life, pp. 1-18.  
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Above all, it insists on a politics characterised by work and struggle, a politics that asks hard 
questions of ourselves and of others, and that takes political risks, knowing that these risks will 
never mend the inevitable brokenness of living in community, but acting anyway, in the hope 
that some progress might be made, however fragile.   
Further Applications of Speculative Thought 
Neither Adorno or Rose has exerted much influence in the world of international political theory, 
although both have been influential in shaping the thought of scholars from a wide range of 
discipline areas, including post-Holocaust studies, social theory, theology, cultural studies, and 
education.  There are aspects of both their writings that render them inaccessible or unattractive 
to political theorists; the prose of both thinkers is (at times self-indulgently) difficult and requires 
persistence and commitment to unravel, and neither offers a simple or readily-grasped 
perspective on how one might address political problems.  Both Adorno and Rose are also 
somewhat controversial figures; Adorno stands accused of cultural elitism, particularly by his 
postmodern critics,24 and Roses polemical style, when directed against particular thinkers or 
styles of thinking, can be less than nuanced in its critique.25  However, this thesis argues that 
                                                
24 Collins, Uncommon Cultures. 
25 For example, as we saw in Chapter Four, Roses critique of Adorno portrays his reading of Hegel as much less 
considered than it actually is.  She maintains that he inherited much of the left-Hegelian misreading of Hegel, which 
borrowed the method rather than the content of Hegels thought.  However, it is clear from his three studies on 
Hegel that Adorno found much of value in the substance of Hegels thought; his ideas on absolute spirit, for 
example, provided inspiration for Adornos negative dialectics and, in particular, for his notion of utopian hope as a 
negative counter to bleak reality.  Indeed, Adorno perceived Hegel as a revolutionary thinker, and in many ways his 
thought (and the thought of the early Frankfurt School more generally) can be perceived as a return to Hegel from 
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both Adorno and Rose offer a way of thinking that powerfully addresses the shortcomings of 
liberal and poststructural approaches to suffering in global politics, and gestures towards an 
alternative way of thinking and being with political import.   
 
Speculative thought offers an approach to suffering in world politics that falls outside ethics in 
Geuss terminology.  It does not prescribe guidelines for living that answer the question What 
ought we to do?  Nor does it privilege a type of knowledge that focuses attention on those 
aspects of human behaviour that can be observed and measured.  Instead, it offers a different way 
of thinking and being that has strong implications for political practice.  At the core of a 
speculative approach is an insistence on struggle: struggle to reach a deeper and more 
contextualised understanding of political problems, struggle to work through actual historical 
trauma, and struggle to engage politically, challenging those laws and social arrangements that 
marginalise and oppress.  Speculative thought offers a theoretical interventionchallenging 
liberal and poststructural accounts of suffering under modernitybut it also has powerful 
implications for political practice.  
 
In the previous chapter, I applied the speculative notions of mourning and political risk to the 
idea of working through trauma in the wake of violence and gestured towards the forms that this 
working through might take, including creative expression, storytelling, critical self-reflection, 
and political activism.  I argued that rather than seeing suffering and trauma as problems to be 
mended, as liberal and Habermasian theorists tend to do, we should view them as opportunities 
                                                                                                                                                       
Marx.  Roses writings on poststructuralism, too, are polemical and overstate the differences between her work and 
the work of some poststructural thought.  The notions of political risk in her work and the political in some 
poststructural writings, for example, are more similar than she might admit.   
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to learn about ourselves and the society in which we live.  As iek points out, trauma points us 
to the real, to the dark side of modernity that we prefer to ignore.26  Poststructural theorists reject 
the notion of working through, arguing that this domesticates the experience of trauma, making it 
palatable and unchallenging.  However, a speculative notion of working through argues that the 
disasters of modernity can inspire critical reflection and political action, both of which are part of 
the process of working through and the (always failed) attempt to comprehend the 
incomprehensible.   
 
In the remainder of this chapter, I gesture towards two other ways in which a speculative 
approach might influence practice.  First, I apply the notion of mourning and political risk to the 
political problem of refugees, who are perhaps the most vulnerable group in global politics but 
who are subjected to inhuman treatment by the international community, who isolate them in 
great warehouses or make asylum-seeking in a host country extraordinarily difficult.  I argue that 
a speculative approach offers an alternative way forward, focusing particularly on notions of 
inaugurated mourning and political risk.  Second, I step back from those specific political 
problems that Rose terms the disasters of modernity and consider instead the influence that a 
speculative approach might have on society in general.  I focus primarily on education, which 
Adorno singles out as being the most important site of potential political transformation, and 
more specifically on storytelling in the classroom in (early) childhood education.  I argue that 
many of the limitations in political thought and practice have their roots in a much more general 
societal tendency towards unreflective acceptance of the status quo and denigration of the other.  
                                                
26 iek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real. 
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These might be mitigated to some extent if there was a cultural shift such that individuals learned 
to reflect critically upon their own and their communities social and political assumptions.   
Refugees and Asylum-Seekers 
The position of refugees and asylum-seekers in world politics is extremely vulnerable; although 
they are technically accorded rights by virtue of their humanity under the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, as stateless citizens they are effectively unable to claim these rights.27  They 
are accorded more specific rights under the Refugee Convention and Protocol, including the right 
to seek asylum in a place of safety where there is a well-founded fear of persecution in their 
country of origin.28  In the post-World War II context, the Convention held some persuasive 
power in the West, in part because of a shared sense of vulnerability in the wake of war.  
However, in recent years, the right of refugees to seek resettlement has been resisted in discourse 
and practice and refugees are often warehoused in substandard temporary accommodations, 
where they are effectively stripped of their humanity, or subjected to adversarial and traumatic 
asylum-seeking processes in countries where they are made to feel unwanted.   
 
In the post-Cold War environment, the right of refugees to seek asylum under international law 
has often been re-interpreted by Western states as their right to intervene in crises where large 
                                                
27 See Schick, Beyond Rules, on the tensions inherent in the language of the Universal Declaration, which uses the 
languages of both cosmopolitan and social liberalism, one of which privileges the individual and the other of which 
privileges the state. 
28 Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, (Convention adopted 28 July, 1951, entered into force 
22 April, 1954; Protocol adopted 31 January, 1967, entered into force 4 October, 1967), for full text see:  
http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b66c2aa10.pdf (last accessed 4 March 4, 2008). 
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groups of people are at risk for economic or political reasons.29  These interventions frequently 
address the problem of displaced persons by creating enormous warehouses in which they might 
find temporary short- (or, more often, medium-) term accommodation.30  These designated sites 
of protection are anything but safe for its residents; they are outside the scope of the Convention 
(being temporary) and thus refugees are accorded few rights.31  The experience of living in 
such an environment is traumatic in itself; these environments maximise almost every negative 
social factor that fosters illness, such as chronic unemployment and unremitting violence.32  In 
the West, however, this solution to the problem of displaced persons is politically more astute 
than allowing them to seek asylum and resettlement elsewhere.  Warehousing refugees keeps 
suffering at bay and prevents the traumatic real from impinging on our comfortable, privileged 
lives.  Furthermore, domestic politics are increasingly characterised by a fear of others, a fear 
that politicians play on in order to engender support and that effectively trumps obligations under 
international law.  Where refugees are accorded temporary asylum in a host country, they are 
required to undergo an enormously complicated and adversarial process as they seek the right to 
remain and to rebuild their lives in a place of safety.  Despite the right to asylum under 
international law, this is regularly violated by states who return asylum seekers to their home 
countries where there is continuing danger of persecution.33   
                                                
29 Vanessa Pupavac, Refugees in the Sick Role: Stereotyping and Eroding Refugee Rights, New Issues in 
Refugee Research, Research Paper No. 128 (August 2006), p. 10. This article can be accessed online at 
http://www.unhcr.org/publ/RESEARCH/44e198712.pdf (last accessed 4 March, 2008). 
30 Smith, Warehousing Refugees. 
31 Marilyn Achiron, A Timeless Treaty under Attack, Refugees Vol. 2, No. 123 (2001), pp. 13-14. 
32 Mollica, Healing Invisible Wounds, p. 227.  In January 1990, before the Site 2 refugee camp on the Thai-
Cambodian border was dismantled, Mollica received a letter from a Khmer relief worker that indicated that the 
ongoing confinement, corruption, and violence in the camp eclipsed the violence of the Pol Pot period as a major 
trauma and was creating serious mental health problems in a complete denial of the rights or autonomy of its 
inhabitants (p. 225).   
33 Achiron, A Timeless Treaty under Attack, pp. 6-29.   
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Those refugees who are granted the right to remain in a host country are viewed by their 
advocates as traumatised victims in need of professional help rather than as autonomous political 
actors exercising their rights under law.  Rights are wielded by professional bodies on their 
behalf, rather than by those who are suffering from statelessness and insecurity, both 
internationally, by bodies such as the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, and 
nationally, by bodies such as the Refugee Council in Britain.  The stereotyping of refugees as 
traumatised victims is in part due to a desire to counter the popular perception of refugees as 
self-seeking and opportunist; however, despite these noble intentions, it is extremely problematic 
and harms rather than helps refugee interest.34  Pupavac warns that refugees are disempowered 
and depoliticised by their relegation to a sick role and cautions against an overemphasis on 
individuals emotional suffering by refugee organisations.35   
 
The professional treatment of refugees who have suffered trauma is generally characterised by its 
narrow focus on the horrific events of a trauma story and the prescription of psychotropic drugs 
and a refusal to consider their broader social needs or to support self-healing.  This arrogant and 
externally-imposed approach to trauma sufferers ignores the tremendous resources of those who 
have suffered to help themselves, part of which requires integration into communities and the 
opportunity to rebuild self-respect through the engagement in productive work.   
 
                                                
34 Pupavac, Refugees in the Sick Role, pp. 1-24.   
35 Pupavac, Refugees in the Sick Role, pp. 20-24. 
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However, a serious engagement with refugees traumatic experiences need not entail their 
relegation to the sick role and consequent depoliticisation.  Mollica, a trauma practitioner who 
has worked with refugees for decades, argues that refugees must be empowered to engage in 
self-help practices.  His emphasis on the notion of self-healing has strong affinities with a 
speculative approach, which emphasises the need for refugees to work through their losses.  A 
speculative approach to trauma prioritises attention to emotional and physical trauma, but does 
so in order to promote a working through that has at its centre a reflection on broader social 
processes and political (re)engagement.  Roses notion of mourning and political risk is 
extremely useful in conceptualising how these losses might be worked through.  The different 
dimensions discussed in the previous chapter are appropriate herecreative expression, 
storytelling, and critical self-reflection; these are all critical in enabling political agency in those 
who have suffered, be it as the result of traumatic experiences in their home country or as the 
result of forced displacement to a foreign land, far from established networks of social support.  
Roses emphasis on the communal aspect of working through is also crucial where individuals 
have experienced such horrific displacement.36   
 
Honig argues that foreigners, including refugees, disrupt the status quo and that this disturbance 
can prompt rethinking and change.   
Legitimation theorists worry that alienation can be a source of civic cynicism and 
withdrawal.  It can.  But it can also be a source of civic activism, unrest, and protest.  
                                                
36 However, in Britain, official dispersal policies are making it increasingly difficult for refugees to access support in 
a community of others from their country of origin.  Pupavac argues that these policies make the professionalisation 
of support even more pervasive, as refugees no longer have the same access to informal support from existing 
communities.  Pupavac, Refugees in the Sick Role, pp. 18-19. 
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The positive side of alienation is that it marks a gap in legitimation, a space that is 
held open for future refoundings, augmentation, and amendment.37   
Alienation and displacement provide an opportunity for refugees to engage in political protest 
and to challenge the status quo.  Refugees should be encouraged to engage in a work of self-
healing and supported in that working through, in order to facilitate political reengagement that 
challenges those practices that dehumanise and depoliticise them.  
 
The experience of refugees in world politics, like the experience of trauma, disturbs the 
mainstream liberal and critical Habermasian belief in moral progress under modernity.  It points 
to persistent suffering, despite attempts to enshrine human rights in law and to rationally 
persuade individuals and communities of the inalterable value of humanity.  Both disasters of 
modernity point to the dark side of so-called progress, to the persistent disregard for human life 
despite Enlightenment values.  The task of a critical intellectual is to enlighten Enlightenment, 
holding up these failures of lived experience against Enlightenment ideals in the hope that this 
will prompt reflection and change.  In the next section, I take a step back from specific disasters 
of modernity in order to discuss the role of education in promoting a different way of thinking 
and being in the world. 
Education 
Education is another arena in which political risk should be attempted.  Adorno maintains that 
schooling, especially early education, has the greatest potential to effect change that might 
                                                
37 Honig, Democracy and the Foreigner, p. 31 
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reduce the likelihood of Auschwitz recurring: in the midst of the status quo it alone has the 
ability, if it is conscious of it, to work directly toward the debarbarization of humanity.38  As we 
have seen, he insists that Auschwitz was not an aberration in an otherwise unproblematic march 
toward an increasingly humanitarian world, but that it was in some sense the logical outcome of 
broader societal processes that allowed the barbarism to continue for so long and with such 
horrifying results.  In Education After Auschwitz, Adorno argues that the possibility of 
transforming the objective political and societal conditions that contributed to the genocide is 
extremely limited but that some progress might be made in the subjective realmnamely, 
through education.39   
 
Adornos approach to education is very much outside ethics in that it does not aim to instil 
universal values about, for example, the equal worth of all human beings.40  On the contrary, 
Adorno believes that a problem-solving approach is likely to be counterproductive, for three 
reasons.  First, he maintains that externally-imposed beliefs and duties are unlikely to have much 
influence on those individuals who might commit or condone oppression, torture, or genocide of 
those they consider to be their inferiors.  Second, he argues that an instrumental appeal to a 
common humanity is likely to be perceived as untrue, as being a means to an end rather than a 
truth in itself.  Third, he argues that the prescription of rules and norms that must be adhered to 
encourages blind obedience of authority in the place of the exercise of reason and the 
                                                
38 Theodor W. Adorno, Taboos on the Teaching Vocation, in Theodor W. Adorno, Critical Models: Interventions 
and Catchwords trans. Henry W. Pickford (New York: Colombia University Press, 2005), p. 190. 
39 Adorno, Education After Auschwitz.  
40Unlike the cosmopolitan  education advocated in Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, Learning Beyond Frontiers, in Tim 
Dunne and Nicholas J. Wheeler, Human Rights in Global Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 
pp. 303-328.  
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development of ones own conscience and that this was one of the major subjective factors that 
facilitated the Nazi genocide.41  Rather than the delineation of rules or the construction of 
dialogic communities in which consensus reigns, then, Adorno advocates an education toward 
critical self-reflection42 with two dimensions: childhood education and general intellectual and 
cultural enlightenment.   
 
At the core of a speculative education toward critical self-reflection is a countering of 
indifference towards painhardnessand indifference towards otherscoldness.  Hardness is 
bred through the educational system, which does not allow the expression of pain or anxiety, and 
is self-perpetuating: Whoever is hard with himself earns the right to be hard with others as well 
and avenges himself for the pain whose manifestations he was not allowed to show and had to 
repress.43  This cycle of hardness with ourselves and others must be halted; we must be made 
aware of the cultivation of hardness in the educational system and its effects, and counter it by 
allowing the freer expression of pain and anxiety, both in the classroom and in society more 
generally.  We must learn to feel our own pain and to communicate it with others.  We must also 
learn to listen to others stories and to face those senseless horrors that take place both within our 
communities and worldwide; if we do not, they are sure to recur.  Coldness, a profound 
indifference toward all those except those with whom they have close (often self-interested) ties, 
is another psychological characteristic that is prevalent under modernity.  The reigning principle 
of the status quo is to look out for ones own interests first and foremost; this was put to the test 
again and again by the Nazi regime and it rarely failed.  Once again, Adorno advocates 
                                                
41 Adorno, Education After Auschwitz, pp. 192-195. 
42 Adorno, Education After Auschwitz, p. 193. 
43 Adorno, Education After Auschwitz, p. 198. 
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enlightenment in the face of coldness, making society aware of its coldness and of the horrific 
consequences it engenders.44  This is the first step towards being able to love, which is the 
antithesis of coldness, but which cannot be imposed from above. 
 
Adornos ideas on education have powerful commonalities with more recent psychological and 
educational writings on critical reflection and storytelling in the classroom.  In what follows, I 
discuss two practical educational programmes that aim to develop critical self-reflection in the 
classroom.  Both focus on the countering of emotional hardness and coldness towards others.  
They come from very different educational contexts: the first programme was developed in 
Israel, in part to help students cope with living in a situation of ongoing trauma, and the second 
was developed in the United States, where the challenges to students emotional health are less 
traumatic, but no less real. 
 
Moses-Hrushovski argues that the classroom is a powerful forum for shaping societies attitudes 
and reactions to adverse events.45  Drawing on her own work as a psychoanalyst and educator of 
teachers and guidance counsellors, as well as her work with children, she advocates a shift in 
atmosphere in the classroom, so that students learning experiences take place in an environment 
of trust rather than fear.  She argues that teachers need to communicate appreciation and 
affirmation rather than suspicion and disappointment; these attitudes create an environment in 
which students can express their creativity and explore new ideas without fear of being shut 
down.  Where students are humiliated by their teachers or fellow students, they often react by 
                                                
44 Adorno, Education after Auschwitz, pp. 200-204. 
45 Moses-Hrushovski, Grief and Grievance, pp. 172-186. 
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adopting deployment strategies.  However, where students feel able to make mistakes without 
fear of being belittled and to express and explore their emotions creatively, they become 
acquainted with different aspects of themselves and of others.  In this environment, students 
learn to feel less threatened by complexity and ambiguity and increasingly comfortable with the 
co-existence of multiple perspectives internally and externally.  In speculative terms, they are 
better able to know and be known, and thus to engage positively in community.   
 
One of Moses-Hrushovskis colleagues, Dvorah Koubovi, has developed a programme of 
therapeutic teaching that trains teachers to become increasingly sensitive to the inner lives of 
their students and may be used in the classroom to encourage emotional health and well-being.  
The programme uses literature or religious narratives as a vehicle for teaching children about 
emotions and pointing to different ways of thinking and being.  The teacher conducts discussions 
of the characters feelings and the ways in which they were expressed; this helps children to 
begin exploring the emotional world without necessarily having to share their own complex and, 
at times, raw emotions.46  In this way, children are given a forum in which they can mourn their 
own losses through the exploration of others losses.  They have permission to listen and reflect 
upon others traumatic experiences in a safe environment, and to talk with their classmates about 
how that makes them feel and, if they wish, they may share their own memories in turn.  They 
are able to engage in the work of mourning, to sit with their complex emotions and process them 
                                                
46 Note that this programme was developed for use in schools in Israel, where there is extensive ongoing trauma and 
heightened anxiety. 
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aloud, knowing that they are not alone in their grief and learning to connect their individual 
experiences with others similar experiences.47   
 
David Schaafsma is another educator who has developed a programme to encourage critical 
reflection in schools.48  He argues that most academic writing aims to develop one persuasive 
and singular voice,49 crafting rational arguments that leave little room for the exploration of 
individuals or groups complex inner worlds.  As a counter to this, he maintains that teachers 
should allow space for students to tell their own stories; stories that challenge students 
commonly held perceptions about themselves and others and that encourage tolerance of 
complexity and ambiguity.  He maintains that storytelling and creative narrative allows the 
expression (and assimilation) of alternative viewpoints and that this points to alternative 
worldsto the utopian hope that things might yet be different.  In a project entitled Write for 
your life, Schaafsma and colleagues encouraged student teachers to write about their 
experiences in order to explore the role that storytelling might play in the classroom.  Students 
wrote personal stories about health and well-being, which were expressed in a variety of forms, 
including poetry, film, drama, and creative narrative.  In doing so, Schaafsma asked his students 
to move beyond their silences and to use the opportunity to express those feelings and explore 
those aspects of themselves that they may not otherwise have done.  In speculative terms, he 
found that as well as acting as a counter to the status quo, in allowing for the expression of 
                                                
47 Moses-Hrushovski, Grief and Grievance, pp. 181-182.  See also Ofra Ayalon, Is Death a Proper Subject for the 
Classroom? Comments on Death Education, International Journal of Social Psychiatry, Vol. 25 (1979), pp. 252-
257. 
48 David Schaafsma, Things We Cannot Say: Writing for your Life and Stories in English Education, Theory into 
Practice Vol. 35, No. 2 (1996), p. 110. 
49 Schaafsma, Things We Cannot Say, p. 112. 
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emotion and the opportunity to know and be known, the exercise also inspired students to reflect 
on broader social processes and motivated social action and political risk.50   
Towards a Speculative International Political Thought? 
This thesis has made the case for a speculative approach to thinking about suffering in world 
politics.  A speculative approach offers a way of negotiating the universal and the particular, 
public and private, without privileging one category over the other.  The persistence of suffering 
in world politics requires making space for those who have suffered to give voice to their pain.  
This focus on particular suffering then feeds back into broader social categories: it facilitates a 
work of mourning, which in turn enables constructive social and political engagement.   
 
Speculative international political thought, then, does not prescribe particular courses of action in 
answer to the question What ought we to do?  Instead, it proffers a different way of thinking 
and of being in the world with political import, both in terms of how we might think about and 
respond to particular disasters of modernity but also, more broadly, in terms of our approach to 
education and culture.  As we have seen, a speculative approach speaks to those who have 
personally suffered specific historical traumas, in the wake of discrete or ongoing political 
                                                
50 Schaafsma found that when he used the model in middle-school classrooms, students used the opportunity to 
explore health issues such as teenage pregnancy and that this spurred them on to socially-aware involvement in the 
community: the girls engaged with public health professionals and other community resources in a number of ways, 
and raised money through the production and sale of greeting cards for an area shelter. Most of them, middle school 
students, had themselves been or were now pregnant. Their inquiry was relevant to their lives, was conducted in part 
through writing and the study of literature, and for many of them involved various forms of social action. (Things 
We Cannot Say, p. 112).  
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violence, natural disaster, or displacement and exile.  It also speaks to those who have 
experienced structural or second-hand trauma, including those whose lives have been shaped by 
a history of oppression (such as those indigenous peoples whose lands and ways of life were 
taken from them) or the inter-generational transmission of trauma (such as the descendents of 
Holocaust survivors).  A speculative approach emphasises working through in response to such 
traumas: a dialectical process that requires critical reflection on ones own (and others) 
particular pain as well as reflection on concrete historical reality and the social processes that 
facilitated the trauma(s).  This process of working through such pain is never complete; however, 
it encourages those who have suffered to struggle to know better themselves and the 
communities of which they are a part and also to make their stories known: to enlighten 
Enlightenment and point to the bleak realities that are hidden by its discourses of progress.  The 
process of working through thus involves political risk, both in terms of acting politically when 
the outcome is unknown and taking the risk of the universal, of pursuing a good enough justice 
on the behalf of many that will inevitably need revisiting and revising. 
 
As well as offering an alternative way of thinking about trauma in global politics, a speculative 
approach also offers a different approach to education.  It advocates an education towards 
critical self-reflection; education that attempts not to instil absolute values, but rather to cultivate 
a different way of thinking about ourselves and others.  Such an education would attempt to 
counter the development of hardness and coldness by encouraging the exploration of childrens 
own emotions as well as insight into how others might feel through storytelling and literature.  It 
would also encourage a questioning, reflective outlook on the world, one that refuses to hold fast 
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to a particular point of view, but is open to revision and challenge from other perspectives.  A 
speculative education will not change the world.  However, in Moses-Hrushovskis words:  
When individuals and groups can keep in their awareness opposing ideas and 
paradoxes, to forestall premature closure; when they can change terror and violence into 
cultural discourse and tolerance, and free themselves from the unconscious defence 
mechanisms and deployment that fan fanaticism and work against development, there is 
hope that change will occur in the direction of reconciliation and peace.51  
A speculative approach to world politics is not an easy path.  On the contrary, it involves 
constant struggle and inevitable failures along the way.  However, it holds always before it the 
promise that things might yet get better and maintains that we cannot give up the attempt to work 
towards a good enough justice, a justice that is always to come.  
                                                
51 Moses-Hrushovski, Grief and Grievance, p. 161. 
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